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TAX CONTROVERSIES: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (4TH ED.) 
2020 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT 
Leandra Lederman & Stephen W. Mazza 
This Cumulative Supplement to the Fourth Edition of the Tax Controversies: Practice and 
Procedure casebook replaces previous updates. It updates the casebook through July 1, 2020. 
After three brief overviews of recent major legislative changes since the Fourth Edition of the 
casebook was published, this Supplement provides more detailed updates, organized by chapter 
and page number of the casebook.  
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act: A Brief Overview 
On March, 27, 2020, President Trump signed into law the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). The CARES 
Act is primarily an economic relief package, but it does contain several tax provisions. For 
example, the legislation seeks to support small businesses by granting an employment tax credit 
equal to 50 percent of qualified wages paid to employees who are not working due to a full or 
partial cessation of business. CARES Act § 2301. The Act also grants recovery rebates for 
individual taxpayers, which represent advance refunds of credits against 2020 tax liability. Id. § 
2201. Nothing in the CARES Act directly affects the procedural rules discussed in the casebook. 
Taxpayer First Act of 2019: A Brief Overview 
On July 1, 2019, President Trump signed into law the Taxpayer First Act of 2019, Pub. L. 
No. 116-25, 133 Stat. 981 (2019) (the “Taxpayer First Act”). The bill may be best known for a 
provision that ultimately was not included in the enacted law—codification of the Free File 
program, potentially preventing the IRS from developing its own free software. See Jad 
Chamseddine, Senate Clears IRS Reform Bill for Trump’s Signature, 163 TAX NOTES FED. 1886, 
1886-87 (2019). However, even without that provision, the Taxpayer First Act contains four 
titles and over 40 sections, virtually all of which focus on aspects of tax procedure. Individual 
changes that affect the material in the casebook are discussed below in connection with the 
updates to Chapters 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 14, 15, and 17. The discussion here provides a brief, broad 
overview, as many of the individual sections are too specific to warrant individual discussion in a 
casebook. 
Title I of the Taxpayer First Act is entitled “Putting Taxpayers First.” It includes 
provisions titled “Independent Appeals Process,” “Improved [IRS] Service,” “Sensible 
Enforcement,” “Organizational Modernization,” and “Other Provisions.” Title II is called “21st 
Century IRS.” It generally focuses on IRS cybersecurity and its electronic systems, with the 
sections it includes grouped under five subtitles.  
Title III, “Miscellaneous Provisions” contains three subtitles: “Reform of Laws 
Governing Internal Revenue Service Employees,” “Provisions Relating to Exempt 
Organizations,” and “Revenue Provision.” Title IV is brief, simply providing for computation of 
the budgetary effects of the law. For further reading that summarizes the principal provisions of 
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the Act, see Special Study on Taxpayer First Act of 2019, THOMSON REUTERS TAX &
ACCOUNTING (June 17, 2019), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/news/special-study-on-taxpayer-
first-act-of-2019/. 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017: A Brief Overview 
As is well known, on December 22, 2017, the President signed into law the legislation 
known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (the “2017 Tax 
Act”). By that time, the fourth edition of the casebook was already in press. The 2017 Tax Act 
included significant changes to the individual and corporate tax, as well as to the rules relating to 
U.S. corporations with overseas operations. However, the 2017 Tax Act included only minor 
revisions to rules relating to tax practice and procedure. A couple of changes worthy of note are 
mentioned briefly in the material below relating to page 722 in Chapter 14. 
In addition, several of the substantive tax law changes in the 2017 Tax Act have an 
indirect effect on some of the material in the casebook. For example, the 2017 Tax Act increased 
the standard deduction and eliminated the personal exemption for tax years 2018 through 2025. 
See I.R.C. §§ 63(c) (standard deduction); 151(d)(5) (personal exemption). Those revisions also 
affect the return-filing threshold for individual taxpayers, mentioned on page 97 in Chapter 3. 
During the 2018 through 2025 time period, the filing thresholds for single individuals and 
married couples filing jointly are based on the applicable standard deduction amount, rather than 




The Taxpayer First Act of 2019 (the “Taxpayer First Act”) includes several provisions 
that envision an overhaul of some of the IRS’s operations. Depending upon the proposals 
released by the Treasury Department, we may see the first major set of changes to the IRS 
structure since the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (“IRS 
Reform Act”) was enacted.  
The Taxpayer First Act requires the Secretary of the Treasury to submit a written IRS 
reorganization plan to Congress by September 30, 2020. Taxpayer First Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 
116-25 § 1302. The plan must “prioritize taxpayer services to ensure that all taxpayers easily and
readily receive the assistance that they need”; “streamline the structure of the agency including
minimizing the duplication of services and responsibilities within the agency”; and “best position
the Internal Revenue Service to combat cybersecurity and other threats.” Id. At the same time,
the Taxpayer First Act repeals a mandate in the IRS Reform Act that requires the IRS to organize
its operations around particular groups of taxpayers. Id. According to a House Committee report
relating to an earlier version of the Taxpayer First Act:
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 The Committee believes that the current IRS organizational structure is 
one of the factors contributing to the inability of the IRS to properly serve 
taxpayers. The Committee believes that the current structure needs to be 
modernized and streamlined to help enable the IRS to better serve taxpayers and 
provide the necessary level of services and accountability to taxpayers in an 
efficient manner. Accordingly, the Committee believes it appropriate to require 
the IRS to submit a comprehensive reorganization plan. The Committee believes 
that the revised structure should ensure taxpayers’ rights are protected, 
information is kept secure, and that the IRS is approachable for taxpayers to ask 
questions and get assistance. Thus, the Committee seeks to provide flexibility to 
the IRS to reorganize its operations after the Commissioner determines that 
another organizational structure, different from past structures, would better serve 
taxpayers. 
 
H.R. REP. NO. 116-1957, at 53-54 (2019). Compare this legislative history to that reproduced on 
pages 7 and 8 of the casebook relating to the IRS Reform Act. Both are heavily focused on 
taxpayer service.  
 
A former IRS Commissioner has warned against a significant IRS reorganization, which 
he believes could interfere with the IRS’s current projects and negatively impact enforcement. 
Allyson Versprille, Tax Veterans Caution Mnuchin Against Major IRS Reorganization, DAILY 
TAX REP. (BLOOMBERG LAW), Jul. 23, 2019. The task of overseeing the reorganization plan may 
fall to the current IRS Commissioner, Charles Rettig, who was confirmed by the Senate in 
September of 2018. Robert Lee & Kaustuv Basu, Ushering in the Rettig Era: What’s Next for the 
IRS?, 179 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) (Sept. 14, 2018) , at 6. According to one account, he is the 
first practicing lawyer to head the IRS in two decades. Id. 
 
To implement changes and draft reports mandated by the Taxpayer First Act, the IRS 
created a Taxpayer First Act Office (TFAO). Michael P. Dolan, IRS Watch: Implementing the 
Taxpayer First Act, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., Dec. 2019-Jan. 2020, at 17. The TFAO has solicited 
feedback from practitioners and other interest groups about reorganization plans and customer 
service. See Allyson Versprille, Carrying Out IRS Reforms Is Agency’s Top Goal Heading Into 
2020, DAILY TAX REP. (BLOOMBERG LAW), Dec. 12, 2019. Because of disruptions created by the 
coronavirus (COVID-19), the IRS has not yet issued its reorganization plan. According to one 
report, the IRS is likely to push back the September 2020 deadline to the end of the year. See 
Alan K. Ota, Place of Criminal Division At Center Of IRS Redesign Debate, LAW360 TAX 
AUTH., Apr. 17, 2020.   
 
The Taxpayer First Act also mandates the IRS to submit a set of comprehensive customer 
service strategies. The legislation envisions strategies that would create secure online and self-
service options that taxpayers can access, as well as an improved system for responding to 
taxpayers’ telephone calls. Taxpayer First Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-25 § 1101. The original 
due date for the customer service report—July, 2020—has been delayed to “no later than 
December” amidst the IRS pivoting to implementing CARES Act provisions and responding to 
extended filing and payment deadlines. See Allyson Versprille, Coronavirus Delaying, But Also 
Informing, IRS Reform Proposal, DAILY TAX REP. (BLOOMBERG LAW), May 11, 2020. 
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Interestingly, the IRS’s need to accommodate employees working remotely and interact with 
taxpayers during the COVID-19 outbreak has shaped some of its reform strategies. Id. For 
example, the pandemic has shown the IRS that it needs to increase its ability to interact with 




Revenue Procedure 2020-2, 2020-1 I.R.B. 107, supersedes Revenue Procedure 2016-2, 




 On May 9, 2019, the House Ways and Means Committee held a hearing on 
“Understanding the Tax Gap and Taxpayer Noncompliance.” Understanding the Tax Gap and 
Taxpayer Noncompliance: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 116th Cong. 
(2019), https://waysandmeans.house.gov/legislation/hearings/understanding-tax-gap-and-
taxpayer-noncompliance. Four witnesses testified—the Honorable J. Russell George, Treasury 
Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA); James R. McTigue, Director, Tax Issues, 
Strategic Issues, Government Accountability Office (GAO); Benjamin Herndon, Chief Research 
and Analytics Officer, IRS; and Kenneth Wood, former IRS Deputy Associate Chief Counsel, 
Office of Chief Counsel (International)—and their testimony is linked there. Id. J. Russell 
George testified that the IRS’s diminished resources have negatively affected tax compliance: 
 
Given the importance of audits to tax compliance, both because of the extent to 
which underreporting is the most significant component of the Tax Gap and 
because of the significant positive multiplier compliance effect from audits, it is 
important that the IRS has the resources to maintain or increase its audit coverage. 
However, due to diminished resources, IRS Examination personnel have 
decreased 38 percent from 13,138 examiners in FY 2010 to 8,205 examiners in 
FY 2017. The number of audits has also decreased by 32 percent from 1.6 million 
in FY 2013 to 1.1 million in FY 2017. Proposed assessments have steadily 
declined over the last 10 years, from $44 billion in FY 2007 to $29 billion in FY 
2017. 
 
Understanding the Tax Gap and Taxpayer Noncompliance: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On 
Ways and Means, 116th Cong. 3 (2019), 
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/congress/congress_05092019.pdf.  
 
James McTigue and Benjamin Herndon both referred to the importance of third-party 
reporting, among other things, as important contributors. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-19-558T, TAX GAP: MULTIPLE STRATEGIES ARE NEEDED TO REDUCE 
NONCOMPLIANCE 7 (2019) (statement of James R. McTigue, Jr., Director, Strategic Issues), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/698969.pdf [hereinafter GAO report] (“[o]ur past work has 
found that three important factors contributing to the tax gap are the extent to which income is 
reported to IRS by third parties, IRS’s resource trade-offs, and tax code complexity.”); Written 
Testimony of Dr. Benjamin D. Herndon, Chief Research and Analytics Officer, Internal Revenue 
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Service Before the House Ways and Means Committee On the Tax Gap (May 9, 2019), 
https://waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/201
9Final%20Herndon%20testimony%20HWM%20050919%20--%20written.pdf (“[S]tatistics [he 
cited] provide further confirmation that ‘visibility’ of income sources and financial transactions 
is a significant contributor to increasing the compliance rates, and enhanced information 
reporting is one of the few means of sizably increasing the compliance rate.”). The GAO report 
also notes that “IRS’s budget declined by about $2.6 billion (18.8 percent) from fiscal years 2011 
through 2019, and IRS’s budget for fiscal year 2019 is less than its fiscal year 2000 budget, after 
adjusting for inflation . . . .” See GAO Report, supra, at 9.  
 
In September 2019, the IRS released new tax gap estimates based on the 2011 through 
2013 tax years. See IRS Pub. 1415, Federal Tax Compliance Research: Tax Gap Estimates for 
Tax Years 2011–2013 (Sep. 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1415.pdf; IRS Pub. 5364, 
Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2011–2013 (Sep. 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p5364.pdf; see also IRS Pub. 5365, Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2011–2013 (Sep. 
2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5365.pdf (Tax Gap Map). The IRS explained: “Like the 
TY 2008–2010 tax gap estimates, these new estimates reflect an estimated average compliance 
rate and associated average annual tax gap covering a timeframe of three tax years.” IRS Pub. 
1415, supra, at 1.  
 
The IRS’s estimate for the gross tax gap for the 2011 to 2013 years is $441 billion 
annually. Id. at 8 fig. 1. However, “IRS Commissioner Charles Rettig said at a May [2019] 
conference the latest data doesn’t account for a large portion of the ‘underground economy,’ 
such as tax evasion through the use of cryptocurrency. That is because the U.S. still had a heavily 
paper, rather than digital, economy during the time period covered by the estimate, he said.” 
Allyson Versprille, New IRS Estimate Shows 11% Increase in Annual Tax Gap, DAILY TAX REP. 
(BLOOMBERG LAW), Sept. 26, 2019, https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/new-irs-
estimate-shows-11-increase-in-annual-tax-gap. 
 
For the 2011 through 2013 tax years, the IRS found an average rate of taxes timely and 
voluntarily paid of 83.6%. IRS Pub. 1415, supra, at 2. Because the IRS changed its methodology 
since its previous tax gap study, it also recalculated the rate for the 2008-2010 tax years. It 
reported that voluntary compliance was virtually unchanged. Id. at 2, 9 tbl. 1 (showing a revised 
estimate of 83.8% for 2008-2011). For further reading on the tax gap, see Natasha Sarin & 
Lawrence H. Summers, Shrinking the Tax Gap: Approaches and Revenue Potential, 165 TAX 




 Starting in 2017, the IRS began releasing annual Taxpayer Attitude Surveys, which 
before that had most recently been administered by the IRS Oversight Board in 2014. See IRS, 
Comprehensive Taxpayer Attitude Survey (CTAS) 2019 (Mar. 2020), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5296.pdf; IRS, Comprehensive Taxpayer Attitude Survey 
(CTAS) 2018 (Nov. 2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5296.pdf; IRS, Comprehensive 
Taxpayer Attitude Survey (CTAS) 2017 (Nov. 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/17ctas_report.pdf.  




The response to the question “What Is an Acceptable Amount to Cheat on Income 
Taxes?”—a very similar question to the one discussed in the casebook is listed below. (For 2019, 
the IRS reported data for only one response.)  
 
 2017 2018 2019 
“A little here and there” 9% 10% 9% 
“As much as possible” 3% 3% 3% 
“Not at all” 88% 85% 87% 
“No opinion” <1% 2% 1% 
 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. DATA BOOK viii (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p55b.pdf; 
IRS, Comprehensive Taxpayer Attitude Survey (CTAS) 2019, supra, at 13 (“Margin of error is 
+/- 2.2% for blended online/phone respondents and +/- 3.1% for phone respondents only.”); IRS, 
Comprehensive Taxpayer Attitude Survey (CTAS) 2018, supra at 12 (“Margin of error is +/- 
2.2% for blended online/phone respondents.”); IRS, Comprehensive Taxpayer Attitude Survey 
(CTAS) 2017, supra at 4, 10 (“Margin of error: +/- 2.18% at 95% confidence level.”). In 2017, 
the IRS stated, “There has been very little change in this attitude over the past six years.” IRS, 
Comprehensive Taxpayer Attitude Survey (CTAS) 2017, supra at 10. This reflects the margin for 





 The updated IRS audit rates for 2017 through 2019 are as follows: 
 
Fiscal Year 
Audit Rate for 
Individuals 
Audit Rate for 
Corporations with Assets 
Under $10 Million 
Audit Rate for 
Corporations with Assets 
$10 Million and Over 
2017  0.60 percent        0.70 percent        7.90 percent 
2018  0.60 percent        0.60 percent        8.10 percent 
2019  0.40 percent        0.50 percent        6.20 percent 
 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. DATA BOOK (2019), supra, at 45 tbl. 17b; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 
DATA BOOK 23 tbl. 9a (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p55b.pdf; INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV. DATA BOOK 23 tbl. 9a (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/17databk.pdf. For further 
reading on the decline in IRS audit rates, see Jad Chamseddine, IRS Audit Rate Continues to 
Drop, 102 TAX NOTES 1436, 1436 (2019) (“The decline in audits can especially be seen in the 
business world, where the IRS examined 1.3 percent of all corporation returns in fiscal 2014 




 The updated IRS enforcement statistics for 2016 are as follows: 
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Fiscal Year  
Notices of  
Federal Tax Lien  Levies  Seizures 
2016 464,000 869,000 436 
2017 446,378 590,249 323 
2018 410,220 639,025 275 
2019 543,604 782,735 228 
 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. DATA BOOK (2019), supra at 60 tbl. 25; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 
DATA BOOK (2017), supra, at 41 tbl. 16; TIGTA, TRENDS IN COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES THROUGH 





The IRS budget statistics for 2017 through 2020 and all figures—including the 2009 




IRS Budget (absolute 




2009 $11,522,598 $13,770,702 
2010 $12,146,123 $14,281,621 
2011 $12,121,830 $13,816,921 
2012 $11,816,696 $13,196,033 
2013 $11,198,611 $12,325,265 
2014 $11,290,612 $12,228,158 
2015 $10,945,000 $11,839,793 
2016 $11,235,000 $12,002,094 
2017 $11,235,000 $11,751,740 
2018 $11,158,703 $11,393,647 
2019 $11,302,554 $11,335,137 
2020 $11,510,054 $11,510,054 
 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/266/19.-IRS-FY-2021-BIB.pdf (reporting absolute dollar 
figures for 2019 and 2020; also reporting that IRS requested budget for 2021 is 
$12,038,503,000); DEP’T OF TREASURY, BUDGET IN BRIEF 1 (2019), 
https://www.treasury.gov/about/budget-performance/budget-in-
brief/bib19/16.%20irs%20fy%202019%20bib.pdf (reporting absolute dollar figures for 2018 and 
2019). See also id. (reporting that IRS requested budget for 2019 is $11,135,000,000). Inflation 
calculations were performed using U.S. Inflation Calculator, 
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com (last visited June 19, 2020).  
 
 After the IRS released its 2018 Data Book, one commentator stated, “The book’s biggest 
headline is that IRS enforcement activities—audits, levies, liens, seizures, and criminal 
investigations—continue to erode, especially for high-income individuals, giant corporations, 
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and passthrough businesses ….” Robert A. Weinberger, Takeaways From the IRS Data Book, 
164 TAX NOTES FED. 503, 504 (2019). Another article commented:  
 
A comparison of the data provided in the 2011 IRS Data Book and the 2018 IRS 
Data Book reveals some of the effects of the reduced funding on the (i) IRS 
workforce, (ii) IRS examination and collection activities, (iii) IRS use of third-
party information reporting, (iv) IRS penalty impositions and the initiation of IRS 
criminal investigations, (v) IRS Appeals Office performance, (vi) IRS Chief 
Counsel litigation activities, and (vii) taxpayer assistance. 
 
John Keenan et al., 2018 IRS Data Book Reveals Insights into Impact of Reduced Funding on 
IRS Operations and Activities, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., June-July 2019, at 15. 
 
The IRS budget did increase in absolute dollars from 2018 to 2019 and again from 2019 
to 2020, after staying steady or dropping since 2016. One commentator argued: 
 
[T]here are signs of at least a modest turn-around. There is a new IRS 
Commissioner who does not have the baggage of his predecessors and who seems 
to be helping to restore morale among Service employees. Republicans in 
Congress have shifted somewhat from trying to punish the IRS to giving it funds 
to help implement the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, a Republican priority. The latest 
Administration budget proposal increased funding for the IRS, from $11.1 billion 
to $11.5 billion, and proposed additional funds for technology upgrades. 
 
Mark A. Luscombe, Is the IRS Starting an Upturn in Enforcement and Customer Service?, 
TAXES, Oct. 2019, at 3. 
 
 However, the IRS budget, even in absolute dollars, remains below its high point in 2010. 
And Congress continues to give the agency additional responsibilities. As a result of the CARES 
Act, the IRS was charged in spring 2020 with rapidly sending out “Recovery Rebates” 
(Economic Impact Payments) to eligible individuals. See I.R.C. § 6428. The IRS sent many 
payments out quickly, but the “Get My Payment” portal on the IRS’s website had numerous 
glitches. See Susan Tompor, IRS ‘Get My Payment’ Stimulus Check Portal Hit By Early 





As mentioned above, in September 2019, the IRS released new tax gap estimates based 
on the 2011 through 2013 tax years. See IRS Pub. 1415, supra. The report also included an 
update on the “Effect of Information Reporting on Individual Income Tax Reporting 
Compliance.” Id. at 14 fig. 3. The new figure shows the same general relationships as the one in 
























Id.; IRS, Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2008–2010, at 5 fig.1 (2016). 
 
Note that the top figure in the chart above (1%) is the same as it was in the prior report, 
and all but the last figure are quite similar. The net misreporting percentage of 55% for “Income 
subject to little or no information reporting” is not as high as the estimate in the previous study. 
However, the main point remains the same: according to IRS estimates, increased information 
reporting correlates with greatly reduced noncompliance.  
 
Former IRS Commissioner Charles Rossotti, a technology expert, recently proposed a 
plan to narrow the tax gap. See Charles O. Rossotti, Recover $1.6 Trillion, Modernize Tax 
Compliance and Assistance, 166 TAX NOTES FED. 1411 (2020). The plan focuses on the single 
largest component of the tax gap: individuals’ unreported business income. Id. at 1413. His 
proposal is called “Tax Compliance and Assistance 2020 (TCA 2020)” and he argues that it 
would “recover[] an estimated $1.6 trillion over the first 10 years while also improving service to 
all taxpayers.” Id. at 1412. The plan makes use of both a new third-party reporting requirement 
and a taxpayer reconciliation statement. See id. at 1415. It would also draw heavily on 
technology to analyze taxpayer returns. See id. at 1418. 
 
 As a threshold matter, “[t]axpayers with more than $25,000 of business income would be 
required to report to their bank and on their returns the bank account or accounts in which their 
business income is deposited.” Id. at 1414. The new third-party reporting requirement would 
apply to banks: “The banks that were designated by taxpayers as receiving their business income 
would be required at year-end to provide the taxpayer and the IRS with a summary report of 
deposits received and disbursements made in these accounts, including those from credit card 
payments.” Id. at 1415. Taxpayer reconciliation would work as follows: 
 
The taxpayer would attach a schedule to the tax return reconciling the total 
amounts reported by the bank with the income and expenses reported on the tax 
return. For example, if the cash received in the bank account was greater than the 









“Income subject to 
substantial information 
reporting and withholding” 
1% 1% 




“Income subject to some 
information reporting” 
17% 19% 
“Income subject to little or 
no information reporting” 
55% 63% 
Copyright © 2020 Carolina Academic Press, LLC. All rights reserved.
10 
 
amount reported on the return, the schedule would itemize the difference. The IRS 
would design a form for this reconciliation schedule that any bookkeeper could 
complete.  
 
Id. Jasper Cummings has pointed out that this is akin to the bank deposits method of 
reconstructing unreported income, but here it would be applied in advance of any audit. Jasper L. 
Cummings, Jr., The Bank Deposits Method on Steroids, 167 TAX NOTES FED. 469, 469 (2020) 
(“[T]he proposal involves putting technology to work on the bank deposits method for auditing 
recalcitrant taxpayers, a method that is over 90 years old. Problem is the audit method will not be 
limited to noncompliant taxpayers ….”) (footnote omitted). 
 
 Based on past experience, Rossotti persuasively argues that “[i]nstituting this increased 
bank and taxpayer reporting would alone improve the accuracy with which taxpayers report 
business income.” Id. at 1415. But the proposal goes beyond that to leverage technology in a 
novel way: “TCA 2020 proposes that over time, the IRS would make use of available modern 
technology to go beyond scoring tax returns and simple data matches by analyzing every return 
as it is filed, using all applicable data sources and advanced analytical models.” Id. at 1418. This 
would be a dramatic shift. It would also require some additional technology and personnel. Id. at 
1421. In particular, “[o]ver an initial five-year period, the technology budget would be about 
doubled, the budget for enforcement and taxpayer assistance increased by 50 percent, and the 
base budget increased annually to keep up with inflation. Regular but smaller percentage 
increases would be required in the subsequent five-year period.” Id. at 1423. This may not be 
politically feasible, as Jasper Cummings points out. Cummings, supra, at 471. Cummings raises 
other potential problems with the proposal, as well. See id. at 472 (stating, for example, that “the 
black box of the magic technology that will make this plan work is yet to be defined.”). 
 
Yet, “[w]hen a former IRS commissioner with vast experience in the technology industry 
goes to the trouble of creating a researched, thought out, and written prescription for 
substantially reducing the federal tax gap, everyone reading Tax Notes should want to know 
what he is thinking.” Id. at 469. While the plan would pose numerous implementation issues, it 
both targets the single largest component of the tax gap and would make use of third-party 
reporting to reach hard-to-tax cash-based and other small businesses. Rossotti notes in his report 
that “it’s not necessary to have perfectly accurate reporting to make a big difference in 
compliance accuracy. Of income that is subject to little or no [third-party information] reporting, 
55 percent is not reported, while only 17 percent of income that is subject to some reporting is 
not reported.” Rossotti, supra, at 1414. For further reading about the effectiveness of information 
reporting, including a synthesis of studies in which an individual reports on a firm (an unusual 
institutional arrangement), see Leandra Lederman & Joe Dugan, Information Matters in Tax 
Enforcement, 2020 B.Y.U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming). That article responds to Wei Cui, Taxation 
Without Information: The Institutional Foundations of Modern Tax Collection, 20 J. BUS. L. 93 
(2017), which takes the contrarian position that it is not information reporting but rather the use 
of a firm as the third-party reporter that increases tax compliance. 
  







 Jasper Cummings has forcefully argued against an apparent trend in the courts of finding 
all Treasury regulations legislative and thus invalid if they weren’t issued with notice and 
comment: 
 
The force and effect of law issue is following a familiar pattern that occurs 
in the tax law and in law generally: An erroneous idea gets floated, is picked up 
by persons who find the idea useful for their own purposes, is repeated in some 
court opinions, and becomes “the law.” The erroneous idea is that all Treasury tax 
regulations have the force and effect of law, are binding, and are entitled to 
Chevron deference either because they are issued with notice and comment under 
APA procedures or they are specifically authorized by section 7805. And if, by 
chance, notice and comment was not used, the regulation is invalid.  
 
This is nuts. There are legislative (substantive) regulations and there are 
interpretive regulations, using the precise words of the APA. The legislative 
regulations have the force and effect of law when issued with proper APA 
procedures because Congress properly delegated to an agency the power to make 
law, in a sense.  
 
Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Conjuring Up the ‘Force And Effect’ of Tax Law, 154 TAX NOTES149, 
161 (2017). He explained in another article: 
 
[A]ll regulations do not have the “force and effect of law” simply by being 
published in the Federal Register after the notice and comment process. Rather, 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires the notice and comment process 
only for legislative regulations that Congress ordered the agency to write (think of 
section 385). If an agency like the IRS chooses (1) to issue interpretive guidance 
as regulations rather than revenue rulings, and also (2) voluntarily chooses to use 
the notice and comment process, those choices cannot convert an interpretation of 
the code into a legislative regulation that can be called a rule of law. 
 
Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Deep State Revenue Rulings, 166 TAX NOTES FED. 545, 546 (2020).  
 
In line with this concern, a recent District Court opinion went beyond regulations in 
finding a Revenue Procedure to be a legislative rule and thus to require notice and comment. 
Bullock v. IRS, 401 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1158 (D. Mont. 2019) (“Revenue Procedure 2018-38, 
2018-31 I.R.B. 280, as a legislative rule, requires the IRS to follow the notice-and-comment 
procedures pursuant to the APA.”). The background is that “Revenue Procedure 2018-38 … 
eliminated the IRS’s previous requirement contained at 26 C.F.R. § 1.6033-2 that exempt 
organizations report donor information.” Id. at 1149. The District Court further stated that “[t]he 
IRS’s promulgation of Revenue Procedure 2018-38, 2018-31 I.R.B. 280 appears to represent a[n] 
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… attempt to ‘evade the time-consuming procedures of the APA’” by not promulgating a 
regulation. Id. at 1158. The court concluded: 
 
Plaintiffs ask simply for the opportunity to submit written data and opposing 
views or arguments, as required by the APA’s public notice-and-comment 
process, before it changes the long-established reporting requirements. A proper 
notice-and-comment procedure will provide the IRS with the opportunity to 
review and consider information submitted by the public and interested parties. 
Then, and only then, may the IRS act on a fully-informed basis when making 
potentially significant changes to federal tax law. 
 
 An article by Marie Sapirie discusses this case and includes the following 
comment: 
 
“What a case like Bullock does is give the IRS a shot across the bow that they 
need to be more attentive to the kinds of things they are putting into subregulatory 
guidance,” said professor Kristin E. Hickman of the University of Minnesota. She 
said the IRS should recognize that labeling guidance subregulatory doesn’t mean 
a court won’t declare it to be a legislative rule. The district court’s opinion isn’t, 
however, a categorical claim that every piece of subregulatory guidance should be 
considered a legislative rule, she said. 
 
Marie Sapirie, Entering the Next Frontier of Tax and Administrative Law, 164 TAX 




Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. 91 (2015) (reviewed by the court), is cited and 
briefly discussed on pages 40 to 41 of the casebook, including in footnote 5 on page 41.
1
 As page 
41 notes, in Altera, the Tax Court had held in a 14-0 opinion that cost-sharing regulations under 
Code section 482 were invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act because they “fail[ed] to 
satisfy State Farm’s reasoned decisionmaking standard.” Id. at 133. In July 2018, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court in a 2-1 decision. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 
2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20524 (9th Cir. Jul. 24, 2018) (opinion withdrawn). One of those two 
judges, Judge Stephen Reinhardt, had passed away several months before the opinion was 
published. See Chris Walker, Nearly Four Months After His Death, Judge Reinhardt Casts the 
Deciding Vote in an Important Tax Exceptionalism Case: Altera v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG (Jul. 24, 2018), https://yalejreg.com/nc/nearly-four-months-
after-his-death-judge-reinhardt-casts-the-deciding-vote-in-an-important-tax-exceptionalism-case-
altera-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue/. On August 2, 2018, the Ninth Circuit substituted 
Judge Susan Graber for Judge Reinhardt. Ninth Circuit General Order 3.2h, Altera Corp. & 
                                            
1
 In addition to the July 2016 amicus brief mentioned in footnote 5 on page 41 of the casebook, 
Professor Lederman participated in a September 2018 amicus brief in Altera. Supplemental Brief of Amici 
Curiae Reuven Avi-Yonah et al., in Support of Respondent-Appellant Commissioner (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3260082. In addition, Professor Lederman co-authored the Altera amicus brief 
mentioned in footnote 2, infra.  
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Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, No. 16-70496 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2018), https://appellatetax.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/Altera-Ninth-Circuit-order-substituting-Judge-Graber.pdf. On August 
7, 2018 the court withdrew its July 2018 opinion. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 898 F.3d 1266 (9th 
Cir. 2018).  
 
On June 7, 2019, the Ninth Circuit issued a new opinion. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 926 
F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2019). The new opinion was also 2-1, reversing the Tax Court, with Judge 
Kathleen O’Malley again dissenting. Id. at 1087. The majority found that the 482 regulations in 
question did have the force of law, stating:  
 
Ultimately, questions of deference boil down to whether “it appears that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the 
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218 . . . (2001). “When Congress has ‘explicitly left a gap for an agency to 
fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute by regulation,’ and any ensuing regulation is binding in 
the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 227 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-
44).  
. . . Section 482 does not speak directly to whether the Commissioner may require 
parties to a QCSA [qualified cost-sharing arrangement] to share employee stock 
compensation costs in order to receive the tax benefits associated with entering 
into a QCSA. Thus, there is no question that the statute remains ambiguous 
regarding the method by which Treasury is to make allocations based on stock-
based compensation. 
 
Id. at 1075-76.  
 
Altera subsequently filed a petition for rehearing en banc. One argument that was raised 
was that the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the Tax Court created something akin to a circuit split 
because the Tax Court is a national court. See Ryan Finley, Ninth Circuit’s Altera Decision 
Didn’t Cause a Circuit Split, 165 TAX NOTES FED. 1051 (2019) (“‘Some in the practitioner 
community have suggested there is a circuit split, but the fact of the matter is there is not 
currently. The final regulations are the law of the land until proved otherwise,’ [Eli] Hoory [, 
Special Counsel (international), IRS Office of Chief Counsel] said. ‘The Ninth Circuit is the only 
circuit that’s ruled on them, [and] they’ve held them to be valid.’”). 
 
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for rehearing, with ten judges recused and three 
judges dissenting.
2
 Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 941 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2019). For an 
                                            
2
 In addition to the July 2016 amicus brief mentioned in footnote 5 on page 41 of the casebook 
and the September 2018 amicus brief mentioned in footnote 1 of this Cumulative Supplement, Professor 
Lederman participated in another amicus brief in Altera. In conjunction with Susan Morse, Stephen Shay, 
and Clinton Wallace, she co-authored an amicus brief opposing rehearing en banc. See Leandra Lederman 
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argument in favor of rehearing that was made before the denial of rehearing, see George M. 
Gerachis, David C. Cole & Juliana D. Hunter, Ninth Circuit Grapples With Agency Positions 
First Raised in Litigation, 164 TAX NOTES FED. 1889 (2019). 
 
Altera filed a petition for certiorari. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 941 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 
2019), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 10, 2020) (No.19-1009). On June 22, 2020, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari. Altera Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, No.19-1009, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 
3288 (June 22, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/062220zor_mjn0.pdf. 
The IRS and Treasury have thus won the battle, though no doubt taxpayers will continue to bring 
APA challenges in other cases.  
 
For those interested in further reading about this stage of the Altera litigation, two 
professors who spearheaded amicus briefs have blogged about the parties’ briefs to the Supreme 
Court. See Susan Morse & Stephen Shay, Pending Cert Petition in Altera: Tax Law in an 
Administrative Law Wrapper, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (May 22, 2020), 
https://procedurallytaxing.com/pending-cert-petition-in-altera-tax-law-in-an-administrative-law-
wrapper/; Susan Morse & Stephen Shay, In Altera Reply Brief, Taxpayer Doubles Down on 






 The Altera litigation discussed in the casebook and just above reflects a trend in tax 
controversy litigation to challenge Treasury and IRS guidance using administrative law, 
including the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). An important pending case is CIC Servs., 
LLC v. IRS, 925 F.3d 247 (6th Cir. 2019), reh’g en banc den., 936 F.3d 501 (9th Cir. 2019), in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari. CIC Servs., LLC v. IRS, No. 19-930, 2020 
U.S. LEXIS 2605 (2020). That case challenges Notice 2016-66, 2016-47 I.R.B. 745, which 
identifies certain transactions, including “micro-captive transactions” as “reportable 
transactions” under Code section 6707A. CIC Servs., 925 F.3d at 249-50. The plaintiff 
challenged the Notice under the APA and moved for a preliminary injunction. Id.at 250. The IRS 
prevailed in its argument that the suit “was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 
7421(a) and the tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (collectively, 
the “AIA”), which divest federal district courts of jurisdiction over suits ‘for the purpose of 
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.’” Id. (footnote omitted). In a 2-1 decision, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 259. It 
found that plaintiff’s suit was both a suit “‘for the purpose of restraining the assessment or 
collection of any tax,’” id. at 257 (citation omitted), and that the case did not fall within any 
exception to the AIA, id. at 258. It remains to be seen how the U.S. Supreme Court will rule. 
 
CIC Servs. is just one high-profile example of administrative law challenges to tax 
guidance. Another recent example is Assoc. for Community Affiliated Plans et al. v. U.S. Dept. of 
                                                                                                                                            
et al., Ninth Circuit Brief of Law Academics and Professors as Amici Curiae in Opposition to the Petition 
for Rehearing En Banc in Altera v. Commissioner (Sept. 6, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3450553. 
 
Copyright © 2020 Carolina Academic Press, LLC. All rights reserved.
15 
 
Treas. et al., 392 F. Supp. 3d 22 (D.D.C. 2019), a case in which the IRS prevailed against an 
APA challenge. That case is on appeal to the D.C. Circuit. See Stephanie Cumings, Government 
Doesn’t Invoke Chevron in Insurance Regs Appeal, 166 TAX NOTES FED. 644 (2020). There have 
been many other APA-based challenges. See Jasper L. Cummings, Chevron, the APA, and Tax 
Regulations, 162 TAX NOTES 1463, 1465 (2019) (“The number of Chevron and APA opinions 
issued just in the last 12 months, plus the ‘scholarly’ articles on those subjects published in the 
same period, would require at least a day to read, and longer to assimilate if that were 
possible.”). Jasper Cummings has further explained that “[t]he musty procedural issues around 
tax regulations have become hot topics, both politically and in tax litigation. Even continuing 
legal education programs now teach how to attack tax regulations.” Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., 
Conjuring Up the ‘Force And Effect’ of Tax Law, 154 TAX NOTES 149, 150 (2017).  
 
Another recent article looks beyond the APA for sources of procedural challenges: 
 
Much has been written about the ability (or inability) to challenge Treasury 
regulations in court based on the Administrative Procedure Act. However, two 
other laws—the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) and the Paperwork Reduction 
Act (PRA)—have gone under the radars of thought leaders and practitioners for 
decades, even though these laws can provide meaningful judicial oversight of 
Treasury conduct in issuing regulations. 
 
Monte Silver, So You Want to Challenge a Treasury Regulation Issued Under the TCJA?, 166 
TAX NOTES FED. 1137, 1137 (2020). Mr. Silver brought a case, Silver v. IRS, No. 1:19-cv-00247 
(D.D.C. 2019), under these provisions. Id. He argues that “[t]his case could have a few 
outcomes. It could (1) force Treasury to adopt RFA and PRA processes; (2) pressure Treasury to 
grant relief to small businesses in this case; and (3) open the door for other similar challenges, 
starting with regulations issued under the TCJA.” Id. at 1141. The government lost its motion to 
dismiss but it has continued to press numerous arguments. Andrew Velarde, DOJ Doubles Down 
on Spurned Arguments in Silver, Offers New Ones, 166 TAX NOTES FED. 1201, 1201 (2020). 
 
On a distinct but related topic, in a March 2019 Policy Statement, Treasury and the IRS 
“reaffirm[ed] their commitment to a tax regulatory process that encourages public participation, 
fosters transparency, affords fair notice, and ensures adherence to the rule of law. Consistent 
with those important regulatory principles, the Department of the Treasury and the IRS hereby 
clarify and affirm their commitment to sound regulatory practices.” DEPT. OF THE TREAS., 
POLICY STATEMENT ON THE TAX REGULATORY PROCESS 1 (2019), 
https://www.millerchevalier.com/sites/default/files/resources/General_Alerts/2019-03-
04_Policy-Statement-on-the-Tax-Regulatory-Process.pdf. For example, the Policy Statement 
“commit[s] to includ[ing] a statement of good cause when issuing any future temporary 
regulations under the Internal Revenue Code.” Id. The Policy Statement also says that “[i]n 
litigation before the U.S. Tax Court, as a matter of policy, the IRS will not seek judicial 
deference under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) or Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to interpretations set forth only in 
subregulatory guidance.” Id. at 2. The Auer issue is discussed further below. 
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In September 2019, the IRS flagged the Policy Statement for its attorneys in CC-2019-
006 (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-ccdm/cc-2019-006.pdf. As a further guide to 
its contents, the headings of the March 2019 Policy Statement that reflect its principal contents 
are “Commitment to Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking”; “Limited Use of Temporary 
Regulations”; “Proper Scope of Subregulatory Guidance Documents”; and “Limit on Notices 
Announcing Intent to Propose Regulations.” Id. at 1-3. For further discussion of the Policy 
Statement, see Jonathan Curry, Treasury Tightens Tax Reg Procedural Guidelines, 162 TAX 
NOTES 1224 (2019); Donald L. Korb et al., Is Treasury’s Policy Statement on the Regulatory 
Process Pro-Taxpayer?, 163 TAX NOTES 565 (2019); Marie Sapirie, Changes in IRS Guidance 




 Recently, Supreme Court observers have wondered whether the Court is poised to 
overrule Chevron. For example, a November 2018 Tax Notes article reports: 
 
The Chevron deference doctrine got short shrift in a railroad tax case 
before the Supreme Court November 6, despite the Eighth Circuit decision that 
the IRS wasn’t entitled to deference in this case.  
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. was the only justice to touch on the topic 
during oral arguments, noting that the statute might not be ambiguous, which is 
the threshold for determining Chevron deference.  
 
Stephanie Cumings, Justices Give Chevron Little Deference in Railroad Tax Case, 161 TAX 
NOTES 898, 898 (2018). Another Tax Notes article titled “Gorsuch Dissent Could Signal 
Beginning of the End for Chevron” states: 
 
In his March 4 dissent, Justice Neil M. Gorsuch disagreed with the 
outcome in BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos, Sup. Ct. Dkt. No. 17-1042, but praised his 
fellow justices for not applying Chevron deference to the IRS’s interpretation, 
which can be granted if the agency’s reading of an ambiguous statute is 
reasonable. . . .  
“Though I may disagree with the result the Court reaches, my colleagues 
rightly afford the parties before us an independent judicial interpretation of the 
law. They deserve no less.”  
Patrick J. Smith of Ivins, Phillips & Barker Chtd. told Tax Notes that 
Gorsuch’s dismissive reference to the Chevron doctrine and his questioning 
whether it retains any force are significant.  
“These comments are certainly a clear invitation to future litigants in the 
Supreme Court to mount a vigorous challenge to this doctrine, which, as 
[Gorsuch] notes, has been subject to mounting criticism by members of the 
Court,” Smith said.  
 
Stephanie Cumings, Gorsuch Dissent Could Signal Beginning of the End for Chevron, 162 TAX 
NOTES 1235, 1235 (2019). However, it is worth noting, as discussed briefly below, that in June 
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2019, in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), the Court declined to overrule Auer deference, 
partly for reasons of stare decisis. Id. at 2406.  
 
For an argument that “Recent Supreme Court [o]pinions [u]rge [c]ourts to [r]igorously 
[a]nalyze the [s]tatute at Step One,” see Joseph B. Judkins, The Rise of Footnote 9 (And Why 
Some TCJA Regulations Fail Chevron Step One), TAXES, Mar. 2020, at 41, 47. For further 
reading on deference trends, see Stephanie Cumings, Chevron May Lack Teeth In a Post-Kisor 
World, 164 TAX NOTES FED. 409 (2019) (“The Supreme Court appears reluctant to overturn 
Chevron soon, but the doctrine may not have as much sway over courts as it once did, according 
to some practitioners.”); Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., What Is Anti-Deference Really About?, 164 
TAX NOTES FED. 2075, 2076 (2019) (arguing in part that “[a]nti-deference to legal interpretation 




 As noted above, in a March 2019 Policy Statement, the Treasury Department said, “In 
litigation before the U.S. Tax Court, as a matter of policy, the IRS will not seek judicial 
deference under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) or Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to interpretations set forth only in 
subregulatory guidance.” DEPT. OF THE TREAS., POLICY STATEMENT ON THE TAX REGULATORY 
PROCESS , supra, at 2. One article explains, “The Treasury Department’s new policy regarding 
Auer deference is issued in the context of growing criticism of such judicial deference, both 
inside and outside of the tax world.” Carina C. Federico et al., Treasury Issues Policy Statement 
that May Be the Death Knell for ‘Auer’ Deference in Tax Cases and Zombie Notices, DAILY TAX 
REP. (BLOOMBERG LAW), Mar. 19, 2019. 
 
 In June 2019, in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), the Court declined to overrule 
Auer deference, stating, in part: 
 
If all that were not enough, stare decisis cuts strongly against Kisor’s 
position. “Overruling precedent is never a small matter.” Kimble v. Marvel 
Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. ___, ___, . . . (2015)). . . . To be sure, stare 
decisis is “not an inexorable command.” Id., at 828 . . . . But any departure from 
the doctrine demands “special justification”—something more than “an argument 
that the precedent was wrongly decided.” Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 
Inc., 573 U. S. 258, 266 . . . (2014). 
And that is even more than usually so in the circumstances here. First, 
Kisor asks us to overrule not a single case, but a “long line of precedents”—each 
one reaffirming the rest and going back 75 years or more. . . . This Court alone 
has applied Auer or Seminole Rock in dozens of cases, and lower courts have done 
so thousands of times. Deference to reasonable agency interpretations of 
ambiguous rules pervades the whole corpus of administrative law. Second, 
because that is so, abandoning Auer deference would cast doubt on many settled 
constructions of rules. . . . It is the rare overruling that introduces so much 
instability into so many areas of law, all in one blow. 
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And third, even if we are wrong about Auer, “Congress remains free to 
alter what we have done.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172-
173 . . . (1989) (stating that when that is so, “[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have 
special force”). . . . It could amend the APA or any specific statute to require the 
sort of de novo review of regulatory interpretations that Kisor favors. Instead, for 
approaching a century, it has let our deference regime work side-by-side with 
both the APA and the many statutes delegating rulemaking power to agencies. . . . 
Given that history—and Congress’s continuing ability to take up Kisor’s 
arguments—we would need a particularly “special justification” to now 
reverse Auer. 
Kisor offers nothing of that ilk. . . .  
 
Id. at 2422-23. However, the Court did “take[] care . . . to reinforce the limits of Auer 
deference,” id. at 2423, providing several parameters: 
 
First and foremost, a court should not afford Auer deference unless the 
regulation is genuinely ambiguous. . . . 
And before concluding that a rule is genuinely ambiguous, a court must 
exhaust all the “traditional tools” of construction. . . .  
If genuine ambiguity remains, moreover, the agency’s reading must still 
be “reasonable.”. . .  
Still, we are not done—for not every reasonable agency reading of a 
genuinely ambiguous rule should receive Auer deference. We have recognized in 
applying Auer that a court must make an independent inquiry into whether the 
character and context of the agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight. 
. . .  
 




Revenue Procedure 2017-1, cited and excerpted on pages 67 through 84, was superseded 
with annual updates in 2018 through 2020. The current version is Revenue Procedure 2020-1, 
2020-1 I.R.B. 1. (The correct citation for Revenue Procedure 2017-1 is 2017-1 I.R.B. 1.) The 
casebook’s citations to sections within the 2017 version of the Revenue Procedure remain the 




Revenue Procedure 2017-2, 2017-1 I.R.B. 106, cited in the casebook, was superseded in 
2018 through 2020, without significant revision. See Rev. Proc. 2020-2, 2020-1 I.R.B. 107. 
 
Revenue Procedure 2017-3, 2017-1 I.R.B. 130, cited in the casebook, similarly was 
superseded in 2018 through 2020, without material revisions. See Rev. Proc. 2020-3, 2020-1 
I.R.B. 131. 







 The IRS made significant changes to the 2018 version of Form 1040, the individual 
income tax return. The 2018 Form 1040 was in the form of a two-sided “postcard.” See 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f1040--2018.pdf. While the 2018 version of the Form 1040 
was reduced in size, it included an additional six schedules taxpayers needed to submit in order 
to report deductions, credits, and calculate tax. In response to complaints from practitioners who 
found the 2018 form confusing because it required taxpayers to spread information across 
multiple attachments, the IRS returned to a Form 1040 that is two full pages for the 2019 filing 
season. Allyson Versprille, Postcard-Sized Tax Form on Permanent Vacation After a Year, 
DAILY TAX REP. (BLOOMBERG LAW), July 20, 2019. The 2019 Form 1040 has only three 
schedules, which taxpayers use to report sources of income that are not included on the face of 
the Form 1040, as well as most deductions and credits. See https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f1040.pdf (last visited June 20, 2020). 
 
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the IRS postponed certain 2019 filing and 
payment deadlines for some taxpayers. See Notice 2020-18, 2020-15 I.R.B. 1. For example, the 
filing and payment deadline for the individual federal income tax return was extended 
automatically from April 15 to July 15. (Notice 2020-18 supersedes an earlier notice that 
extended only the payment date to July 15 but not the filing date. Notice 2020-17, 2020-15 
I.R.B. 1.) Taxpayers are not required to submit an application for extension in order to take 
advantage of the July 15, 2020 deadline for filing a return or paying tax. For any return or 
payment automatically postponed, no interest, penalty, or addition to tax for failure to file or 
failure to pay tax (discussed in Chapter 12) will accrue for the period between April 15 and July 
15. Id. Subsequent IRS Notices extended other deadlines. See, e.g., Notice 2020-20, 2020-16 
I.R.B. 660 (extending filing and payment deadlines for federal gift and generation-skipping tax); 
Notice 2020-23, 2020-18 I.R.B. 742 (extending deadlines for certain estate tax returns and 
payments and some tax-exempt organization submissions); Notice 2020-35, 2020-25 I.R.B. 1 
(postponing the deadline for some employment taxes).  
 
Further details about filing and payment extension are posted on the IRS’s website at 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/filing-and-payment-deadlines-questions-and-answers. The post 
clarifies that if a taxpayer wishes to extend the filing deadline beyond July 15 to October 15 (the 




 The Taxpayer First Act mandates an expansion of electronic tax return filing. Section 
2301 of the Act amends Code section 6011(e) to permit the IRS to require that, for calendar 
years before 2021, return preparers who file at least 100 returns during the calendar year (rather 
than 250) must file returns electronically. Taxpayer First Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-25 § 
2301(b). After 2021, persons who file at least 10 returns during the calendar year must file 
returns electronically. An exception to the new requirements applies to preparers who can 
establish that they live in an area without adequate internet access. I.R.C. § 6011(d)(3)(D).    




 On another topic, a recent Ninth Circuit case upheld the validity of Treasury Regulation 
section 301.7502-1, which provides that, other than direct proof of actual delivery, a registered or 
certified mail receipt is the only prima facie evidence of delivery for purposes of the mailbox 
rule in Code section 7502. Baldwin v. United States, 921 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2019). The Baldwins 
claimed to have mailed their amended return to the IRS by first class mail but did not use either 
certified or registered mail. The return never arrived at the IRS office. Id. at 839-40. At the trial 
level, the District Court applied the common law mailbox rule, which provides that “proof of 
proper mailing—including by testimonial or circumstantial evidence—gives rise to a rebuttable 
presumption that the document was physically delivered to the addressee in the time such a 
mailing would ordinarily take to arrive.” Id. at 840. Based on testimony provided by two of the 
taxpayers’ employees, the lower court concluded that the testimony was sufficient to establish 
proof of mailing, therefore the presumption of delivery and, consequently, the mailbox rule 
applied. Id. at 842. 
 
 The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court, finding that Treasury Regulation section 
301.7502-1(e)(2) was a valid interpretation of the statute. The court’s analysis represents a good 
review of the Chevron deference standard discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
[W]e employ the familiar two-step analysis under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 . . . (1984). We ask first whether 
“Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842. If it 
has, Congress’ resolution of the issue controls and the agency is not free to adopt 
an interpretation at odds with the plain language of the statute. But if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous on the question at hand, we then ask whether the agency’s 
interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. 
At step one of the analysis, we conclude that IRC § 7502 is silent as to 
whether the statute displaces the common-law mailbox rule. In particular, with 
respect to the question relevant here, the statute does not address whether a 
taxpayer who sends a document by regular mail can rely on the common-law 
mailbox rule to establish a presumption of delivery when the IRS claims not to 
have received the document. The statute does afford a presumption of delivery 
when a taxpayer sends a document by registered mail, 26 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1)(A), 
and it authorizes the creation of similar rules for certified mail, electronic filing, 
and private delivery services. § 7502(c)(2), (f)(3). But as to documents sent by 
regular mail, the statute is conspicuously silent. 
At step two of the Chevron analysis, the remaining question is whether 
Treasury Regulation § 301.7502-1(e)(2) is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute. We conclude that it is. As reflected by the circuit split that developed 
on this issue, Congress’ enactment of IRC § 7502 could reasonably be construed 
in one of two ways: as intended merely to supplement the common-law mailbox 
rule, or to supplant it altogether. The Treasury Department chose the latter 
construction by interpreting IRC § 7502 to provide the sole means by which 
taxpayers may prove timely delivery in the absence of direct proof of actual 
delivery. That construction of the statute is reasonable in light of the principle that 
“where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general 
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prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of 
evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. 483, 496 . 
. . (2013) (alteration omitted); see also Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 501 (9th 
Cir. 2017). Given that the purpose of enacting IRC § 7502 was to provide 
exceptions to the physical-delivery rule, it is reasonable to conclude that 
“Congress considered the issue of exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to 
the ones set forth.” United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 . . . (2000). 
In arguing that the Treasury Department unreasonably construed IRC § 
7502 as having displaced the common-law mailbox rule, the Baldwins invoke a 
different principle of statutory interpretation, which provides that “the common 
law . . . ought not to be deemed repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear 
and explicit for this purpose.” Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. 
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 464 U.S. 30, 35 . . . (1983) (alteration and 
internal quotation marks omitted). But the mere fact that dueling principles of 
statutory interpretation support opposing constructions of a statute does not prove, 
without more, that the agency’s interpretation is unreasonable. The question 
remains whether the agency has adopted a permissible construction of the statute, 
taking into account all of the interpretive tools available. As is true in this case, an 
agency’s construction can be reasonable even if another, equally permissible 
construction of the statute could also be upheld. 
Finally, our prior interpretation of IRC § 7502 in Anderson does not bar 
our decision to defer to the agency's conflicting, but nonetheless reasonable, 
construction of the statute. As noted above, before the relevant amendment of 
Treasury Regulation § 301.7502-1(e), we “decline[d] to read section 7502 as 
carving out exclusive exceptions to the old common law physical delivery rule.” 
Anderson, 966 F.2d at 491. But “[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a statute 
trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the 
prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous 
terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.” National 
Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 
967, 982 . . . (2005). We did not hold in Anderson that our interpretation of the 
statute was the only reasonable interpretation. In fact, our analysis made clear that 
our decision filled a statutory gap. Under Brand X, the Treasury Department was 
free to fill that gap by adopting its own reasonable interpretation of the governing 
statute. 
 
Id. at 842-43. The Supreme Court denied the Baldwins’ certiorari petition in February of 2020. 




 The IRS released guidance in 2019 regarding when taxpayers should file an amended 
return. See IRS Tax Tip 2019-70 (June 4, 2019), at 
https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USIRS/bulletins/2492287. According to the 
announcement, taxpayers who need to change their filing status or add previously omitted 
income should file an amended return. Id. In addition, “[t]axpayers who claimed deductions or 
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credits they shouldn't have claimed or didn't claim deductions or credits they could have claimed 
may need to file an amended return.” Id. The IRS further stated that taxpayers who make 
mathematical or clerical errors on the return or who fail to submit necessary forms typically do 
not need to file an amended return. Id. In those cases, the IRS will make the correction or contact 
the taxpayer by mail if additional information is needed. Id. The guidance also provides that 
taxpayers who are already due a refund should wait to get it before filing an amendment that 
increases the amount of their reported refund. Id. The IRS advised those who amend a return that 
will result in additional tax should pay the tax and file the amendment as soon as possible, so as 
to limit penalties and interest. Id.   
 
 More recently, the IRS announced that, for the first time, taxpayers may begin filing 
amended returns electronically. IRS Tax Tip 2020-69 (June 11, 2020). Taxpayers will only be 
able to file amended returns electronically for tax year 2019. Taxpayers will still have the option 




 The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 24, made several 
changes to Code section 7623 relating to whistleblower awards under section 7623(b). For 
example, the legislation expanded the base upon which the whistleblower award will be 
determined to include not just tax, penalties, interest, and additions to tax, but also “any proceeds 
arising from laws for which the Internal Revenue Service is authorized to administer, enforce, or 
investigate, including—(A) criminal fines and civil forfeitures, and (B) violations of reporting 
requirements.” I.R.C. § 7623(c)(2). The inclusion of criminal fines conflicts with guidance 
included in Treasury Regulation section 301.7623-2(d), cited on page 115 of the casebook. 
Legislative history to the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 confirms that penalties arising from 
violations of reporting requirements, such as the Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts 
requirement, should be included in the definition of proceeds that are subject to a whistleblower 
award. H. R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 336-39.   
 
 On another topic, the Taxpayer First Act includes modified procedures relating to 
whistleblower claims and protections for those who provide information. Act section 1405 gives 
the IRS more leeway to disclose information to the whistleblower during the course of the 
investigation. It amends Code section 6103(k) to permit the IRS to exchange information with 
whistleblowers to the extent that the disclosure is necessary to obtain information that is not 
otherwise reasonable available. I.R.C. § 6103(k)(13)(A). The IRS maintains that, in certain 
cases, ongoing interaction with whistleblowers during the audit can be beneficial, as the 
whistleblower may have information about sources and connections that are not otherwise 
available. Allyson Versprille, IRS ‘Black Hole’ Swallows Whistleblower Against Koch, Walmart, 
DAILY TAX REP. (BLOOMBERG LAW), Jul. 1, 2019. Act section 1405 also requires the IRS to 
notify whistleblowers about the status of their cases within 60 days of the case being referred to 
audit or when taxpayers make tax payments to settle liabilities relating to information that the 
whistleblower provided. I.R.C. § 7623(a) (as amended). In order to protect taxpayer 
confidentiality, the whistleblower who receives otherwise confidential taxpayer information is 
subject to criminal penalties for disclosing that information. Taxpayer First Act of 2019, Pub. L. 
No. 116-25 § 1405 (amending Code § 7213(a)(2)). 




 The Taxpayer First Act also amends section 7623 by adding subsection (d), which grants 
whistleblowers protections against retaliation from an employer. Legislative history relating to 
an earlier version of the bill explains the provision as follows:  
 
 The provision adds to section 7623, anti-retaliation whistleblower 
protections for employees. A person who alleges discharge or other reprisal by 
any person in violation of these protections may file a complaint with the 
Secretary of Labor (within 180 days after the date on which the violation occurs), 
and if the Secretary of Labor has not issued a final decision on such complaint 
within 180 days (and the delay is not due to bad faith of the claimant), an action 
may be brought in the appropriate district court. The remedies are consistent with 
those currently available under the False Claims Act, including compensatory 
damages or reinstatement, 200 percent of back pay and all lost benefits, with 
interest, and compensation for other special damages including litigation cost, 
expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees. 
 
H.R. REP. NO. 116-1957, at 61 (2019). 
 
Page 120:  
 
 The post-TEFRA partnership audit procedures enacted in 2015 and effective for returns 
filed after December 31, 2017 continue to raise questions for both taxpayers and tax advisors. 
Congress passed a set of technical corrections in 2018, Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, 
Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348, and the IRS has issued several sets of proposed regulations 
that seek to clarify the scope of the new audit regime and how items should be netted against one 
another to determine the total amount of the adjustment. See, e.g., 82 Fed. Reg. 27334 (June 14, 
2017) (creating Proposed Regulation section 301.6221(a)); 83 Fed. Reg. 4868 (Feb. 2, 2018) 
(creating Proposed Regulation section 301.6225). The IRS has since issued final regulations in 
section 301.6221(b)-(f), describing how eligible taxpayers can opt out of the new audit regime. 
T.D. 9892, 83 Fed. Reg. 24 (Jan. 2, 2018). In February of 2019, the IRS issued another set of 
final regulations that, among other changes, amends § 301.6222-1 relating to consistency 
requirements, and § 301.6241-1 relating to calculating the imputed underpayment. T.D. 9844, 84 
Fed. Reg. 6468 (Feb. 27, 2019). The regulations came shortly before the IRS announced that 
partnership audits under the post-TEFRA procedures would likely begin during the summer of 
2019. Kelly Zegers, Partnership Audits May Being This Summer, IRS Official Says, DAILY TAX 
REP. (BLOOMBERG LAW), June 6, 2019. Subsequently, the IRS Appeals Office released detailed 
guidance to its employees on partnership audit procedures. See Memorandum for Appeals 
Employees, AP-08-1019-0013 (Oct. 18, 2019), at https://www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/appeals/ap-08-
1019-0013.pdf.  
 
 The issues addressed in the Consolidated Appropriations Act and the updated final 
regulations are beyond the casebook’s scope. For those interested in an in-depth analysis of the 
new regime, see IRS Releases Final Regulations Under Centralized Partnership Audit Regime, 
Announces New Planned Proposed Regulations, J. TAX’N., June 2019, at 40; Keith C. Durkin, A 
Comprehensive Explanation of New Partnership Tax Audit Rules, 159 TAX NOTES 973 (2018); 
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Warren P. Kean, What to Know and Do About the New Partnership Audit Rules Now, 156 TAX 
NOTES 471 (2017).  
 
Page 143:  
 
Former IRS Commissioner Charles Rossotti recently proposed a plan to narrow the tax 
gap that makes use of the methodology of the bank deposits method. See Jasper L. Cummings, 
Jr., The Bank Deposits Method on Steroids, 167 TAX NOTES FED. 469, 469 (2020). Taxpayers 
reporting “more than $25,000 of business income …. would attach a schedule to the tax return 
reconciling the total amounts reported by the bank with the income and expenses reported on the 
tax return. For example, if the cash received in the bank account was greater than the amount 
reported on the return, the schedule would itemize the difference.” Charles O. Rossotti, Recover 
$1.6 Trillion, Modernize Tax Compliance and Assistance, 166 TAX NOTES FED. 1411, 1415 












 The Taxpayer First Act tightened the notification provisions in Code section 7602(c), 
which require the IRS to provide advance notice to the taxpayer before contacting third parties as 
part of an investigation of the taxpayer. Taxpayer First Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-25 § 1206. 
Code section 7602(c)(1), as amended, now requires 45-day advance notice (rather than 
“reasonable” advance notice), that the IRS intends to contact third parties. Moreover, as a 
general rule, the period of contact cannot be greater than one year. I.R.C. § 7602(c)(1) (as 
amended in 2019 by Pub. L. No. 116-25).  
 
 Code section 7602(c)(1) now includes the following language: “A notice shall not be 
issued under this paragraph unless there is an intent at the time such notice is issued to contact 
persons other than the taxpayer during the period specified in such notice.” This amendment 
appears to prevent the IRS from seeking to satisfy the section 7602(c) notification requirement 
by providing a general, broad notice to the taxpayer at the beginning of an audit.  
 
Earlier in 2019, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down the IRS’s claim 
that by providing taxpayers with a copy of IRS Publication 1 at the commencement of an audit, it 
satisfied the advance notification requirement. J.B. v. United States, 916 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th 
Cir. 2019). Publication 1 explains the audit process and includes language that the IRS may 
contact other persons to obtain information necessary to perform the audit. According to the 
court, the IRS fails to satisfy the “reasonable advance notice” requirement in section 7602(c)(1) 
“unless it provides notice reasonably calculated, under all relevant circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the possibility that the IRS may contact third parties, and that affords 
interested parties a meaningful opportunity to resolve issues and volunteer information before 
those third-party contacts are made.” Id. at 1173 (citing Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 
(2006)). According to the court, the general notice included in Publication 1 did not satisfy this 
requirement.  
  
 Note that the amendments to section 7602(c)(1) removed the “reasonable” modifier and 
do not specify what type of notice would satisfy the mandate. For example, does the IRS have to 
provide in the notice a list of specific third-party contacts it plans to make? The Ninth Circuit in 
J.B. did not go so far as to require a list specifying the names of the third parties. Adequate 
notice, according to the court, depends on the relevant facts. Id. at 1169; see also Highland 
Capital Management L.P. v. United States, 626 F. App’x 324, 327 (2d Cir. 2015) (ruling that 
section 7602(c) does not require separate notice before each third-party contact or advance notice 
of the specific documents that will be requested).   
 
Interim guidance issued in the summer of 2019 to the Commissioners of the four IRS 
operating divisions included sample third-party notification letters (Letter 3164: Third Party 
Contact Letter) that reflect the revisions to section 7602(c). The following is an excerpt from one 
of the sample letters: 
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We’re writing to tell you that we intend to contact other persons such as a 
neighbor, a bank, an employer, or employees. When we contact other persons, we 
generally need to tell them limited information, such as your name. 
 
The law prohibits us from disclosing more information than is necessary 
to obtain or verify the information we’re seeking. We will make contact 
beginning 45 days from the date of this letter, on [fill in beginning date], and 
ending one year later, on [fill in ending date]. You have a right to request a list of 
those contacted. You can make your request by telephone, in writing, or during a 
personal interview. 
 
Memorandum for Commissioners, LB&I, SBSE, TEGE, and W&I, SBSE-04-0719-0034 (July 
26, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/sbse/sbse-04-0719-0034.pdf.  
 
The updates included in the Memorandum are to be incorporated into various portions of 
the Internal Revenue Manual. In June of 2020 the IRS released revisions to Internal Revenue 
Manual section 5.9.3.12.1, incorporating the new requirements. IRM Procedural Update, New 
Third Party Contact Requirements, sbse-05-0520-0639 (May 26, 2020), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/sbse/sbse-05-0520-0639.pdf. Revisions to other affected 
provisions within the Internal Revenue Manual, including the Third-Party Contact Program 




  The Taxpayer First Act limited the IRS’s authority to issue John Doe summonses. In 
addition to the existing limitations in section 7609(f) that must be considered in a prior court 
hearing, the legislation adds an additional requirement: “The Secretary shall not issue any [John 
Doe] summons . . . unless the information sought to be obtained is narrowly tailored to 
information that pertains to the failure (or potential failure) of [taxpayers] . . . to comply with one 
or more provisions of the internal revenue laws which have been identified.” Taxpayer First Act 
of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-25 § 1204(a), 133 Stat. 981, 988 (2019) (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. § 7609(f)). The legislative history of a prior version of the bill fleshes out, to some 
degree, the intended purpose of the amendment: 
 
 The Committee believes that the John Doe summons is a useful tool, but 
that it is important that the information sought in the summons be at least 
potentially relevant to the tax liability of an ascertainable group. 
 The Committee also believes that the use of this important tool has at 
times potentially exceeded its intended purpose. A John Doe summons is not 
intended to be an opening bid for information from the party being served nor is it 
intended to be used for the purposes of a fishing expedition. Given the IRS’s past 
use of this authority, the Committee feels it is necessary to clarify its intended 
usage. 
 
H.R. REP. NO. 116-1957, at 41-42 (2019).  
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The amendments to section 7609(f) were not at issue in a case that has drawn significant 
attention, Taylor Lohmeyer Law Firm PLLC v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 3d 548 (W.D. Tex. 
2019). The Texas law firm of Taylor Lohmeyer received a John Doe summons seeking client 
lists and client account records of those who may have failed to report income from unidentified 
offshore accounts. The firm sought to quash the summons, claiming that their clients’ identities 
are protected by the attorney-client privilege. The District Court for the Western District of 
Texas rejected the firm’s challenge, noting that, as a general rule, the identity of a client is not 
privileged information. Id. at 555. The court also found that the firm failed to present sufficient 
evidence to rebut the presumption that the summons was enforceable. Id. at 557. 
 
The law firm appealed, and the District Court stayed enforcement of the John Doe 
summons while the appeal was decided. Taylor Lohmeyer Law Firm LLC v. United States, 2019 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194033. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected the firm’s privilege argument. 
957 Fed. 3d 505 (5th Cir. 2020): 
 
“[A]s [another] general rule, client identit[ies] and fee arrangements are not 
protected as privileged”. In re Grand Jury Subpoena for Attorney Representing 
Criminal Defendant Reyes-Requena, 926 F.2d 1423, 1431 (5th Cir. 1991) (Reyes-
Requena II) (citation omitted). That said, a “narrow exception” exists “when 
revealing the identity of the client and fee arrangements would itself reveal a 
confidential communication”. Id. (citation omitted). This “limited and rarely 
available sanctuary, which by virtue of its very nature must be considered on a 
case-to-case basis”, recognizes that “[u]nder certain circumstances, an attorney 
must conceal even the identity of a client, not merely his communications, from 
inquiry”. United States v. Jones (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 517 F.2d 666, 
671 (5th Cir. 1975) (citation omitted). 
 
The exception, however, does not expand the scope of the privilege; it 
does not apply “independent of the privileged communications between an 
attorney and his client”. In re Grand Jury Subpoena for Attorney Representing 
Criminal Defendant Reyes-Requena, 913 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(emphasis added). Rather, a client's identity is shielded “only where revelation of 
such information would disclose other privileged communications such as the 
confidential motive for retention”. Id. at 1125 (citation omitted). In that regard, 
the privilege “protect[s] the client's identity and fee arrangements in such 
circumstances not because they might be incriminating but because they are 
connected inextricably with a privileged communication—the confidential 
purpose for which [the client] sought legal advice”. Reyes-Requena II, 926 F.2d at 
1431 (emphasis added). 
 
Id. at 510.   
 
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the narrow exception to the general rule that client 
identities are not protected by privilege did not apply because the IRS did not purport to know 
that the clients had engaged in misconduct:     
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[C]ontrary to the Firm’s contention, [the IRS Agent’s] declaration did not 
state the Government knows the substance of the legal advice the Firm provided 
the Does. . . . Rather, it outlined evidence providing a “reasonable basis”, as 
required by 26 U.S.C. § 7609(f), “for concluding that the clients of [the Firm] are 
of interest to the [IRS] because of the [Firm’s] services directed at concealing its 
clients' beneficial ownership of offshore assets”. The 2018 declaration also made 
clear that “the IRS is pursuing an investigation to develop information about other 
unknown clients of [the Firm] who may have failed to comply with the internal 
revenue laws by availing themselves of similar services to those that [the Firm] 
provided to [a client of the firm who had already been audited and agreed to a 
deficiency arising from an offshore transaction]”. (Emphasis added.) . . . . 
[N]either of the Agent’s declarations in this case identified specific, substantive 
legal advice the IRS considered improper and then supported the Government’s 
effort to receive the identities of clients who received that advice. . . .  
 
Instead, the John Doe summons at issue seeks, inter alia: documents 
“reflecting any U.S. clients at whose request or on whose behalf [the Firm] ha[s] 
acquired or formed any foreign entity, opened or maintained any foreign financial 
account, or assisted in the conduct of any foreign financial transaction”; “[a]ll 
books, papers, records, or other data . . . concerning the provision of services to 
U.S. clients relating to setting up offshore financial accounts”; and “[a]ll books, 
papers, records, or other data . . . concerning the provision of services to U.S. 
clients relating to the acquisition, establishment or maintenance of offshore 
entities or structures of entities”. (Emphasis added.) As the Government asserted, 
this broad request, seeking relevant information about any U.S. client who 
engaged in any one of a number of the Firm’s services, is not the same as the 
Government’s knowing whether any Does engaged in allegedly fraudulent 
conduct, or the content of any specific legal advice the Firm gave particular Does, 
and then requesting their identities. 
 
Id. at 511.   
 
The attorney-client privilege is discussed in more detail in Section 4.03[A][1] of the 
casebook, and the issue of enforceability of a summons seeking the names of a law firm’s clients 




As explained on pages 165 to 166 of the casebook, the U.S. Supreme Court in United 
States v. Clarke ruled that the taxpayer, Dynamo Holdings, had a right to an evidentiary hearing 
to challenge the IRS’s summons if the taxpayer could identify facts that raised an inference of 
bad faith on the part of the IRS when it issued the summons. United States v. Clarke, 573 U.S. 
248, 254 (2014) (cited as 134 S. Ct. 2361 in the casebook). 
 
On remand, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s order to 
enforce the summonses and deny an evidentiary hearing to the taxpayer because the taxpayer’s 
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allegations of retaliation were mere conjecture and did not support an inference of improper 
motive. United States v. Clarke, 816 F.3d 1310, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016). Dynamo Holdings 
petitioned the Supreme Court for a second time, claiming that on remand the lower courts 
unfairly denied without any explanation its efforts to amend its pleadings to provide additional 
facts showing bad faith on the IRS’s part. See Matthew Beddingfield, Supreme Court Rejects 
Dynamo Holdings’ IRS Summons Case, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Jan. 10, 2017, at K-1. The 
Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving “open a legal procedure issues concerning a taxpayer’s 




In SEC v. Alderson, No. 18-CV-4930 (VEC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97241 (S.D.N.Y 
Jun. 10, 2019), the court distinguished Schaeffler v. United States, 806 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2015), 
and found that the taxpayer and its accounting firm were not engaged in a “common legal 
enterprise.” Id. at *22. Accordingly, the court found that privilege was waived when the 
company’s CEO transferred to its accounting firm, BDO USA, LLP (BDO), two tax opinions 
written by the company’s counsel “so that James Cassidy, BDO’s Senior Tax Director, could 
incorporate the opinions’ conclusions into BDO’s advice to clients.” Id. at *9, *18. 
 
For further reading on the attorney-client privilege, see William D. Elliott, Tax Practice 
and the Attorney-Client Privilege, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., Dec. 2019-Jan. 2020, at 35, 37 (stating 




 In United States v. Sanmina Corp., No. C 15-00092 WHA, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
172137 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2018), the court “affirm[ed] Judge Grewal’s finding that [certain] 
memoranda are protected by the attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product doctrine but 
finds that privilege was waived when Sanmina disclosed the memoranda to DLA Piper to obtain 
an opinion on value, then turned over the valuation report to the IRS.” Id. at *3. That case has 
been appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Sanmina Corp. 
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172137 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-17036 (9th 
Cir.). “The Ninth Circuit is entertaining the possibility that a district court conflated work 
product and attorney-client privilege when finding privilege waived on legal memoranda 
provided to outside counsel to prepare a valuation report.” Andrew Velarde, Oral Arguments in 
Privilege Waiver Appeal Focus on Work Product, 166 TAX NOTES FED. 1203, 1203 (2020). 
 
 Microsoft recently lost a privilege dispute in district court. See United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., No. C15-102RSM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8781, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2020). “The 
court spared only a fraction of the 174 documents claimed by Microsoft to be protected by the 
FATP privilege, work product doctrine, or attorney-client privilege, ordering most of them to be 
produced within a week.” Amanda Athanasiou, Microsoft Loses Years-Long Privilege Dispute, 











 The Taxpayer First Act codified a requirement for an “Internal Revenue Service 
Independent Office of Appeals.” Taxpayer First Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-25 § 1001, 133 
Stat. 981, 983 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 7803). According to the new legislation, “It 
shall be the function of the Internal Revenue Service Independent Office of Appeals to resolve 
Federal tax controversies without litigation on a basis which—(A) is fair and impartial to both 
the Government and the taxpayer, (B) promotes a consistent application and interpretation of, 
and voluntary compliance with, the Federal tax laws, and (C) enhances public confident in the 
integrity and efficiency of the Internal Revenue Service.” I.R.C. § 7803(e)(3). The new 
legislation also provides for the appointment of a “Chief of Appeals” who will report directly to 
the IRS Commissioner. I.R.C. § 7803(e)(2). The IRS Commissioner made that appointment in 
May of 2020. William Hoffman, Keyso Named Chief of Independent Offices of Appeals, 167 
TAX NOTES FED. 1474 (2020). 
 
 The practical effect of the new legislation on the Appeals process remains unclear at this 
point. See Kristen A. Parillo, IRS Reform Bill Won’t Make ‘Sea Change’ to Appeals Process, 163 
TAX NOTES FED. 2049 (2019). The legislation envisions the Appeals function continuing to be 
part of the IRS’s operations, not a separate entity. According to the legislative history of an 
earlier version of the bill, “Independent Appeals is intended to perform functions similar to those 
of the current Appeals.” H.R. REP. NO. 116-1957, at 30 (2019). Moreover, “cases of a type that 
are referred to Appeals under present law remain eligible for referral to Independent Appeals.” 
Id. at 31. 
 
 The legislation does include several components that could affect how the Appeals 
process operates. For example, the statute generally requires that Appeals provide the taxpayer 
access to nonprivileged portions of the taxpayer’s case file no later than 10 days before a 
scheduled Appeals conference. I.R.C. § 7803(e)(7)(A). Access must be granted to individuals 
with adjusted gross income not exceeding $400,000 and entities with gross receipts not 
exceeding $5 million for the taxable year to which the dispute relates. I.R.C. § 7803(e)(7)(C). 
Previously, taxpayers who were denied access to their case files were required to file FOIA 
requests, as discussed below and on Page 282 of Chapter 6 of the casebook.  
 
Officials within the IRS Appeals Office are concerned about how the IRS will implement 
the new requirement, which becomes effective in July 2020. A lack of personnel to process 
requests and redact privileged information are among their concerns. See Allyson Versprille, IRS 
Appeals Seeks More Staff to Deal with New Case-File Access, DAILY TAX REP. (BLOOMBERG 
LAW) (Oct. 22, 2019). 
 
 The new legislation also added Code section 7803(e)(6): “The Chief of Appeals shall 
have authority to obtain legal assistance and advice from the staff of the Office of the Chief 
Counsel. The Chief Counsel shall ensure, to the extent practicable, that such assistance and 
advice is provided by staff of the Office of the Chief Counsel who were not involved in the case 
with respect to which such assistance and advice is sought and who are not involved in preparing 
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such case for litigation.” Taxpayer First Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-25 § 1001(a), 133 Stat. 
981, 984. This provision appears to be aimed at concerns that the IRS has skirted the ex parte 
communication limitations, discussed on pages 228 to 230 of the casebook, by allowing Chief 
Counsel attorneys to become involved in audits and Appeal cases. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-1957, 
at 29 (2019). According to this Committee report, which relates to a prior version of the bill, “to 
the extent practicable, staff assigned to answer inquiries from Independent Appeals should not 
include those involved in advising the IRS employees working directly on the case prior to its 
referred to Independent Appeals or in preparation of the case for litigation.” Id. at 30. 
 
 The pilot program that allows IRS exam personnel and representatives from the IRS 
Chief Counsel’s Office to participate in certain Appeals conferences has drawn criticism. The 
IRS maintains that the goal of the program “is to narrow the scope of the dispute and not to force 
taxpayers into mediation.” Kristin A. Parillo, IRS Appeals Conference Pilot Designed to Narrow 
Scope of Dispute, 165 TAX NOTES FED. 1515 (2019). However, taxpayer representatives and 
other officials, including the National Taxpayer Advocate, maintain that the program threatens 
the independence of the IRS Appeals Office and is inconsistent with legislative changes included 
in the Taxpayer First Act. Stephanie Cumings, IRS Appeals is Thwarting Congress, Taxpayer 
Advocate Says, 166 TAX NOTES FED. 307 (2020). The 2020 National Taxpayer Advocate Report 
proposes amendments to Code section 7803 that would require that taxpayers consent to the 
participation of exam and counsel representatives in an Appeals Conference before that 




The Taxpayer First Act also includes provisions that envision greater access to the 
Appeals process. First, Code section 7803(e)(4) mandates that access to Appeals “shall be 
generally available to all taxpayers.” Subsection (e)(5) goes further, requiring that Appeals 
provide a taxpayer who receives a notice of deficiency and who is denied a requested Appeals 
conference a detailed written explanation explaining why the denial took place. I.R.C. § 
7803(e)(5). The legislation grants a taxpayer who was denied an Appeals conference the right to 
protest the denial to the IRS Commissioner. I.R.C. § 7803(e)(5)(C). It also requires the IRS to 
report to Congress each year the number of requests for an Appeals conference that were denied 
and the basis for these denials. I.R.C. § 7803(e)(5)(B). The IRS does not appear to have released 
the first report, but an IRS official maintains that, in the period since Congress enacted section 
7803(e)(5), the IRS has denied access to Appeals to only a “handful” of docketed cases. Kristen 
A. Parillo, ‘Handful’ of Taxpayers Denied Access to Appeals, 166 TAX NOTES FED. 1037 (2020).   
 
Although not mentioned in the legislative history, a recent case involving Facebook Inc.’s 
ongoing dispute with the IRS may be part of what prompted the provisions relating to Appeals 
access. The case also raises interesting questions about the extent to which the Taxpayer Bill of 
Rights, discussed in Section 1.02[B] of the casebook, creates enforceable obligations on the 
IRS’s part. See Leandra Lederman, Is the Taxpayer Bill of Rights Enforceable?, Indiana Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 404 (April 4, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3365777 (discussing 
this issue and the Facebook case). 
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 In Facebook, after receiving a notice of deficiency alleging that it had undervalued 
intangible assets transferred to an Irish subsidiary and asserting a $1.73 million deficiency for 
2010, Facebook filed a petition in Tax Court contesting the deficiency. Facebook requested a 
conference with the Appeals Office, which the IRS denied. The dispute over the right to an IRS 
Appeal went before a U.S. magistrate judge, who ruled that Facebook did not have a legally 
protected right to an Appeals conference in a tax deficiency case. Facebook Inc. & Subsidiaries 
v. IRS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81986 (N.D. Cal., May 14, 2018).  
 
 Facebook based its claim on the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), alleging that the 
“IRS acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in violation of law, in refusing to refer its tax case to IRS 
Appeals.” The IRS maintained that its decision not to grant an Appeals conference in a dispute 
over tax liability is not reviewable under the APA. Id. at *3-4. The magistrate judge agreed that 
the IRS’s decision was not reviewable, and also ruled that Facebook did not have standing to 
challenge the IRS’s decision because “the deprivation of a nonexistent right to access IRS 
Appeals does not constitute an injury in fact.” Id. at *4. 
 
 As part of her analysis, the magistrate judge noted that while the IRS Reform Act grants 
taxpayers an absolute right to an Appeals conference in certain collection cases, that absolute 
right does not exist in other contexts. Id. at *5. That remains true even after the IRS adopted in 
2014 the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (“TBOR”), mentioned on pages 8 to 9 of the casebook, which 
includes “the right to appeal an IRS decision to an independent forum.” The Taxpayer Bill of 
Rights was signed into law in 2015 as part of the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act, 
Pub. L. No. 114-113, Div Q, Title IV, Subtitle A, § 401(a), 129 Stat. 3117 (2015) (adding I.R.C. 
§ 7803(a)(3)). Relying on legislative history, the judge concluded that the statutory TBOR did 
not create new enforceable taxpayer rights, but merely obligated the IRS Commissioner to ensure 
that IRS employees are familiar with and act in accordance with preexisting taxpayer rights 
established by other Code provisions. Id. at *23. And even if TBOR did create an enforceable 
right to appeal a decision to an independent forum, Facebook failed to establish that the right 
related to the IRS Appeals Office, as opposed to the right to contest the deficiency in an 
independent forum such as the Tax Court. Id. at *25. 
 
 The magistrate judge also ruled that Facebook failed to make a case under the APA 
because the decision not to grant an Appeal did not represent a “final agency action for which 
there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” Id. at *48 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704). According to the 
judge: 
 
The IRS’s decision not to refer Facebook’s tax case to IRS Appeals similarly is 
not a final agency action because it is not an action “by which rights or 
obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” 
Facebook retains its right to challenge the IRS’s tax-deficiency determination 
before the Tax Court (or to try to negotiate a settlement with the IRS Counsel), 
and it is Facebook’s and the IRS’s litigation (and/or negotiation) going forward 
that will ultimately determine the parties’ rights, obligations, and legal 
consequences. . . . Again, Facebook’s argument to the contrary depends on its 
assumption that it had an enforceable right to take its tax case to IRS Appeals, and 
that the IRS’s decision not to refer its case to IRS Appeals foreclosed that right. 
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But as described above, Facebook does not have this right. The IRS’s decision not 
to refer Facebook’s tax case to IRS appeals did not alter this non-right or 
otherwise determine any rights, obligations, or legal consequences. It therefore is 
not a final agency action that is reviewable under the APA. 
 
Id. at *31-32.      
 
 Note that, in response to Facebook’s request for an IRS Appeal, the IRS had sent a letter 
to Facebook stating that a referral to Appeals “is not in the interest of sound tax administration.” 
Id. at *27-28. This and the ensuing litigation occurred prior to the enactment of the Taxpayer 
First Act. Newly enacted Code section 7803(e)(5) would not necessarily have granted Facebook 
an Appeals conference as a matter of right, but presumably the IRS would have had to justify its 
refusal with a more detailed explanation. Section 7803(e)(5)(C) also provides that “The 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall prescribe procedures for protesting to the Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue a denial of a request described in subparagraph (A).” Such procedures would 
seem to give a future taxpayer in Facebook’s position an opportunity to protest the denial to the 
IRS Commissioner. At this point, the Commissioner has not prescribed procedures for protesting 
denial of an Appeals conference request. For further reading on the Facebook case and the 
TBOR, see Lederman, supra, and the articles in the Temple Law Review symposium, “Taxpayer 




 As discussed in Section 7.03[D] of the casebook, a taxpayer may be asked, but cannot be 
forced, to extend the statute of limitations on assessment in order to give the IRS examining 
agent more time to complete an audit. See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4)(B) (stating that the IRS “shall 
notify the taxpayer of the taxpayer’s right to refuse to extend the period of limitations, or to limit 
such extension to particular issues or to a particular period of time, on each occasion when the 
taxpayer is requested to provide such consent”). According to some experienced practitioners, 
“solicitation of consents to extend the limitation period on assessment has become the norm 
rather than the exception.” Frank Agostino & Valeria Vlasenko, Consents to Extend the State of 
Limitations on Assessment: How to Protect a Taxpayer’s Rights to Finality and Quality Service 
and Avoid Hardship, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., Apr.-May 2019, at 5, 6. See also Hale E. Sheppard, 
Clarifying Misconceptions About Extending Assessment-Periods and “Cooperating” During IRS 
Audits, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., Aug.-Sept. 2019, at 41, 42 (“The norm in modern times is for the 
IRS to seek one or more Forms 872 from taxpayers in essentially every audit.”) 
 
 The decision of whether to extend voluntarily the limitations period can have significant 
consequences. If the taxpayer refuses to grant an extension, the IRS agent generally will 
conclude the audit and issue a Notice of Deficiency, meaning that the taxpayer will be pressured 
to decide quickly whether to pursue the case in Tax Court and negotiate with Appeals on a 
docketed basis. Sheppard, supra at 40. Giving up the opportunity to negotiate with Appeals on a 
nondocketed basis may also affect whether the burden of proof on factual issues shifts to the IRS 
under section 7491 and whether the taxpayer can recoup fees under section 7430. Id. at 43-44. If 
the IRS asks the taxpayer to extend the statute of limitations on assessment, Agostino and 
Vlasenko suggest the following: 




1) [I]dentify the contested issues; 2) limit the scope of the consent to such issues 
using simple unambiguous language; 3) ask for suspension of interest under Code 
Sec. 6404(g); 4) request that no penalties be assessed; and 5) send the request in 
writing to the Revenue Agent. Practitioners should stress that consent to extend 
the limitations period on assessment is a unilateral waiver of a fundamental right. 
Accordingly, the government should suspend interest and avoid asserting 
penalties in consideration of such a waiver. 
 




 In response to concerns from practitioners, an IRS official announced (prior to the 
COVID-19 pandemic) that the decision over whether an Appeals conference will take place in 
person or by telephone will be at the discretion of the taxpayer. This position reverses guidance 
issued in Internal Revenue Manual section 8.6.1.4.1., cited in the casebook, which places the 
discretion to grant an in-person conference with the Appeals Office. According to an IRS 
announcement in November of 2018: 
 
[I]f a taxpayer or representative requests an in-person conference and the assigned 
Appeals employee’s office cannot accommodate in-person conferences, the case 
will be sent to an Appeals office that can accommodate the request. This guidance 
provides that Appeals will use its best efforts to schedule the in-person conference 
at a location that is reasonably convenient for both the taxpayer and Appeals. 
Appeals’ ability to hold the conference in the taxpayer’s preferred location may 
be limited due to regulatory requirements or resource constraints, including the 
availability of Appeals employees with appropriate subject matter expertise and 
the level of case inventories at the preferred location. 
 
AP-08-1118-0013 (Nov. 28, 2018), at https://www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/spder/ap-08-1118-
0013.pdf. The IRS has updated Internal Revenue Manual section 8.6.1.4.1 to reflect these 
changes. 
  







 The casebook explains that “if a taxpayer wishes to obtain materials that were prepared 
by the IRS during an investigation of the taxpayer’s own return, the taxpayer may have to make 
an individual FOIA request.” The Taxpayer First Act amended Code section 7803 to add new 
subsection (e), which includes the following:  
 
In any case in which a conference with the Internal Revenue Service Independent 
Office of Appeals has been scheduled upon request of a specified taxpayer, the 
Chief of Appeals shall ensure that such taxpayer is provided access to the 
nonprivileged portions of the case file on record regarding the disputed issues 
(other than documents provided by the taxpayer to the Internal Revenue Service) 
not later than 10 days before the date of such conference.  
 
Taxpayer First Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-25 § 1001(a) (new paragraph 7803(e)(7)). The new 
provision limits the definition of “specified taxpayer” by adjusted gross income for individuals 
and gross receipts for everyone else. Id. A recent article explains further: 
 
In the past, taxpayers needed to request the administrative file directly from the 
Exam Team or file a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. These methods 
of obtaining taxpayer information are often burdensome and time consuming for 
taxpayers. Although the changes to access to the administrative file are welcome, 
the right to access is limited to individuals whose adjusted gross income does not 
exceed $400,000 for the year at issue and to entities whose gross receipts do not 
exceed $5 million for the year at issue. Thus, this provision will not provide any 
benefit to taxpayers who are audited by the IRS’s Large Business & International 
division. 
 
Andrew R. Roberson & Kevin Spencer, Taxpayer First Act: Changes to the IRS Appeals 





The Taxpayer First Act amended Code section 6103(c), as well as several other 
subsections of 6103. See, e.g., Taxpayer First Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-25 §§ 1405(a) 
(amending section 6103(k) to add a new paragraph relating to “Disclosure To Whistleblowers”), 
2003 (amending section 6103(k) to add a new paragraph relating to “Disclosure of Return 
Information For Purposes of Cybersecurity and the Prevention of Identity Theft Tax Refund 
Fraud”), 2004(a) (amending section 6103(p) to add a new paragraph relating to “Disclosure To 
Contractors and Other Agents”), 2202(a), (b) (amending section 6103(c) and (a)(3)). The 
amendment to section 6103(c) adds the following language: 
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Persons designated by the taxpayer under this subsection to receive return 
information shall not use the information for any purpose other than the express 
purpose for which consent was granted and shall not disclose return information 
to any other person without the express permission of, or request by, the taxpayer. 
 
Id. § 2202(a). The Act also adds subsection (c) to the list in section 6103(a)(3). Id. § 
2202(b).  
 
A recent event brought section 6103 to the attention of the general public. In the spring of 
2019, the House Ways and Means Committee, which is chaired by Rep. Richard Neal, sought to 
obtain President Trump’s 2013 through 2018 tax returns under the authority of Code section 
6103(f). Rep. Neal sent a letter to IRS Commissioner Charles Rettig on April 3, 2019 seeking 
those returns. Debbie Lord, Trump’s Tax Returns: What is 6103 and How Will It Be Used to Get 
Trump’s Returns?, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Apr. 9, 2019), 
https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/national/trump-tax-returns-what-6103-and-how-will-
used-get-trump-returns/ySwIPaFbjWrAN2L0nVtkxJ/ (linking Rep. Neal’s letter). Section 
6103(f)(1), which is not discussed in the casebook, provides: 
 
Upon written request from the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of 
the House of Representatives, the chairman of the Committee on Finance of the 
Senate, or the chairman of the Joint Committee on Taxation, the Secretary shall 
furnish such committee with any return or return information specified in such 
request, except that any return or return information which can be associated with, 
or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer shall be 
furnished to such committee only when sitting in closed executive session unless 
such taxpayer otherwise consents in writing to such disclosure. 
 
I.R.C. § 6103(f)(1) (emphasis added). Rep. Neal’s letter explained in part that “the Committee is 
considering legislative proposals and conducting oversight related to our Federal tax laws, 
including, but not limited to, the extent to which the IRS audits and enforces the tax laws against 
a President.” Letter from the Hon. Richard E. Neal, to the Hon. Charles Rettig, Before the H. 




The major events in this dispute include the following: On April 5, 2019, President 
Trump’s wrote a letter to the Treasury Department’s General Counsel “challenging Neal’s 
request for the returns, saying that to grant the request would set a ‘dangerous precedent.’” Lord, 
supra. The letter further stated that “Even if Ways and Means had a legitimate purpose for 
requesting the President’s tax returns and return information, that purpose is not driving 
Chairman Neal’s request. His request is a transparent effort by one political party to harass an 
official from the other party because they dislike his politics and speech.” Letter from William S. 
Consovoy, to Brent J. McIntosh (Apr. 5, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/4.5.2019_Letter_from_WConsovoy_to_BMcI
ntosh.pdf. On April 10, “Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin informed Congress . . . that his 
department would be unable to comply with House Democrats’ deadline . . . .” Lauren Fox & 
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Caroline Kelly, Mnuchin Says Treasury Unable to Comply with Deadline for Trump’s Tax 
Returns, CNN (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/10/politics/trump-tax-returns-
house-deadline/index.html. On April 13, 2019, Rep. Neal sent another written request to 
Commissioner Rettig. Lauren Fox & Donna Borak, House Committee Sends New Letter to IRS 
Demanding Trump’s Tax Returns, CNN (Apr. 13, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/13/politics/trump-tax-returns-house-letter-irs/index.html (linking 
to the letter).  
 
On May 6, 2019, “Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin . . . told House Democrats he 
would not furnish President Trump’s tax returns . . . .” Damian Paletta & Jeff Stein, Mnuchin 
Rejects Democrats’ Demand to Hand Over Trump’s Tax Returns, All but Ensuring Legal Battle, 
WASH. POST (May 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/mnuchin-
rejects-democrats-demand-to-hand-over-trumps-tax-returns-all-but-ensuring-legal-
battle/2019/05/06/5483f8ac-7022-11e9-9eb4-
0828f5389013_story.html?utm_term=.d25ede5546b9 (linking Mnuchin’s letter). On May 10, 
2019, “Neal subpoenaed six years of the president’s personal tax returns along with six years of 
returns from eight Trump companies. The subpoenas were sent to both Mnuchin and IRS 
Commissioner Charles Rettig, requiring them to deliver the documents to committee offices by 5 
p.m. May 17.” Doug Sword, Mnuchin Refuses to Comply with Subpoenas for Trump Tax 
Returns, ROLL CALL (May 17, 2019), https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/trump-tax-returns-
battle-could-head-to-court-as-early-as-next-week. Mnuchin refused to comply with the 
subpoena. Kevin Breuninger, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin Defies House Democrats’ 
Subpoena for Trump’s Tax Returns, CNBC (May 17, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/17/mnuchin-says-will-defy-house-democrats-subpoena-for-
trumps-tax-returns.html (stating that “[i]n a letter sent about an hour before the subpoena’s 5 
p.m. ET deadline, Mnuchin said that he would not authorize the IRS to give Trump’s personal 
and business tax returns to Congress” and linking the letter). 
 
On July 2, 2019, the House Ways and Means Committee filed suit in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia “ask[ing] this Court to order Defendants to comply with 
Section 6103(f) and the subpoenas by producing the requested information immediately.” 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Comm. on Ways & Means v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Treas., No. 1:19-cv-1974 (D.D.C. filed Jul. 2, 2019), 
https://waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/As
%20filed%20Complaint.pdf. There have been two opinions issued so far in this case. The first 
one, Comm. on Ways & Means v. U.S. Dep’t of Treas., No. 1:19-cv-1974, 2019 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 147260, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2019), denied the Ways and Means Committee’s motion 
to expedite and denied the Committee’s motion for summary judgment as premature. The second 
one, Comm. on Ways & Means v. U.S. Dep’t of Treas., No. 1:19-cv-1974, 2019 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 171609, at *4 (D.D.C. Sep. 4, 2019), denied as lacking standing the motion to intervene 
of Duane Morley Cox. Mr. Cox apparently is a member of the public. See generally id.  
 
It will be interesting to see the ultimate outcome of this case. In a related development, on 
July 9, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a pair of cases relating to access to President 
Trump’s financial documents. Both were 7 to 2 decisions authored by Chief Justice Roberts. In 
Trump v. Vance, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3552 (July 9, 2020), the Court refused to grant categorical 
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relief from a subpoena issued by the New York County District attorney’s Office to the 
President’s accounting firm, seeking information that included tax returns. Id. at *10-11, *39. 
The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the lower court, where the 
President can make further arguments. Id. at *39. 
 
Trump et al. v. Mazars USA, LLP, et al., 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3553 (July 9, 2020), involved 
three House committees’ subpoenas, including one that encompassed tax returns:  
 
The House Committee on Financial Services issued a subpoena to Deutsche 
Bank seeking any document related to account activity, due diligence, 
foreign transactions, business statements, debt schedules, statements 
of net worth, tax returns, and suspicious activity identified by 
Deutsche Bank. It issued a second subpoena to Capital One for similar 
information. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued 
a subpoena to Deutsche Bank that mirrored the subpoena issued by 
the Financial Services Committee. And the House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform issued a subpoena to the President’s personal 
accounting firm, Mazars USA, LLP, demanding information related to 
the President and several affiliated businesses. 
 
Id. at *1 (case Syllabus). In this case, the court held that the subpoenas did not exceed the House 
Committees’ constitutional authority but remanded the case for further consideration of 
separation of powers issues. Id. at *18-25, *37. Note that the Trump v. Mazars case did not 
involve the House Ways and Means Committee. 
 
For further reading on this pair of Supreme Court decisions, see Paul Caron, Perspectives 
On The Supreme Court’s Trump Tax Return Decision, TAXPROF BLOG (July 10, 2020), 
https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2020/07/perspectives-on-the-supreme-courts-trump-
tax-return-decision.html. For further reading on the question of whether the President’s returns 
can and/or should be kept confidential, see, e.g., Lawrence Gibbs, INSIGHT: Let’s Not Forget 
There’s a Reason for Keeping Tax Returns Private, DAILY TAX REP. (BLOOMBERG LAW) (Aug. 
14, 2019), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/insight-lets-not-forget-theres-a-
reason-for-keeping-tax-returns-private; Joseph J. Thorndike, Lawmakers Have a Right to 
Trump’s Returns—Or Do They?, 163 TAX NOTES FED. 1141 (2019); James W. Wetzler, Trump’s 
Taxes and the Erosion of Norms, 164 TAX NOTES FED. 1069 (2019). 
 
  







The casebook discusses United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478 
(2012), which held that Code section 6501(e)’s six-year statute of limitations does not apply to 
overstatements of basis. Beverly Clark Collection, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-150 
involves the application of Home Concrete to an alleged sham transaction.  
 
In a 2010 opinion in Beverly Clark Collection, the U.S. Tax Court decided the case based 
on an overstatement of basis argument. Id. at *4. The IRS appealed the 2010 decision but 
abandoned its “overstatement of basis argument after the U.S. Supreme Court decided United 
States v. Home Concrete & Supply ….” Id.at *5-6. In 2014, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit vacated the Tax Court decision so that the court could consider the IRS’s “sham 
transaction” argument. Id. at *6. In its 2019 opinion, the Tax Court found the two arguments to 
be a distinction without a difference: 
 
[R]espondent’s theory here is that a sham sale, not an overstatement of basis, gave 
rise to the omission. So we must decide whether that distinction makes any 
difference. We conclude that it does not; we are bound to the Supreme Court's 
analysis. That is, even if we assume that the basis was not wrong but the sale . . . 
was a sham, the Clarks did not omit an item of gain entirely; they just reported an 
incorrect amount of gain. 
 




 Finnegan v. Commissioner, 926 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2019), affirmed the Tax Court 
decision cited in the casebook. Finnegan applied the Tax Court’s decision in Allen v. 
Commissioner, 128 T.C. 37 (2007), which, as discussed in the casebook, applied the unlimited 
statute of limitations for fraud where the fraud was committed by the return preparer, not the 
taxpayer.  
 
In Finnegan, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court’s application of Allen (thus 
ruling in favor of the IRS). Finnegan, 926 F.3d at 1264. However, like the Tax Court, the Court 
of Appeals found that the taxpayers “waived this argument. They knew that the IRS was relying 
on Allen and its holding, and they chose not to challenge it. They didn’t challenge it before, 
during, or after trial. In fact, they explicitly told the Tax Court they admitted to Allen and were 
not challenging it.” Id. at 1270. Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit did not face 
the issue of whether it agreed with the holding of Allen, and it did not substantively engage with 
BASR Partnership v. United States, 795 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015), a case the IRS brought to the 
Tax Court’s attention about a year after the trial in Finnegan (and which the casebook discusses 
on pages 353-54).  
  





Page 378:  
 
 One of the issues where the U.S. Tax Court differs from other federal courts is how the 
documents filed in its cases can be accessed by non-parties. Because the Tax Court is not subject 
to the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, its documents are not available online from Public 
Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER), https://www.pacer.gov/. Instead, the Tax Court 
makes available for free on its own website some documents, notably opinions and orders. See 
U.S. Tax Court, Opinions Search, https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/UstcInOp/OpinionSearch.aspx; 
U.S. Tax Court, Orders, https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/InternetOrders/TodaysOrders.aspx 
(providing a search tool). However, before the COVID-19 pandemic, other filings typically were 
only available from the Tax Court’s offices in Washington, D.C. or by mail. See Maggie Goff & 
T. Keith Fogg, Nonparty Remote Electronic Access to Tax Court Records, 167 TAX NOTES FED. 
771, 773 (2020) (“Although Tax Court reports and orders are available online free of charge, all 
other documents, such as briefs and motions, cannot be remotely accessed by nonparties 
online.”) 
 
 The Tax Court’s exclusion from PACER not only impedes access, it increases private 
costs. 
 
In the words of the PACER website, “PACER hosts millions of case file 
documents and docket information for all district, bankruptcy, and appellate 
courts. These are available immediately after they have been electronically filed.” 
PACER thus facilitates quick electronic access to numerous documents in a case 
file. PACER also has a fee schedule that is significantly below 50 cents per page: 
 
“Access to case information costs $0.10 per page. The cost to access a single 
document is capped at $3.00, the equivalent of 30 pages. The cap does not apply 
to name searches, reports that are not case-specific, and transcripts of federal 
court proceedings. 
 
By Judicial Conference policy, if your usage does not exceed $15 in a quarter, 
fees are waived.” 
 
Leandra Lederman, Increased Transparency in the U.S. Tax Court: Has the Moment Arrived?, 
SURLY SUBGROUP BLOG, https://surlysubgroup.com/2018/11/01/increased-transparency-in-the-u-
s-tax-court-has-the-moment-arrived/ (Nov. 1, 2018). 
 
In contrast with PACER, the Tax Court’s photocopy fee is 50 cents per page. See Press 
Release, U.S. TAX COURT (Jan. 15, 2020) (Fee Schedule, page 1), 
https://ustaxcourt.gov/press/01152020.pdf. This can be cost-prohibitive even for those in the 
Washington, DC area. The court prohibits cell phone or other photography of documents (which 
would help lower costs for those able to access the court in person). Goff & Fogg, supra, at 792. 
Professor Keith Fogg has blogged about this set of issues issue on Procedurally Taxing, and he 
has also co-authored an article laying out the concern. See generally id.  




The Goff and Fogg article also observes that the Tax Court closed for a period of time 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, eliminating access to many documents during the period of 
closure. Id. at 772. More specifically, the Tax Court closed to visitors on March 13, 2020 and 
announced that it would not process requests for photocopies. Press Release, U.S. TAX COURT 1 
(Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/03132020.pdf. At the end of May, the Tax 
Court announced that on June 1, 2020, it would “resume accepting requests for copies of Court 
records from non-parties (copy requests).” Press Release, U.S. TAX COURT 1 (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/05292020_copies.pdf. That Press Release announced several 
changes: “Until further notice, all copy requests must be made by telephone and will be fulfilled 
electronically by email. The Court’s fees with respect to these copy requests will be $0.50 per 
page, with a per-document cap of $3.00.” Id.  
 
That per-document cap is in line with PACER’s approach. The Tax Court’s use of email 
should also make the process much easier for requesters. Keith Fogg praised the changes in a 
blog post. See Keith Fogg, What Information Should the Tax Court Make Available 
Electronically to Non-Parties, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Jun. 2, 2020), 
https://procedurallytaxing.com/what-information-should-the-tax-court-make-available-
electronically-to-non-parties/. In part, he stated: 
 
Wealth should not control access to justice. Pro se litigants and low income 
taxpayer clinics lack the resources to go to DC and sit in the Tax Court’s clerk’s 
office to look at documents and generally lack the ability to pay $.50 per page to 
obtain briefs and other documents that might assist in their cases. Big firms do not 
face the financial barriers and the IRS has access to everything as an institutional 
player. The new cost structure announced in the press release discussed above 
will go a long way toward breaking down the barrier created by wealth and, 




It would be very helpful if the Tax Court were included in PACER or could offer a 
similar online system, but changes along those lines do not seem likely anytime soon. 
 
In 2018 the Tax Court announced that it had signed a one-year contract 
with a software developer to build an electronic filing and case management 
system. People were hopeful that the new system would provide the “first-ever 
public Internet access to U.S. Tax Court briefs,” but a recent announcement from 
the chief judge indicates the Tax Court “does not yet envision changing its policy 
regarding posting material online.” 
 
Goff & Fogg, supra, at 773-74 (footnotes omitted). The Tax Court upgraded its website on July 
17, 2020. See Keith Fogg, Tax Court Website, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (July 21, 2020). 
However, the court has not issued a press release about its planned new system. See Press 
Releases, U.S. TAX COURT, https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press_releases.html (last visited July 22, 
2020). 






 Since the casebook’s publication in 2018, the U.S. Tax Court has made a number of 
changes in its Rules of Practice and Procedure, which are available online at 
https://ustaxcourt.gov/rules.html. The Tax Court’s website indicates which rules have been 
amended. See Press Releases, U.S. TAX COURT, https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press_releases.html 
(announcing several amendments to the Rules). In particular, the court made November 30, 
2018; July 15, 2019; and January 15, 2020 amendments, and the court also proposed 
amendments on April 21, 2020. See id.  
 
The November 30, 2018 amendments include changes to Rules 3, 11, 13, 20, 22, 23, 25, 
34, 143, 280, and 281. U.S. Tax Ct. Notice (Nov. 30, 2018), 
https://ustaxcourt.gov/resources/rules/Notice_113018.pdf, at 1. They also include new Title 
XXXIV (Certification and Failure to Reverse Certification Action with Respect to Passports), 
which contains Rules 350 through 354. Id. at 2. For explanations of the rule changes, see Press 
Release, U.S. TAX COURT Appendix (Nov. 30, 2018), https://ustaxcourt.gov/press/113018.pdf. 
 
The Tax Court’s July 15, 2019 amendments include changes to Rules 13, 20, 25, 34, 38, 
60, 61, 74, 230, 233, 240, and 310. Notice, U.S. TAX COURT 1 (Jul. 15, 2019), 
https://ustaxcourt.gov/resources/rules/Notice_071519.pdf. They also include new Title XXIV.A 
(Partnership Actions Under BBA [Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015] Section 1101), containing 
Rules 255.1 through 255.7. For explanations of these changes, see Press Release, U.S. TAX 
COURT Appendix (Jul. 15, 2019), https://ustaxcourt.gov/press/071519.pdf. 
 
In addition, on May 10, 2019, “Chief Judge Foley announced . . . that the United States 
Tax Court has adopted procedures to permit admitted practitioners in good standing to enter a 
limited appearance at scheduled trial sessions. The procedures will take effect at the beginning of 
the 2019 Fall Term.” Press Release, U.S. TAX COURT (May 10, 2019), 
https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/051019.pdf. For the procedure, see Admin. Order No. 2019-01, 
U.S. TAX COURT (May 10, 2019), 
https://ustaxcourt.gov/resources/rules/limited_eoa/Admin_Order_No_2019-01.pdf.  
 
The Tax Court’s January 15, 2020 amendments include changes to Rules 11, 12, and 200. 
In part, the amendments “replaced Appendix II, Fees and Charges, with a Fee Schedule.” Press 
Release, U.S. TAX COURT 1 (Jan. 15, 2020), https://ustaxcourt.gov/press/01152020.pdf. The 
amendments are explained in that press release. See generally id. (Appendix). Although the fee 
schedule authorizes a periodic fee for Tax Court bar membership, Professor Keith Fogg has 
explained that the authorization does not necessarily mean that the Tax Court will impose one. 
Keith Fogg, Tax Court Proposes New Rules, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Dec. 2, 2019), 
https://procedurallytaxing.com/tax-court-proposes-new-rules/. 
 
The Tax Court’s proposed amendments of April 21, 2020 include changes to Rules 21, 
24, 260, 261, and 262. Press Release, U.S. TAX COURT 1 (Apr. 21, 2020), 
https://ustaxcourt.gov/press/04212020_1.pdf. The Tax Court invited comments by May 31, 2020. 
Id. at 1; Press Release, U.S. TAX COURT 1 (May 18, 2020), 
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https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/05182020.pdf (requesting emailed comments due to disruption 
in mail delivery caused by the COVID-19 pandemic). 
 
The Tax Court has also issued a series of press releases addressing temporary changes 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic. See Press Releases, U.S. TAX COURT, 
https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press.htm. The first one was on March 11, 2020. See id. As one 
example, on May 29, 2020, the Tax Court announced that it would conduct all proceedings 
remotely until further notice. Press Release, U.S. TAX COURT (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/05292020_proceedings.pdf. As the situation is changing 
rapidly and is, we hope, a temporary one, we will not include further detail here. 
 
In the past couple of years, the Tax Court has also issued a few press releases to 
announce Tax Court judge retirements. See Press Releases, U.S. TAX COURT, 




 The chart on page 390 of the casebook shows how the volume of Tax Court cases  
pending and the aggregate dollar amounts in dispute have varied between 2004 and 2016. The 
chart below adds the 2017 through 2019 figures. See SOI Tax Stats—Chief Counsel Workload: 
Tax Litigation Cases, by Type of Case—IRS Data Book Table, IRS 27 (Jul. 1, 2019), 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-chief-counsel-workload-tax-litigation-cases-by-type-
of-case-irs-data-book-table-27 (last visited July 22, 2020).  
 
Fiscal Year 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Number of cases 
pending (dockets 
in thousands) 
27.6  24.9                
 





in Cases Pending 
(in billions) 
$22.5 $21.2                
 




In late 2019, the Tax Court reportedly was deciding cases more rapidly than new ones 
were filed. See Aysha Bagchi, Tax Court Closing More Cases Than Are Filled, Decreasing 
Backlog, BLOOMBERG TAX (Oct. 5, 2019), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/tax-
court-closing-more-cases-than-are-filed-decreasing-backlog (“‘The U.S. Tax Court is making 
progress in reducing its case backlog,’ U.S. Tax Court Special Trial Judge Carluzzo told 
Bloomberg Tax at the American Bar Association tax section meeting … on Oct. 5. ‘We are 
closing more cases every month than get filed.’”). However, that was before the court closed for 
a period of time during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
  








 Along the lines of taxpayers who challenge a notice of deficiency or other aspect of tax 
controversy procedure using the Administrative Procedure Act, some taxpayers have been using 
the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (“TBOR”), which was codified in 2015, to support similar 
arguments. (In that vein, the Facebook case was discussed in connection with page 227 of 
Chapter 5, above.) In the notice of deficiency context, Moya v. Commissioner, 152 T.C. 182 
(2019), provides an example. In that case, the taxpayer argued that “[t]here are no deficiencies in 
tax for any of the examination years because the notice was unlawfully issued. The notice was 
unlawfully issued because, in conducting his examination for the examination years, respondent 
deprived her of rights guaranteed to all taxpayers by the TBOR.” Id. at 188. The Tax Court found 
that that did not invalidate the notice of deficiency or warrant looking behind it: 
 
[W]e conclude that, even if we were to credit petitioner’s claims that, in 
examining her returns, respondent violated her rights to be informed, to challenge 
the IRS position and be heard, and to a fair and just tax system (all rights found in 
the IRS TBOR) and, also, that he failed to afford her an interview near her home 
in California before he issued the notice, we would neither invalidate the notice, 
relieve petitioner of any portion of the burden of proof, nor take any other action 
to remediate those violations or failure. The simple reasons are that (1) the IRS 
TBOR did not add to petitioner’s rights and (2) even if everything she says is true, 
respondent's missteps that petitioner complains of would not in this de novo 
proceeding cause us to either lift or lighten her burden of proving error in 
respondent’s determinations of deficiencies in her tax. See Greenberg’s Express, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. [324,] at 327-328. 
 




Nelson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-95, 2018 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 95, raises the 
question of what constitutes a “naked assessment.” In Nelson, the Tax Court found that the 
taxpayer had been employed for a short time by a company called Empire and had received 
wages from that company. “At trial, petitioner did not deny receiving wages of $1,678, but 
asserted, referring to Empire, that he ‘did not know who these guys are.’” Id. at *6. The Tax 
Court did not find that testimony credible. On the naked assessment issue, the court found a 
sufficient link between the taxpayer and the wages: 
 
For 2014 the IRS received from Empire a Form W-2 reporting that it had paid 
petitioner during 2014 wages of $1,678. Respondent also introduced two relevant 
documents that confirm this information: (1) a copy of the notice of deficiency 
issued to petitioner for 2014 and (2) petitioner’s Wage and Income Transcript for 
Copyright © 2020 Carolina Academic Press, LLC. All rights reserved.
45 
 
2014. We find that these documents sufficiently connect petitioner to an income-
producing activity. 
 
Id. at *5-6.  
 
 The Tax Court’s analysis in Nelson is surprising. As Bryan Camp explains in a blog post 
discussing this case, “[o]nly one of the items—the information return—is a genuine piece of 
evidence. The other two items are just bootstraps: recitations of conclusions based on that single 
W-2.” Bryan Camp, Lesson From the Tax Court: Naked Assessments!, TAXPROF BLOG ¶ 19 (Jul. 
9, 2018), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2018/07/lesson-from-the-tax-court-naked-
assessments.html. Where the IRS is required to provide evidence connecting the taxpayer to an 
income-producing activity, it should not be able to make one piece of evidence into several by 
repeating the information in its own records or documents.  
 
The Nelson opinion cites a 2008 Tax Court case, Banister v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
2008-201, 2008 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 197, as “holding that a notice of deficiency indicating 
third-party payers paid the taxpayer specific amounts in question satisfied the minimal 
evidentiary burden.” Nelson v. Comm’r, 2018 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 95, at *6. However, 
Banister is part of a line of cases addressing situations in which courts found that although the 
record did not contain direct evidence connecting the taxpayer to an income-producing activity, 
the documents in the record (generally IRS-created documents) indicated that the IRS was in 
possession of the direct evidence.  
 
In Banister, the Tax Court stated that “the notice of deficiency indicates that the third-
party payers paid petitioner the amounts in question and reported those payments to 
respondent. Although direct evidence of the payments is not in the record, the notice of 
deficiency alone suggests, as in Rapp and Curtis, that respondent possessed such evidence.” 
Banister, 2008 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 197, at *5 (citing Rapp v. Comm’r, 774 F.2d 932, 935 (9th 
Cir. 1985); Curtis v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2001-308, aff’d in part and rev’d on another issue, 73 
Fed. Appx. 200 (9th Cir. 2003)). This line of cases would therefore be applicable if, for example, 
the IRS in Nelson no longer had the W-2 but had a document, such as the notice of deficiency, 
that it had prepared based on the W-2. That is not the case, and Banister does not hold that a 
notice of deficiency alone is sufficient to preclude a naked assessment. Importantly, in Banister, 
the Tax Court immediately goes on to state that, “petitioner does not deny receiving the income 
and instead argues that respondent ‘failed to recognize, determine and/or make allowance for 
Petitioner expenses, losses and deductions, and exclusions (both business and non-business).’ 
We view that position as an implicit acknowledgment that he received at least some income 
during his 2002 tax year.” Banister, 2008 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 197, at *5. 
 
Nelson is discussed further below in connection with page 469. For additional reading, 




 For recent Court of Appeals cases discussing what constitutes new matter, see Blau v. 
Commissioner, 924 F.3d 1261, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (affirming the Tax Court and finding that, 
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where the IRS changed from finding a substantial valuation misstatement penalty to a gross 
valuation misstatement penalty, “although the IRS may theoretically have had the burden of 
proof as to the increase in penalty, there was no additional fact to which that burden applied”) 
and Feinberg v. Commissioner, 916 F.3d 1330, 1334 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding that the Tax 
Court erred and should have placed the burden of proof on the IRS because substantiation of 
business expenses requires different evidence from finding that the business involved unlawful 




 Williams v. Commissioner, 795 F. App’x 920, 925 (5th Cir. 2019) applies the Revenue 
Procedure cited in the casebook regarding “clear and concise notification” of a new address, Rev. 
Proc. 2010-16, 2010-1 C.B. 664. In Williams, the Fifth Circuit upheld the Tax Court’s decision 
finding the taxpayer’s notification insufficient: 
 
[IRS Settlement] Officer West refused to consider the October 1, 2014 
notification because it did not include proof of mailing. The Tax Court 
acknowledged that Williams must have sent some notification of change of 
address because the IRS mailed subsequent notices to the Bedford P.O. Box in 
2015. However, the letter was not addressed to any of the departments of the IRS 
identified in the Revenue Procedure. Assuming Williams mailed the letter on 
October 1, that was only 43 days before the Notice of Deficiency, not the 45 days 
described by the Revenue Procedure…. 
 
We need not decide whether the Commissioner is automatically entitled to 
45 days to process a change-of-address notification based on its Revenue 
Procedure or whether the regulations and Revenue Procedure entitle the IRS to 
more time to process notifications. There is doubt as to when Williams mailed his 
clear and concise notice of change of address. Officer West did not act arbitrarily 
or capriciously when she found Williams’s evidence insufficient. Accordingly, 
the Tax Court did not err in affirming the IRS Office of Appeals' decision and 
there is not sufficient evidence to overturn the Tax Court's finding that Williams’s 
last known address had not changed by November 12, 2014. 
 




 Nelson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-95, 2018 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 95, which 
was discussed above in connection with page 428, is a case in which, like Portillo v. 
Commissioner, 932 F.2d 1128 (1991), the IRS relied on a third-party information return. In 
Nelson, it was a W-2. The court also referred to the notice of deficiency and the IRS’s Wage and 
Income Transcript, but, as discussed above, those are simply documents the IRS based on the W-
2. 
 
 Can the Tax Court simply rely on a W-2? In a footnote in Nelson, the Tax Court states: 




Section 6201(d) provides that, “if a taxpayer asserts a reasonable dispute with 
respect to any item of income reported on an information return * * * and the 
taxpayer has fully cooperated with the Secretary,” the IRS may not rely solely on 
the information return to satisfy its burden of production. Petitioner has not 
alleged a “reasonable dispute” concerning the Form W-2, and he wholly failed to 
cooperate with IRS representatives during the examination and trial 
preparation. See Parker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-66, 103 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1321, 1323 (finding section 6201(d) inapplicable where the taxpayer “did 
not bring any factual dispute over any item of income to the IRS’ attention within 
a reasonable time” but instead raised frivolous arguments). 
 
Id. at *6 n.3. 
 
As Bryan Camp explains, “From that language Judge Lauber infers the opposite: if the taxpayer 
either does not dispute an information return or does not cooperate with the IRS during the 
examination, then the IRS decision to rely solely on the third party return is the ‘ligament of fact’ 
necessary to connect the taxpayer to the alleged income.” Camp, Lesson From the Tax Court, 
supra, at ¶ 20. 
 
 Portillo predates Code section 6201(d) (as mentioned on page 469 of the casebook), so it 
did not address the application of that section. With respect to the Nelson case’s citation of 
section 6201(d), Bryan Camp comments: 
 
What §6201(d) does NOT say is the IRS can just ignore Portillo and its progeny. 
But Judge Lauber’s reading of § 6201 would seem to undo Portillo. That is, the 
concern of the Fifth Circuit (and other courts) was that applying the presumption 
of correctness in unreported income cases forced the taxpayer to prove a negative. 
Judge Lauber’s reading of § 6201 seems to allow the IRS to say to the taxpayer 
during audit: “We believe the W-2. Prove the negative.” I do not think that is the 
right procedure to establish the presumption of correctness, yet for all I can tell, 
that is what the IRS did here. 
 
Camp, Lesson From the Tax Court: Naked Assessments!, supra, at ¶ 22.   
 
The Tax Court’s opinion in Nelson does not cite Portillo, perhaps because Portillo is a 
Fifth Circuit case. Appeal in Nelson would lie to the Second Circuit. Nelson, 2018 Tax Ct. Memo 
LEXIS 95 at *6. The Second Circuit cited Portillo in Matthews v. Commissioner, but only for the 
proposition that “A tax court’s determination that a taxpayer failed to substantiate deductions 
must be sustained unless clearly erroneous.” Matthews v. Comm’r, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 
39838, *10 (2d Cir. 1995).  
 
As this discussion suggests, the intersection of Code section 6201(d) with Portillo and 
other naked assessment cases involving information returns remains an interesting question. For 
further reading, see Camp, Lesson From the Tax Court: Naked Assessments!, supra.  
 






 The “determination” issue continues to spur controversy. In a recent court-reviewed Tax 
Court case, it was the IRS that argued it had failed to make a determination in a notice of 
deficiency—the first of two notices of deficiency the IRS had sent the taxpayer. See U.S. Auto 
Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 T.C. 94 (2019) (reviewed by the court). The key facts are as 
follows: 
 
On May 15, 2012, respondent issued a set of documents purporting to be a notice 
of deficiency (May notice). The May notice encompasses: (1) a cover letter dated 
May 15, 2012, addressed to petitioner and stating that respondent determined 
deficiencies in petitioner’s Federal income tax accounts of $24,480 and $30,668 
for TYE June 30, 2003 and 2007, respectively; (2) a Form 4089, Notice of 
Deficiency—Waiver, also addressed to petitioner, listing identical deficiencies for 
TYE June 30, 2003 and 2007, and no deficiency for TYE June 30, 2008; (3) a 
Form 5278, Statement—Income Tax Changes, showing U.S. Auto Finance, not 
petitioner, as the taxpayer and stating the same deficiencies for TYE June 30, 
2003 and 2007, and zero deficiency for TYE June 30, 2008; and (4) a Form 886-
A, Explanation of Adjustments, showing U.S. Auto Finance as the taxpayer and 
purporting to explain the adjustments shown on the Form 5278. The Form 886-A 
within the May notice states that respondent disallowed part of U.S. Auto 
Finance's claimed $748,314 and $1,063,792 deductions for rent expense for TYE 
June 30, 2007 and 2008, respectively. 
 
On August 2, 2012, respondent issued to petitioner a second purported notice of 
deficiency (August notice). The August notice determines the following 
deficiencies and section 6662(a) penalties: 
 








2007 $3,371,690 $674,338 
2008   2,995,911   599,182 
 
Id. at 95-96 (emphasis added). Thus, the IRS sent a total of five documents, including two that 
accompanied the May notice and referred to “U.S. Auto Finance” instead of “U.S. Auto Sales.” 
The August notice referred to 2008 instead of 2003 and contained much higher deficiencies than 
the May notice. 
 
The taxpayer filed a separate petition in response to each notice. In the petition 
responding to the May Notice, the taxpayer stated “that proposed deficiencies ‘on their face are 
applicable to U.S. Auto Finance Inc., a separate and distinct corporation.’” Id. at 96. The 
taxpayer also “alleged that the May notice was erroneous, arbitrary and capricious, and that 
respondent should bear the burden of proof as to all items.” Id. The IRS responded by alleging 
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that the May notice of deficiency did not make a determination, and moved to dismiss the case 
for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 95. This is likely because the IRS wanted to litigate the case based 
on the August notice of deficiency. Recall that Code section 6212 states in part that “[i]f the 
Secretary has mailed to the taxpayer a notice of deficiency as provided in subsection (a), and the 
taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court within the time prescribed in section 6213(a), the 
Secretary shall have no right to determine any additional deficiency of income tax for the same 
taxable year,” I.R.C. § 6212(c)(1), which would seem to apply to the taxpayer’s 2007 tax year if 
the May notice of deficiency was valid. 
 
 To decide the validity question, the Tax Court majority applied Dees v. Commissioner, 
148 T.C. 1 (2017), which is quoted in the casebook. In the first step of its analysis, the Tax Court 
found the May notice ambiguous on its face. Id. at 99 (“Although the documents making up the 
May notice indicate that a determination has been made, it is not possible to ascertain from the 
documents which entity would owe the determined deficiencies—petitioner or its related entity, 
U.S. Auto Finance.”). The majority therefore found that “the party asserting that this Court has 
jurisdiction—here petitioner—must prove the relevant jurisdictional facts.” Id. The majority 
agreed with the IRS: “Petitioner admits that the May notice reflects determinations with respect 
to U.S. Auto Finance, and it is clear that petitioner has not been prejudiced by the erroneous 
notice. Moreover, the evidence in the record—particularly the tax returns—cannot be ignored…. 
That evidence is unambiguous and confirms that the May notice reflected a determination with 
respect to U.S. Auto Finance and not petitioner. The May notice is thus invalid, and we lack 
jurisdiction.” Id. at 101-02. 
 
Eight additional judges joined Judge Marvel’s opinion for the court. Id. at 95, 104. Judge 
Marvel also filed a separate concurrence, in which two other judges joined. Id. Judge Buch filed 
a separate concurrence. Id. at 108.  
 
Judge Foley dissented, joined by Judges Ashford and Urda. Id. at 111. His dissent argued 
that the case was governed by the Tax Court’s opinion in Scar v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 855 
(1983), rev’d, 814 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1987), not Dees. Id. at 111, 112 (Foley, J., dissenting). His 
dissent concluded: “Both the savvy and, far more numerous, unsophisticated taxpayers will be 
subject to this newly devised standard. It is inequitable, unreasonable, and a bit disconcerting to 
force taxpayers to jump through judicially imposed analytical and evidentiary hoops to prove 
the IRS’s intent. Not every mistake mandates invalidating a notice of deficiency. John C. Hom & 
Assocs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 210, 213 (2013) (citing Elings v. Commissioner, 324 
F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2003)). The prudent course of action is to hold the notice valid, freely allow 
amendments to respondent's answer, and permit the Court to resolve the issues. Unfortunately, 
the opinion of the Court ignores precedent, endorses a jury-rigged analytical construct, and puts 
the onus on taxpayers to divine the meaning of the IRS's slapdash gobbledygook.” 
 
Judge Ashford filed a separate dissent, as well. Id. at 116. Her dissent stated in part, “It 
continues to be my view—as I explained in my concurring opinion in Dees—that such a test 
(with both objective and subjective elements) is, at best, unnecessary, and at worst, improper.” 
Id.  
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This case raises an issue in the category of procedural errors courts may treat as 
eliminating subject matter jurisdiction. There is discussion in another such context in Chapter 10 
of this Supplement, below. Should procedural errors of this kind eliminate the Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction to decide the case? Would a different procedural remedy be fairer to the parties? 
Note that, in this case, the IRS won its motion to dismiss, and presumably the parties will litigate 
the matter with respect to the August notice of deficiency. However, in a case in which the IRS 
did something similar but did not catch its error and sent a new notice of deficiency before the 
statute of limitations on assessment expired, an invalid notice of deficiency would mean that the 
taxpayer won the case. For further reading on this case, see James A. Beavers, Imprecise Notice 
of Deficiency Does Not give Tax Court Jurisdiction, THE TAX ADVISER, Jan. 2020, at 69. 
 
  







 It is worth noting that the percentage of returns filed claiming refunds dropped in 2019. 
See Laura Davison, About 2.7 Million Fewer People Got Tax Refunds After Law Change, DAILY 
TAX REP. (BLOOMBERG LAW), Oct. 17, 2019 (“About 2.7 million fewer people got tax refunds 
this year under the tax law overhaul that altered rates and paycheck withholding starting in 2018, 
according to new figures from the Internal Revenue Service.”). This is due to changes made by 
the 2017 Tax Act. “About 80% of filers received a tax cut under the new law, but changes in 
withholding rates meant that many got the tax cut in small chunks in their paychecks throughout 




The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida recently decided an interesting 
case on the variance doctrine. In Ginsburg v. United States, Case No: 6-17-cv-1666-Orl-41DCI, 
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66166 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2019), the taxpayer/plaintiff argued “that 
summary judgment should be granted in his favor regarding the gross valuation misstatement 
penalty because the IRS failed to comply with section 6751(b) of the Internal Revenue 
Code prior to assessing the penalty.” Id. at *9. The general rule in that subsection is that 
“No penalty . . . shall be assessed unless the initial determination of such assessment is 
personally approved (in writing) by the immediate supervisor of the individual making such 
determination or such higher level official as the Secretary may designate.” I.R.C. § 6751(b)(1). 
 
The problem for the taxpayer was that he did not allege such IRS noncompliance in his 
refund claim. Ginsburg, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66166, at *10. “He argue[d] that the variance 
doctrine does not apply in this instance because Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating 
compliance with section 6751(b).” Id. The court disagreed and found that “[n]othing precluded 
Plaintiff from raising the IRS’s alleged noncompliance in his refund claim, and Plaintiff’s failure 
to do so prevents this Court from considering it.” Id. at *11.  
 
This case and others underscore one of the perils of the refund route—the variance 
doctrine and the pressure it puts on the content of the refund claim. See, e.g., Logan v. United 
States, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103654 *8-9 (M.D. Fla. June 21, 2018) (rejecting the taxpayer’s 
argument that two new claims “do not substantially vary from the Original Claim because the 
IRS is required to investigate all possible grounds for recovery upon receiving a refund claim”). 
For further reading on the Ginsburg case, see Keith Fogg, Variance Doctrine Trumps IRS 






 As mentioned in the casebook, Code section 7422(a) provides that no refund suit can be 
filed without first filing a claim for refund. Is that requirement jurisdictional, meaning that if it is 
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not met, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case? A recent opinion from the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit argues that although it is considered jurisdictional under 
current law, it should not be: 
 
The Claims Court concluded that, because Walby’s 2014 administrative refund 
claim was untimely, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a), it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over that claim. Although this conclusion is correct under our existing 
case law, see, e.g., Stephens v. United States, 884 F.3d 1151, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 
2018), it may be time to reexamine that case law in light of the Supreme Court's 
clarification that so-called “statutory standing” defects—i.e., whether a party can 
sue under a given statute—do not implicate a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.4, … 
(2014); see also Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 
F.3d 1225, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (recognizing that, following Lexmark, it is 
incorrect to classify “so-called” statutory-standing defects as jurisdictional). 
 
The Supreme Court has not addressed § 7422(a) following Lexmark. We 
note, however, that the Court’s most recent discussion of § 7422(a) does not 
describe it as “jurisdictional.” See Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1 at 
4-5, 11-12 [(2008)] …. And, although our court has continued to refer to this 
statute as jurisdictional following Lexmark, we have not yet addressed the 
implications of that case and the many Supreme Court cases applying it.  
 
In view of the Supreme Court’s guidance in Lexmark, it may be improper 
to continue to refer to the administrative exhaustion requirements of § 7422(a) 
and § 6511 as “jurisdictional pre-requisites.” That these provisions concern the 
United States’ consent to be sued would not seem to change this conclusion. The 
Supreme Court has “made plain that most time bars are nonjurisdictional.” United 
States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 410 … (2015). … 
 
Accordingly, although the Claims Court properly dismissed Walby’s 2014 refund 
claim because she did not meet the prerequisite for bringing such a claim, we 
think that, under Lexmark, Arbaugh [v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006)], and 
their progeny, the court likely did not lack subject matter jurisdiction over this 
claim. 
 
Walby v. United States, 957 F.3d 1295, 1299-1300 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (footnotes omitted). For 
further discussion of this case and an explanation of why the jurisdictional aspect of the issue 
may matter, see Carlton Smith, Federal Circuit Panel Calls For Reconsidering the Court’s 
Precedent Holding Refund Claim Filing and Timing Requirements Jurisdictional to a Refund 
Suit, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (May 13, 2020), https://procedurallytaxing.com/federal-circuit-
panel-calls-for-reconsidering-the-courts-precedent-holding-refund-claim-filing-and-timing-
requirements-jurisdictional-to-a-refund-suit/ (pointing out that subject matter jurisdiction 
requirements are not waivable). 
 
 





The recent case of Harrison v. United States, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14335 (W.D. Wisc. 
Jan. 29, 2020), illustrates the changes that have occurred over time in when a refund claim made 
on a delinquent return is deemed filed and the perils of being unaware of a Treasury regulation. 
The background is that after the taxpayer won on this issue in Weisbart v. U.S. Dep’t of Treas., 
222 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussed on page 510 of the casebook), the IRS announced a 
change in its litigating position: “the Service will apply the timely mailing/timely filing rule of 
section 7502(a) in such cases and treat claims for refund included on delinquent original returns 
as filed on the date of mailing for purposes of section 6511(b)(2)(A).” IRS Chief Counsel Notice 
CC-2001-019 (Mar. 22, 2001). Also in 2001, the Treasury Department published a regulation 
reflecting this pro-taxpayer position. The regulation states in part:  
 
(1) … If section 7502 would not apply to a return (but for the operation 
of paragraph (f)(2) of this section) that is also considered a claim for credit or 
refund because the envelope that contains the return does not have a postmark 
dated on or before the due date of the return, section 7502 will apply separately to 
the claim for credit or refund if - 
(i) The date of the postmark on the envelope is within the period that is 
three years (plus the period of any extension of time to file) from the day 
the tax is paid or considered paid (see section 6513), and the claim for 
credit or refund is delivered after this three-year period; and 
(ii) The conditions of section 7502 are otherwise met…. 
 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7502-1(f)(1). That provision “applies to any claim for credit or refund 
on a late filed tax return described in paragraph (f)(1) of this section except for those 
claims for credit or refund which (without regard to paragraph (f) of this section) were 
barred by the operation of section 6532(a) or any other law or rule of law (including res 
judicata) as of January 11, 2001.” Id. § 301.7502-1(g)(2). 
 
 In Harrison, the government (surprisingly, in light of this history) argued that section 
7502 did not apply to the refund claim included in the delinquent return. In its first opinion, the 
court agreed. Harrison v. IRS Comm’n Sic of Internal Revenue, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6036 
(W.D. Wis. Jan. 9, 2020), vacated, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14335 (W.D. Wisc. Jan. 29, 2020). Id. 
at *5-6, *9. The court did not cite Weisbart or the regulation in that opinion. See id.  
 
 Carlton Smith blogged about the error. See Carlton Smith, District Court Gets Timely 
Mailing Is Timely Filing Rule of Section 7502 Wrong as Applied to Refund Claim Lookback 
Period of Section 6511(b)(2)(A), PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://procedurallytaxing.com/district-court-gets-timely-mailing-is-timely-filing-rule-of-section-
7502-wrong-as-applied-to-refund-claim-lookback-period-of-section-6511b2a/ (“[S]adly, the 
court got the upshot wrong. The exact issue in the case was definitively resolved the other way in 
regulations adopted in 2001 that followed a once-controversial Second Circuit opinion. Neither 
the DOJ nor the district court in Harrison seems to be aware of the Second Circuit opinion or the 
relevant regulation.”). Smith wrote in part: 
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Before berating the district judge, who is no doubt not a tax procedure specialist, I 
would point out that the parties’ briefing on the motion did not mention either the 
Second Circuit’s opinion in Weisbart or the regulation under section 7502. The 
brief accompanying the motion is here, the taxpayers’ brief is here, and the 
government’s reply brief is here. I am quite dismayed, though, that the DOJ Trial 
Section attorney did not know of the relevant authority. I have sent an e-mail to 





 The taxpayers did file a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court granted. 
Harrison v. United States, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14335 *6 (W.D. Wisc. Jan. 29, 2020). The 
court vacated its previous order. Id. It also excoriated the government: 
 
Regrettably, not only did plaintiff [taxpayer] fail to bring this case and the 
regulations to the court’s attention in their previous briefing on defendant's 
motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, but the IRS and the U.S. Department 
of Justice, whose respective jobs include promulgating and enforcing the 
applicable regulation, also did not. Still, presented with the regulations, defendant 
concedes it has no basis to oppose the motion for reconsideration, and the IRS has 
confirmed that it is prepared to issue a refund in the amount sought in plaintiffs 
complaint, plus statutory interest. …While there is no question that this is the 
appropriate response and course of action, the court remains troubled by 
defendant’s failure to alert the court to the Weisbart case and even more the 
regulations. In its submission, defendant represents that the IRS did not identify 
the Weisbart case, the Chief Counsel’s Notice or the regulations, but 
acknowledges that counsel for defendant did identify the Weisbart case in their 
own research, and chose not to disclose it in their briefing because it is not 
“controlling” in the Seventh Circuit…. This might be a viable defense if: (1) the 
failure to cite Weisbart were the only failure and; (2) the U.S. Department of 
Justice's and IRS's aspirations only were not to fall below the bare minimum 
ethical threshold…. 
 
More critically, however, the Weisbart court relied on a Treasury 
Regulation, which is controlling authority on both the IRS and this court. 
Defendant explains that the Chief Counsel’s Notice announcing a change in its 
litigation position and the amendment to 26 C.F.R. § 301.7502-1(f) occurred after 
the Weisbart opinion, but the language in 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-3(a)(5), on which 
the Second Circuit in part relied, remains in place today, and defendant failed to 
alert the court of this regulation. Thus, the conduct of defendant’s counsel here 
falls below even a bare minimum ethical standard, something counsel would have 
discovered by reading Weisbart and the current versions of the regulations cited in 
that case closely, rather than dismissing it as an inconvenient contrary authority 
that they were not ethically required to cite to the court. … 
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[T]he court will require defendant to circulate this opinion and order, along with 
the Chief Counsel’s Notice and 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7502-1(f) and § 301.6402-
3(a)(5) to all attorneys in the IRS Office of Chief Counsel and to the Tax Division 
of the U.S. Department of Justice in hopes that these actions will prevent future 
opposition to meritorious claims for refunds, as well as any instinct to ignore the 
duty of candor to the court by burying precedent no matter how well reasoned, 
helpful or directly on point it may be simply because one is not ethically bound to 
disclose it. 
 
Id. at *2-6 (citations omitted). Thus, the court did not blame the government for failing to 
identify the 2001 Treasury regulation, which is controlling, but did blame it for failing to bring to 
its attention Weisbart and a regulation under section 6402 that the Weisbart court cited in support 
of its decision. For further reading on the ethics issue in this case, see Carlton Smith, District 
Court Reverses Its Section 6511(b)(2)(A) Ruling and Excoriates IRS and DOJ for Not Citing 
Relevant Authority, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://procedurallytaxing.com/district-court-reverses-its-section-6511b2a-ruling-and-excoriates-




 In Borenstein v. Commissioner, 919 F.3d 746 (2d Cir. 2019), the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit interpreted the flush language in section 6512(b)(3), which is quoted in the 
casebook: “In a case described in subparagraph (B) where the date of the mailing of the notice of 
deficiency is during the third year after the due date (with extensions) for filing the return of tax 
and no return was filed before such date, the applicable period under subsections (a) and (b)(2) 
of section 6511 shall be 3 years.” I.R.C. § 6512(b)(3). In Borenstein, the taxpayer had overpaid 
her 2012 taxes and received a six-month extension of time to file, expiring October 15, 2013. 
She failed to file before she received a notice of deficiency the IRS sent on June 19, 2015—
during the third year after the original due date of the return but during the second year after the 
extended due date. Borenstein, 919 F.3d at 748. On August 29, 2015, the taxpayer finally filed 
her 2012 return, claiming a refund. Id. The question before the court was whether a two-year or 
three-year lookback period applied, which in turn depended on the meaning of the flush language 
quoted above: was “the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency . . . during the third year 
after the due date (with extensions) for filing the return of tax”? The Tax Court said that it was 
not. Borenstein v. Comm’r, 149 T.C. 263, 264 (2017). It found that the “with extensions” 
parenthetical modified the phrase “due date.” Id. at 272 (“A modifying phrase is normally read to 
modify the nearest plausible antecedent. This rule is typically referred to as the ‘last antecedent’ 
rule.”). 
 
The Second Circuit reversed. It found that “[w]hile the Tax Court determined that ‘(with 
extensions)’ modifies the noun ‘due date,’ it is at least as plausible that ‘(with extensions)’ 
modifies the phrase ‘third year after the due date,’ thereby extending the third year.” Borenstein, 
919 F.3d at 750. Given the ambiguity the Second Circuit had identified, it consulted legislative 
history. It determined that it “appears that the amendment to 26 U.S.C. § 6512(b)(3) was 
intended to expand the jurisdiction of the Tax Court to order refunds for taxpayers who failed to 
file a return prior to the mailing of a notice of deficiency, and thereby eliminate an unwarranted 
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differential in treatment.” Id. at 751. It observed that “[t]he Tax Court’s interpretation of 26 
U.S.C. § 6512(b)(3) results in differential treatment of taxpayers that the statute’s flush language 
was intended to eliminate: it would have had jurisdiction to grant Borenstein a refund if she had 
not been granted an extension for the filing of her return, but lacks jurisdiction because she 
obtained an extension that was not used.” Professor Keith Fogg has observed, “[t]he Second 
Circuit opinion makes sense to me. I think it achieves the intent of Congress in ‘fixing’ the 
statute after Lundy. It also avoids what seems like an absurd result the IRS interpretation 
achieves by avoiding the six month black hole or donut hole.” Second Circuit Reverses Tax 
Court in Borenstein, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Oct. 11, 2019), 
https://procedurallytaxing.com/second-circuit-reverses-tax-court-in-borenstein/. 
 
For further reading on the Borenstein litigation, see, e.g., Stephanie Cumings, Second 
Circuit Closes Tax Court’s Refund ‘Black Hole’, 163 TAX NOTES 300 (2019) (discussing the two 
decisions); Philip N. Jones, Second Circuit Fills Black Hole in Refund Statute of Limitations, J. 
TAX’N., June 2019, at 33; Keith Fogg, Borenstein Case Leaves Taxpayer Bare on Refund Claim, 
PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Dec. 14, 2017), https://procedurallytaxing.com/boresntein-case-leaves-
taxpayer-bare-on-refund-claim (discussing the Tax Court case and the amicus brief submitted by 




 The statutory “mailbox rule” of section 7502 does not apply to refund suits. See Patel v. 
IRS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126321 (D. N.J. July 29, 2019); I.R.C. § 7502(d)(1) (“This section 
shall not apply with respect to … the filing of a document in, or the making of a payment to, any 
court other than the Tax Court ….”). That is because the statute provides that “[t]his section shall 
not apply with respect to … the filing of a document in, or the making of a payment to, any court 




 In Carter v. United States, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181266 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 9, 2019), a 
district court held the equitable tolling rule of Code section 6511(h) does not apply to an estate, 
only to an individual, even if the personal representative of the estate is suffering from a 
financial disability. Id. at *14 (“Unfortunately for Carter, estates do not constitute ‘individuals’ 
subject to § 6511(h)’s provisions. Estates, while able to conduct their affairs only through 
personal representatives, exist separately from their personal representatives.”). The court also 
held that the expiration of the statute of limitations poses a jurisdictional bar to hearing the case. 
Id. at *11, 18 though it raised questions about that in footnote, id. at *18 n.7.  
 
For further discussion of the Carter case, including the subject matter jurisdiction issue, 
see Keith Fogg, An Estate Cannot Use the Financial Disability Provisions to Toll the Statute of 
Limitations for Filing a Refund Claim, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Sep. 12, 2019), 
https://procedurallytaxing.com/an-estate-cannot-use-the-financial-disability-provisions-to-toll-
the-statute-of-limitations-for-filing-a-refund-claim/. The subject matter jurisdiction issue is also 
mentioned above in connection with Walby v. United States, 957 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 
  







 A recent case illustrates the difficulty associated with recovering costs and fees under 
section 7430. The taxpayer in Klopfenstein v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-156, 2019 Tax 
Ct. Memo LEXIS 163, entered into a settlement with the IRS Appeals Office under which the 
IRS agreed to abate 90% of the section 6707 reportable transaction penalties that the IRS 
originally proposed. In response to the taxpayer’s claim for administrative costs, the IRS agreed 
that, given the settlement, the taxpayer substantially prevailed with respect to the amount in 
controversy. Id. at *7. The taxpayer was still denied any recovery because, according to the Tax 
Court, the IRS did not take a position contrary to the taxpayer’s, meaning that the taxpayer could 
not be a prevailing party: 
 
[A] taxpayer will not be treated as the prevailing party if the IRS “establishes that 
the position of the United States in the proceeding was substantially justified.” 
Sec. 7430(c)(4)(B)(i). 
 
With respect to an administrative proceeding, the “position of the United 
States” means the position taken by the United States “as of the earlier of—(i) the 
date of the receipt by the taxpayer of the notice of the decision of the Internal 
Revenue Service Office of Appeals, or (ii) the date of the notice of deficiency.” 
Sec. 7430(c)(7)(B). The IRS “is not considered as having taken any position in an 
administrative proceeding prior to the issuance of an Appeals Office decision or a 
notice of deficiency.” Rathbun v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 7, 13 (2005); see Fla. 
Country Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 73, 86 (2004) (“[W]e interpret 
section 7430(c)(7) to limit recovery of administrative costs to those situations in 
which a notice of deficiency or Appeals Office decision has been issued.”), aff’d, 
404 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 
Id. at *5-6. 
 
 Because the section 6707 penalty is an assessable penalty and not subject to the 
deficiency procedures, the IRS did not issue a Notice of Deficiency. And because the taxpayer 
settled the case early in the Appeals process, the IRS did not issue a Notice of Determination. 
Because it had not issued either notice, the IRS was not treated as having taken a position 
contrary to the taxpayer’s; therefore, the taxpayer could not be treated as a prevailing party. Id. a 
*9. The Klopfenstein case is discussed in Linda Galler, Logic Loses in Taxpayer’s Effort to 
Recover Attorney’s Fees, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Feb, 11, 2020), 
http://procedurallytaxing.com/logic-loses-in-taxpayers-effort-to-recover-attorneys-fees/. 
 
Page 558:  
 
The inflation-adjusted recovery amount for attorney’s fees under section 7430 is $210 per 
hour for 2020. Rev. Proc. 2019-44, 2019-47 I.R.B. 1093 § 3.60. That represents an increase from 
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levels set in 2018 and 2019. Rev. Proc. 2018-57, 2018-49 I.R.B. 827 § 3.60 ($200 for 2019); 
Rev. Proc. 2017-58, 2017-45 I.R.B. 489 § 3.54 (same for 2018). 
 
When it comes to recovering cost and fees, how much is too much? In Tolin v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-29, 2018 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 57, the Tax Court rejected the 
taxpayer’s claim that his lawyer’s experience in the thoroughbred industry justified an enhanced 
attorney fee award (in excess of the statutory rate), in a case involving deductions for horse 
breeding activities. Id. at *48-49. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s determination, 
noting that the results of the case turned on the extent of the taxpayer’s phone calls and business 
trips and not on any “equine-related” issues. Tolin v. Commissioner, 929 F.3d 548, 552-53 (8th 
Cir. 2019).   
 
The Tax Court also reduced the number of hours for which the taxpayer could recover. In 
total, the taxpayer had sought to recover over $250,000 for 642 hours of work on the case. This 
included an amount equivalent to four and a half weeks of full-time work on the post-trial brief, 
which was 36 pages in length. Tolin, 2018 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS at *43-44. The Tax Court 
reduced that number of hours to 88.2. Id. at *45. The Eight Circuit found that the Tax Court’s 
reductions were not an abuse of discretion: 
 
[T]the government’s initial notice of deficiency sought about $60,000 in 
additional taxes and penalties from Tolin. Tolin’s requested attorney's fees, just 
for the 280 hours submitted for post-trial briefing, would have exceeded $50,000, 
even at the lower statutory rate of $180 per hour. “‘[B]illing judgment’ is an 
important component in fee setting. . . . Hours that are not properly billed to one's 
client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory 
authority.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (internal quotation omitted).  
 
Tolin, 929 F.3d at 554 (emphasis in original).   
 
 One commentator has taken exception to the Eighth Circuit’s use of the quotation from 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hensley, noted above. Robert Kantowitz, Three Important 
Summer Cases on ‘Collateral’ Tax Issues, 164 TAX NOTES FED. 1749 (2019): 
 
 [Hensley] does not support, the broader proposition that the very size of a 
dispute can place it outside the ambit of resolution for the sole reason that it is 
incapable of being resolved without an inordinate expenditure of attorney fees. 
That prospect is troublesome enough in a dispute between private parties, but it is 
downright unacceptable when a private party is fighting the government in a 
context like tax, in which the normal antidote to the problem—a class action—is 
rarely, if ever, available. If the government unjustifiably asserts an additional tax 
due of $60,000, and it legitimately takes $50,000 (or even 10 times that amount) 
to defend a position that is not just eminently reasonable but for which the 
government had no basis, the government should be reimbursing the lawyer and 
the taxpayer for the fees. 
 
Id. at 1752. Do you agree? 







 A report by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration found that for fiscal 
years 2015 through 2017, the Large Business & International Division, which examines business 
taxpayers with assets in excess of $10 million, assessed accuracy-related penalties in only 6% of 
the 4600 returns that it examined. TIGTA, Few Accuracy-Related Penalties Are Proposed in 
Large Business Examinations and They Are Generally Not Sustained on Appeal, Rep. 2019-30-
036, May 31, 2019, at 4, 7. When the IRS did propose accuracy-related penalties, large business 
taxpayers usually were successful in having those penalties reduced or eliminated on appeal.  
 
 According to the report, which focused on 195 cases closed by Appeals as of December 
2018, the IRS Appeals Office reduced proposed penalty amounts totaling $773 million by $765 
million, a reduction of nearly 99 percent. Id. at 3-4. By comparison, the report found that the IRS 
assesses accuracy-related penalties against 25% of returns filed by smaller businesses. Id. at 7. 
What explains the disparity between penalties assessed against large versus small businesses? 
How do the low penalty rate and the penalty reduction rate for those who appeal impact 
voluntary compliance by large business taxpayers? The Commissioner of the IRS has pushed 
back against the TIGTA report, claiming that the IRS will not increase or decrease penalties 
based on “reports that come from outside the system.” Eric Vauch, Rettig Says TIGTA Report 




 The Taxpayer First Act increased the minimum penalty for failure to file an income tax 
return within 60 days of the due date. Effective for returns filed after December 31, 2019, the 
minimum penalty may not be less than the lesser of $330 (adjusted for inflation) or 100 percent 
of the amount required to be shown as tax on the return. Taxpayer First Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 




One increasingly interesting question as it relates to the “bright line” rule laid out in 
United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985), is whether or not the Court’s holding applies to 
returns filed electronically by a third-party preparer. The plaintiffs in Intress v. United States, 
404 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1176-77 (M.D. Tenn. 2019), challenged the applicability of Boyle in these 
circumstances. The taxpayers in Intress were out of the country when their 2014 tax return was 
due, so they sought to obtain a filing extension through their tax return preparer. Id. at 1176. The 
tax preparer completed the Form 4868 extension request on April 15th around 7:01 p.m., queued 
the document in her electronic filing software, but failed to hit “send.” As a result, the extension 
request was not timely filed. Id. The error did not become apparent until October of 2015. Id.  
 
The IRS assessed a failure-to-file penalty of $120,607.27 against the taxpayers, which 
they contested administratively. After the IRS denied their request for abatement, the couple paid 
the penalty and filed a refund suit in district court. Id. At trial, the taxpayers argued that they 
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qualified for abatement because their reliance on a third-party tax preparer to file the extension 
request constituted reasonable cause. Id. at 1177. They further claimed that the Court’s holding 
in Boyle should not apply to e-filed returns. To hold otherwise, they argued, would be 
incompatible with past IRS efforts to encourage e-filing, which “now necessarily involves use of 
specialized software that a taxpayer cannot employ totally independently.” Id. at 1177-78. 
 
The District Court, while noting that their argument was “worthy of analysis,” dismissed 
it. Id. at 1178. The court found that Boyle applied to the taxpayers because, like the taxpayers in 
Boyle, they were not required to use tax preparation services. Id. at 1177. Consequently, they 
were not required to e-file the extension request. Moreover, “[t]he decision to use such a service 
is within the taxpayer’s control. The taxpayer is amply capable of either using a tax preparer who 
is still permitted to paper-file or preparing his return himself.” Id. at 1179-80. The court further 
held that, even if Boyle did not apply to e-filed returns, the taxpayers would still have to prove 
they used “ordinary business care and prudence.” Id. at 1181. The court went on to hold that “it 
would never be reasonable to blindly take someone’s word that he will timely file your taxes.” 
Id. The court added a caveat, however, noting that the taxpayers’ theory would be “much more 
plausible if and when the IRS requires all returns to be e-filed or paper filing process becomes so 
cumbersome as to transcend ‘ordinary business care and prudence.’” Id. 
 
Practitioners have been quick to criticize the decision in Intress. For example, one 
commentator maintains that the ruling in Intress “fl[ies] in the face” of congressional efforts to 
encourage e-filing and fails to understand the reality of e-filing and its role in tax filings today. 
See Kristen A. Parillo, Reasonable Cause Standard Unchanged by E-Filing, 164 TAX NOTES 
FED. 1147, 1148 (2019).  
 
Another practitioner has pointed out the inconsistency between the government’s position 
in Intress and Treasury regulations defining reasonable cause for failure to file an information 
return. Hale E. Sheppard, Clarifying the Reasonable-Reliance Defense to Penalties in an E-
Filing Era: An Analysis of Boyle, Haynes, Intress, and More, J. TAX’N., Jan. 2020, at 13. For 
example, regulation section 301.6724-1 provides that an information reporting penalty will be 
waived under Section 6724 when the violation is due to reasonable cause if (i) “[t]here are 
significant mitigating factors with respect to the failure” or (ii) “the failure arose from events 
beyond the filer’s control.” Treas. Reg. § 301.6724-1(a)(2). One of the events listed as “beyond 
the taxpayer’s control” for section 6724 purposes include actions or inactions by the taxpayer’s 
agent after the taxpayer “exercised reasonable business judgment in contracting with the agent to 
file timely” and accurate returns. Treas. Reg. § 301.6724-1(c)(1)(iv), (5)(i). According to this 
practitioner, the concept of “imputed reasonable cause”—the idea that reasonable cause on the 
part of the taxpayer’s agent should be extended to the taxpayer herself—should apply not just to 
a failure to file information returns but should be extended to income tax returns as well. 




 Because of confusion stemming from the 2017 Tax Act, the IRS announced that it would 
revise the estimated tax penalty standards for 2018 returns. Under the guidance, individual 
taxpayers would not face penalties if they paid at least 80 percent of their estimated 2018 tax 
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liability. The penalty threshold is normally 90 percent. Notice 2019-25, 15 I.R.B. 942, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-19-25.pdf. The IRS announced subsequently that it would 
calculate and waive penalties using the new percentage threshold. Taxpayers who already paid 
the penalty will receive a refund without the need to file a refund claim. IR-2019-44 (Aug. 14, 
2019), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-automatically-waives-estimated-tax-penalty-for-




 As noted in the casebook, a taxpayer’s position is not attributable to negligence if the 
position has a “reasonable basis.” See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1). A recent decision from the 
Eighth Circuit raises the issue of whether the reasonable basis standard requires that the taxpayer 
establish that he or she actually relied on the relevant legal authorities that support a return 
position (a subjective standard) or whether a position has a reasonable basis if, viewed 
objectively, the IRS or the courts would find that the position had a reasonable basis. In Wells 
Fargo & Co. v. United States, 957 F.3d 840 (8th Cir. 2020), the Eighth Circuit upheld, in a 2-1 
decision, the application of a negligence penalty against the taxpayer when the taxpayer entered 
into a transaction with a nontax purpose. The Eighth Circuit phrased the penalty issue as follows: 
The parties dispute whether the reasonable-basis defense requires evidence 
that a taxpayer actually relied on relevant legal authority which supports its return 
position. Wells Fargo argues that its return position was objectively reasonable 
under the relevant legal authorities. Accordingly, it contends that it is irrelevant 
whether it actually relied upon those authorities in forming its return position. The 
government, however, asserts that a taxpayer cannot “base” its return position on 
the relevant authorities without showing that it actually relied on those authorities. 
Because Wells Fargo did not submit any evidence that it subjectively based its 
return position on legal authority, the government submits that the district court 
correctly applied the negligence penalty. Alternatively, the government argues 
that Wells Fargo lacked an objectively reasonable basis for its return position. 
We agree with the government that the reasonable-basis defense requires 
evidence of actual reliance on the relevant authority on the part of the taxpayer. 
We start with the plain language of the regulation, see Solis v. Summit 
Contractors, Inc., 558 F.3d 815, 823 (8th Cir. 2009), which provides a defense to 
the negligence penalty only when the taxpayer’s “return position is reasonably 
based on one or more [relevant] authorities.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) 
(emphasis added). The plain or common usage of the word “base” suggests that 
one is relying on particular information in order to form an opinion or a position 
about something. See Base, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
“base,” in part, as “[t]o use (something) as the thing from which something else is 
developed”). Thus, in order to “base” a return position on particular legal 
authority, a taxpayer must show that it actually relied upon those authorities in 
forming its position. As the district court noted, “[i]t is difficult to know how a 
taxpayer could ‘base’ a return position on a set of authorities without actually 
consulting those authorities, just as it is difficult to know how someone could 
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‘base’ an opinion about the best restaurant in town on Zagat ratings without 
actually consulting any Zagat ratings.” Wells Fargo II, 260 F. Supp. 3d [1140,] at 
1148. Indeed, the regulation does not require the taxpayer’s position to be simply 
“consistent with” or “supported by” the relevant legal authority. If it did, then it 
might be sufficient that the relevant authorities supported the taxpayer’s position, 
regardless of whether the taxpayer relied upon them. But in order for a taxpayer to 
“base” its position on relevant authority, it must have actually known about those 
authorities and actually relied upon them when forming its return position. . . . But 
see TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 3d 142, 151 (D. Conn. 2014) 
(rejecting the government’s position that evidence of taxpayer’s subjective or 
actual reliance was necessary), rev’d on other grounds, 604 F. App’x. 69 (2d Cir. 
2015). 
Moreover, we think that such a reading of the regulation is sensible in 
light of the broader context of the statute and accompanying regulatory 
definitions. Again, the government is seeking to impose a “negligence penalty,” 
which suggests that the focus of the inquiry must be, at least in part, on the 
taxpayer’s actual conduct—whether it met the requisite standard of care in 
preparing its tax return and considering its return position—rather than simply 
determining whether its legal position finds support in the relevant legal authority. 
See 26 U.S.C. § 6662(c) (defining “negligence” as “any failure to make a 
reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of this title”). Indeed, in 
discussing the negligence penalty, we have explicitly held that “the burden is on 
the taxpayer to prove that he did not fail to exercise due care or do what a 
reasonable and prudent person would do under similar circumstances.” Chakales 
v. Comm’r, 79 F.3d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 1996). Additionally, requiring evidence of 
actual reliance is supported by the fact that a taxpayer adopts a particular “return 
position” only when it actually “determines its tax liability with respect to a 
particular item of income, deduction or credit.” 26 C.F.R. § 301.6114-1(a)(2)(i). 
Accordingly, reading the phrase “reasonably based” to require evidence of actual 
reliance is more consistent with the broader statutory and regulatory framework. 
 
Id. at 851-53.   
 
 The dissenting judge in Wells Fargo concluded that the reasonable-basis standard does 
not require the taxpayer to show that the taxpayer actually relied on the relevant authorities that 
form its return position. Id. at 857. Picking up on the restaurant review analogy: 
[L]et us alter the district court’s restaurant analogy. Suppose three friends try to 
decide where to go for dinner. Two of the friends, Friend A and Friend B, offer 
differing suggestions, each claiming his suggestion is the best restaurant in town. 
Tasked with resolving the dispute, Friend C consults Zagat to see which of the 
two recommended restaurants is indeed “the best,” and, after doing so, sides with 
Friend A. Friend C’s decision was indeed based on the Zagat ratings. But Friend 
A did not rely on the Zagat ratings when taking his position. In other words, 
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Friend C’s determination was based on Zagat, regardless of whether Friend A 
ever relied on the service. 
In my view, the court is more like Friend C, in that we are tasked with 
resolving the debate between the United States and Wells Fargo as to whether 
Wells Fargo’s position had a reasonable basis. To decide, the court may find a 
reasonable basis if the position is supported by authorities designated in the 
regulation. This is true whether or not Wells Fargo actually relied on these 
authorities. 
 
Id. Are you convinced by the dissenting judge’s analogy? What if the law changes between the 
time the taxpayer reported the position and when the taxpayer is asked to establish that the 
position is supported by a reasonable basis. Does the Eighth’s Circuit’s analysis preclude the 
taxpayer from relying on authority that developed after the taxpayer reported the return position?   
 
 According to Professor Leslie Book, “Wells Fargo is the first appellate opinion to hold 
that reasonable basis for penalty defense purposes is based on a subjective rather than objective 
standard.” He predicts that the Eighth Circuit’s opinion will not be the last appellate word on the 
issue. Leslie Book, In Wells Fargo 8th Circuit Holds Reasonable Basis Defense to Negligence 
Penalty Requires Taxpayers Prove Actual Reliance on Authorities, PROCEDURALLY TAXING 





Revenue Procedure 2019-9, 2019-2 I.R.B. 292, updates Revenue Procedure 2016-13, 
2016-4 I.R.B. 290, cited in the casebook, without significant revisions to the material discussed 




 A long-overlooked Code provision has taken on new significance after a 2017 decision 
by the U.S. Tax Court. The Tax Court’s holding in Graev v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. 485 (2017), 
involves Code section 6751(b), enacted as part of the IRS Reform Act. Section 6751(b) mandates 
that “no penalty . . . shall be assessed unless the initial determination of such assessment is 
personally approved (in writing) by the immediate supervisor of the individual making such 
determination.” I.R.C. § 6751(b)(1). The requirement of written supervisory approval does not 
apply to the delinquency penalties in section 6651 or the penalty for failure to pay estimated tax 
in sections 6654 and 6655. I.R.C. § 6751(b)(2)(A). 
 
 The taxpayers in Graev received a notice of deficiency asserting a 40-percent gross 
valuation misstatement penalty relating to noncash charitable contribution deductions. After the 
IRS filed an answer to the taxpayers’ Tax Court petition, the IRS amended its answer to concede 
the 40-percent penalty and instead impose a 20-percent accuracy-related penalty arising from 
different contributions made by the taxpayers. In an earlier opinion involving the same set of 
facts, a divided Tax Court had sustained the 20-percent penalty, ruling that the taxpayers’ 
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argument that the IRS failed to comply with section 6751 was premature in a pre-assessment 
deficiency proceeding. Graev v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. 460 (2016), 2016 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 33 
(Nov. 30, 2016) (referred to by the Tax Court as “Graev II”). However, in Chai v. 
Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the dissent in Graev II 
and held “that § 6751(b)(1) requires written approval of the initial penalty determination no later 
than the date the IRS issues the notice of deficiency (or files an answer or amended answer) 
asserting such penalty.” Chai v. Comm’r, 851 F.3d 190, 221 (2d Cir. 2017).  
 
In response to the Second Circuit’s decision, a divided Tax Court vacated its ruling in 
Graev II and reversed its prior holding that consideration of whether the IRS complied with 
section 6751(b) was premature in a deficiency case. Graev, 149 T.C. 485, 483. Writing for the 
majority, Judge Thornton ruled as follows: 
 
Under section 7491(c) the Commissioner bears the burden of production 
with respect to the liability of an individual for any penalty. To satisfy this burden 
the Commissioner must present sufficient evidence to show that it is appropriate 
to impose the penalty in the absence of available defenses. See Higbee v. 
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001). In light of our holding that compliance 
with section 6751(b) is properly at issue in this deficiency case, we also hold that 
such compliance is part of respondent’s burden of production under section 
7491(c). 
 
Id. at 493-94. Based on the unique facts of the case, the majority ultimately found that the IRS 
had satisfied the approval requirement and sustained the 20-percent penalty, id. at 498. 
 
 Judge Holmes, who concurred in the result, disagreed with his colleagues over the issue 
of whether compliance with the written approval requirement should be considered in deficiency 
cases. According to Judge Holmes: 
 
Section 6751 has been in the Code for nearly twenty years. Adopting [the 
Second Circuit’s] reading as our own, and rolling it out nationwide, amounts to 
saying that we have been imposing penalties unlawfully on the tens of 
thousands—perhaps hundreds of thousands—of taxpayers who have appeared 
before us in that time. It is quite a counterintuitive result to those with a working 
knowledge of tax vocabulary and procedure; it will have unintended and irrational 
consequences unless corrected by additional appellate review or clarifying 
legislation; it is contrary to the text of the Code, whether viewed by itself or in 
light of a seemingly applicable canon of construction—and I predict it will even 
end up harming taxpayers unintentionally. 
 
Id. at 503. 
 
 The holding in Graev has spawned significant litigation, and tax practitioners reportedly 
have been taking a closer look at penalty assessments and arguing that penalties should be 
dismissed if the IRS did not follow the requirements of section 6751(b). Caroline Vargas & 
Courtney Rozen, Jump in ‘Graev’ References Pressures IRS on Penalty Assessment, DAILY TAX 
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REP. (BNA), at 6 (July 9, 2018). In several subsequent cases, the Tax Court has found taxpayers 
not liable for applicable penalties even though the facts before the court revealed that the 
taxpayers should have been penalized. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2020-74, 
2020 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS *74 (substantial understatement penalty not imposed because of 
IRS’s failure to comply with supervisory approval requirement); Kroner v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 
2020-73, 2020 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS *73 (same in the context of gift tax); J.C. Becker v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2018-69, 2018 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS *69 (civil fraud penalty not 
imposed); Azam v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2018-72, 2018 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS *73 (negligence 
penalty not imposed).  
 
Guidance from the IRS’s Chief Counsel’s Office advises IRS attorneys to submit 
evidence of compliance with section 6751(b) even if the taxpayer does not raise the issue. Chief 
Counsel Advice, CC-2018-006 (June 6, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
ccdm/cc%202018%20006.pdf. As a general rule, “[a]ttorneys should not argue that approval of a 
penalty appearing in a statutory notice of deficiency may be obtained from the Internal Revenue 
Service after the statutory notice is mailed.” Id. at 2. Moreover, if the IRS attorney cannot obtain 
proof of proper supervisory approval, then the attorney should concede the penalty. Id. The IRS 
has also updated the Internal Revenue Manual to specify procedures for obtaining managerial 
approval of penalties. I.R.M. 4.19.13.6.2. 
 
What if the IRS raises a penalty assertion for the first time after it issues the notice of 
deficiency or raises a penalty different from that included in the notice? Would the IRS be able 
to satisfy the approval requirements in section 6751(b), or is the notice of deficiency its “initial 
determination”? The taxpayers in Roth v. Commissioner, 922 F.3d 1126, 1130 (10th Cir. 2019), 
made the argument that the notice of deficiency represented the IRS’s initial determination of all 
penalties, suggesting that any penalty raised later—in the IRS’s answer to a Tax Court petition, 
for example—would necessarily fail to satisfy the prior approval requirements. In that case, the 
notice of deficiency sent to the taxpayers asserted a 20% valuation misstatement penalty. The 
taxpayers filed a petition in Tax Court, and, in its answer, the Chief Counsel attorney, after 
receiving supervisory approval, asserted a 40% gross valuation misstatement penalty. Id. at 
1129-30. 
 
The Tenth Circuit rejected the taxpayers’ arguments that the notice of deficiency 
represented the initial penalty assertion. In doing so, the court noted the ambiguity inherent in the 
statutory language of section 6751(b). Id. at 1132. The statute prohibits a penalty assessment 
unless the “initial determination of such assessment” is approved. I.R.C. § 6751(b)(1). As 
students who have studied Chapter 9 know, the IRS “determines” deficiencies, and a deficiency 
determination is a prerequisite for an assessment that is based on a deficiency. By contrast, “The 
Code does not require, or even contemplate, that ‘assessments’ will be ‘determined.’” Roth, 922 
F.3d, at 1132. Acknowledging this ambiguity, the court went on to conclude that neither the 
statutory language nor the legislative history to section 6751(b) requires the IRS to include its 
initial determination in the notice of deficiency. Id. at 1132-33.  
 
The court also found support for its conclusion in the language of section 6214(a), which 
explicitly allows the Tax Court to redetermine a deficiency and any additional penalties stated in 
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the notice if the IRS asserts the claim at or before a Tax Court hearing or rehearing. According to 
the Tenth Circuit: 
 
[Section] 6214(a) expressly contemplates the IRS’s ability to bring claims for 
“any addition” to a taxpayer’s deficiency in a proceeding before the Tax Court. 
I.R.C. § 6214(a). After the IRS asserts such a claim, . . ., the Tax Court has 
“jurisdiction to redetermine the correct amount of the deficiency even if the 
amount so redetermined” exceeds that in the “notice . . . mailed to the taxpayer,” 
including “any additional amount, or any addition to the tax.” Id. Numerous cases 
decided before and after the passage of § 6751 have upheld the Tax Court's 
“jurisdiction to consider a claim by the Commissioner for an increased deficiency 
and penalties asserted at or before the hearing or a rehearing.” Kramer v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo 2012-192, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 38 (T.C. 2012); see, e.g., Powell v. 
Comm’r, 581 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2009); Ferrill v. Comm’r, 684 F.2d 261, 
265 (3d Cir. 1982); Henningsen v. Comm’r, 243 F.2d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 1957). 
We agree with the IRS that adopting the [taxpayers’] proposed interpretation of § 
6751(b) would effectively repeal the Tax Court’s well-settled jurisdiction to 
consider claims for new penalties asserted by the IRS in a deficiency proceeding. 
 
Id. at 1134-35. See also Koh v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2020-77, 2020 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS *75 
(Chief Counsel attorney has the authority to make an initial penalty determination in an answer 
to the taxpayer’s Tax Court petition). 
 
 Instead of asserting a penalty after issuing a notice of deficiency, what if the IRS asserts a 
penalty in the 30-day letter, before it issues the notice? Must the IRS agent who drafts the 30-day 
letter seek prior approval for the penalty assertion before issuing the 30-day letter? According to 
the Tax Court, the answer is yes. Clay v. Commissioner, 152 T.C. 223 (2019), 2019 U.S. Tax Ct. 
LEXIS 14, involved a group of taxpayers who failed to include in income casino distributions 
from their tribe. The Tax Court found the distributions taxable but refused to impose an 
accuracy-related penalty for failing to report the amounts. The IRS agent who audited the 
taxpayers asserted in the 30-day letter a substantial understatement penalty. The facts revealed 
that the agent did not receive prior supervisory approval before issuing the 30-day letter. Id. at 
*15-16.  
 
 The Tax Court in Clay framed the argument as follows: “[W]hether approval can come 
after the agent sends the taxpayer proposed adjustments that include penalties. In other words, 
must an agent secure penalty approval before sending to the taxpayer written notice that penalties 
will be proposed, in this case in the form of a notice of proposed adjustment that gives the 
taxpayer right to appeal the proposed penalties with Appeals.” Id. at *38-39. According to the 
court: 
 
      The determinations made in a notice of deficiency typically are based on 
the adjustments proposed in an RAR [Revenue Agent’s Report, eds.]. See 
Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. at 194-195; Globe Tool & Die Mfg. 
Co. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1139, 1141 (1959) (“[R]espondent sent to 
petitioner by registered mail a notice of deficiency determining deficiencies in 
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income tax for the taxable years 1951 and 1952. * * * Said determination by 
respondent was based on the adjustments contained in the revenue agent's 
report[.]”); Fitzner v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1252, 1255 (1959) (“[I]t is obvious 
that petitioner * * * is relying upon the revenue agent’s report of examination 
upon which respondent based his determination of deficiency.”). And when those 
proposed adjustments are communicated to the taxpayer formally as part of a 
communication that advises the taxpayer that penalties will be proposed and 
giving the taxpayer the right to appeal them with Appeals (via a 30-day letter), the 
issue of penalties is officially on the table. See Palmolive Bldg Inv’rs, LLC v. 
Commissioner, 152 T.C.  ,    , 2019 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 4 at *4-5 (Feb. 28, 2019). 
Therefore, we conclude that the initial determination for purposes of section 
6751(b) was made no later than September 13, 2010, when respondent issued the 
RAR to petitioners proposing adjustments including penalties and gave them the 
right to protest those proposed adjustments. 
 
Id. at *39-40. Because supervisory approval took place after the 30-day letter was issued, the 
penalty assertions were barred by section 6751(b). See also Laidlaw’s Harley Davidson Sales, 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 154 T.C. No. 4 (2020), 2020 Tax Ct. LEXIS *4, *21-22 (finding that 30-day 
letter proposing listed transaction penalty in section 6707A was the initial determination of the 
penalty and concluding that IRS Appeals Officer abused her discretion in a CDP Hearing when 
she upheld the penalty even though the Revenue Agent did not obtain supervisory approval 
before issuing 30-day letter.) 
 
 Often citing Clay, subsequent Tax Court cases also raise the question of what constitutes 
an initial determination of the penalty, which then allows the court to decide whether the IRS 
received timely supervisory approval. For example, in Belair Woods, LLC v. Commissioner, 154 
T.C. No. 1 (2020), 2020 Tax Ct. LEXIS *1, a majority of the Tax Court ruled that a letter and 
summary report sent by a Revenue Agent to the tax matters partner of an LLC did not constitute 
an initial determination. The letter invited the tax matters partner to a conference to discuss the 
Revenue Agent’s tentative proposed adjustments, which included penalty assertions. Id. at *4-5. 
According to Judge Lauber: 
 
The “initial determination” of a penalty may occur earlier in the 
administrative process, but it still must be a formal act with features resembling 
those that a “determination” itself displays. Like the 30-day letter involved in 
Clay, the “initial determination” of a penalty assessment will be embodied in a 
formal written communication to the taxpayer, notifying him that the Examination 
Division has completed its work and has made a definite decision to assert 
penalties. 
 
Id. at *14-15. In Belair Woods, the court found that while the letter send by the Revenue Agent 
may have advised the taxpayers of the possibilities that penalties could be imposed, but it did not 
unequivocally communicate to the taxpayers that penalties would be imposed. Id. at *17.  
 
The court also noted some broader implications that would result if the “initial 
determination” takes place too early in the tax controversy process: 




 Considerations of fairness and efficient tax administration dictate that the 
taxpayer be given an opportunity to submit information bearing on the 
appropriateness of penalties before the Examination Division finalizes its 
adjustments. In some circumstances, facts that bear on the appropriateness of 
penalties may be exclusively in the taxpayer’s possession. See, e.g., sec. 
6664(c)(3)(B) (requiring taxpayer to show that he “made a good faith 
investigation of the value of the contributed property” in order to establish 
defense to valuation misstatement penalty). Section 6751(b) does not require 
examining agents to get supervisory approval before taking exploratory steps to 
gather the pertinent facts. 
 
Id. at *18-19. See also Tribune Media Co. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2020-2, 2020 Tax Ct. 
Memo LEXIS 2, *17-18 (“If developing a penalty issue, the IRS may need to request 
information related to whether imposing a particular penalty is justified. This would 
necessarily involve communicating the possibility that a penalty is being considered long 
before the Commissioner actually determines whether to impose a penalty, let alone 
communicates that determination to the taxpayer. The mere possibility that a penalty 
might be asserted is not a determination.”).   
 
An IRS Associate Chief Counsel also warns that “‘if you push the supervisor’s 
approval to the earliest point in the process, you’re really not taking a close look at 
whether the penalty should be included in the statutory notice of deficiency.... It operates 
almost counter to the whole purpose [of section 6751(b)], which is the supervisor would 
act as a backstop—as someone who could really force the agent to appraise whether 
penalties are appropriate.’” Kristen A. Parillo, Penalty Approval Decisions Raise IRS 
Policy Concerns, 166 TAX NOTES FED. 1038, 1038 (2020) (quoting Kathryn Zuba, IRS 
Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and Administration)).  
 
 Code section 6751(b) contains two exceptions. As noted above, the prior-supervisory-
approval requirement does not apply to the delinquency penalty or the failure to pay estimated 
tax penalties. I.R.C. § 6751(b)(2)(A). It also does not apply to “any . . . penalty automatically 
calculated through electronic means.” I.R.C. § 6751(b)(2)(B). A 2019 Tax Court decision 
examined the scope of that latter exception. Walquist v. Commissioner, 152 T.C. 61 (2019), 2019 
U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 2, involved taxpayers who received a computer-generated 30-day letter that 
proposed a deficiency due to unreported income. The IRS’s computer-generated letter included a 
substantial understatement penalty, which was determined to be due and calculated 
mathematically based on the amount of the proposed tax understatement. Because the taxpayers 
did not respond to the 30-day letter, the taxpayers received a computer-generated notice of 
deficiency that also included the penalty. Id. at *2-3. The question before the court was whether 
an accuracy-related penalty produced by an IRS computer program without human involvement 
falls within the exception in section 6571(b)(2)(B). Id. at *12.  
 
 The Tax Court concluded that the penalty was not subject to supervisory approval. In 
doing so, the court relied on the plain language of the statute as well as an analogy to the 
exception in section 6751(b)(2)(A), which permits the IRS to assess delinquency penalties for 
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failure to pay income and estimated taxes without prior supervisory approval. According to the 
court:  
 
Substantial understatement penalties, when computer-determined by the 
[IRS’s computer] program, resemble additions to tax under sections 6651, 6654, 
and 6655. The penalty is determined mathematically according to a formula 
derived from the statutory text. See sec. 6662(a), (b)(2), (d)(1)(A). And the 
penalty is mandatory, subject to statutory exceptions including “reasonable 
cause.” . . .  
 
Computer-determined penalties likewise resemble additions to tax in that 
they typically do not raise the concern that prompted Congress to enact the 
supervisory-approval requirement. Congress’ goal in enacting section 6751(b)(1) 
was to ensure that penalties are “only * * * imposed where appropriate and not as 
a bargaining chip.” See S. Rept. No. 105-174, at 65 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 537, 601. 
“The statute was meant to prevent IRS agents from threatening unjustified 
penalties to encourage taxpayers to settle.” Chai, 851 F.3d at 219 (citing 
legislative history). Where, as here, a penalty is determined by a computer 
software program and never reviewed by a human being, it could hardly be 
considered a “bargaining chip.” Rather, like an addition to tax under section 6651, 
6654, or 6655, it is added to the tax automatically according to a predetermined 
mathematical formula. 
 
Id. at *16-17.  
 
A commentator has pointed out the limited scope of the holding in Walquist. Had the 
taxpayers responded to the computer-generated 30-day letter and brought the matter to the 
attention of an actual IRS employee, the supervisory approval requirement would likely have 
applied and would have required supervisory review before the IRS employee sent a notice of 
deficiency. Bryan Camp, Lessons From the Tax Court: No Human Review Needed for 
Automated Penalties?, TAXPROF BLOG, 
https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2019/03/lesson-from-the-tax-court-no-human-review-




 As noted in Section 12.06 of the casebook, Code Section 7491(c) places the burden of 
production on the IRS to establish an individual’s liability for most penalties. The Tax Court’s 
decision in Graev v. Commissioner, discussed above, concluded that part of the IRS’s burden of 
production under section 7491(c) includes coming forward with evidence that it complied with 
the supervisory approval requirements in Code section 6751(b). Graev v. Commissioner, 149 
T.C. 485, 492-94 (2017). In Frost v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. No. 2 (2020), 2020 U.S. Tax Ct. 
LEXIS 2, the Tax Court reiterated the need for the IRS to satisfy its burden of production in 
penalty cases and that this burden incorporates establishing timely supervisory approval. Id. at 
*12-13. What happens, procedurally, when the IRS introduces evidence that it complied with 
section 6751(b)(1)? According to the court, “[O]nce the Commissioner makes that showing, the 
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taxpayer must come forward with contrary evidence.” Id. at *15. What might that contrary 
evidence entail? 
  
The burden now shifts to petitioner [the taxpayer] to offer evidence 
suggesting that the approval of the substantial understatement penalty was 
untimely—e.g., that there was a formal communication of the penalty before the 
proffered approval. If a taxpayer makes that showing, we will weigh the evidence 
before us to decide whether the Commissioner satisfied the requirements of 
section 6751(b)(1). This rule is faithful to the requirement that the Commissioner 
come forward initially with evidence of written penalty approval. By shifting the 
burden to the taxpayer after the Commissioner makes the initial showing, we 
avoid imposing the burden of proving a negative (i.e., that there were no prior 
formal communications). If the taxpayer introduces sufficient evidence to 
contradict the Commissioner’s initial showing, then the Commissioner can 
respond with additional evidence and argument, and the Court can weigh all of 
the evidence (that is after all the business of judging). And evidence of prior 
formal communication (if it exists) would be available to the taxpayer since he 
would have received such a communication and therefore could introduce it to 
challenge a claim that the supervisory approval was timely. In other words, the 
rule we articulate today will not require the Commissioner to show that there was 
no prior formal communication as part of his initial burden. 
 
Id. at *17-18. On the facts of Frost, the taxpayer did not introduce any evidence showing that the 
IRS communicated to him a penalty determination before the Revenue Agent received 
supervisory approval. And because the taxpayer also did not present evidence of any applicable 
defenses to the penalty, the penalty was sustained. Id. at *18-19. Note that the court did not 
address the question of which party bore the ultimate burden of proof regarding section 6751(b). 
Because the taxpayer did not introduce any contrary evidence, placing the ultimate burden of 
proof on the IRS would not have changed the outcome. Id. at *10 n.6. For an extensive 
discussion of burden of proof issues in penalty cases, see Jenny L. Johnson Ware, Litigating 
Supervisory Approval of Penalties: Who Bears the Burden of Proof?, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., 
Apr.-May 2019, at 19.  
  







 As noted in the casebook, a taxpayer may file a stand-alone suit in either federal district 
court or the U.S. Court of Federal Claims to recover overpayment interest. If the taxpayer files 
the suit in district court relying on 28 U.S.C. section 1346(a)(2) (the “Little Tucker Act”), the 
amount of the recovery is limited to $10,000. Whether the district court also has jurisdiction to 
hear stand-alone claims for overpayment interest under 28 U.S.C. section 1346(a)(1), which does 
not have a recovery cap, remains unclear. Recently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in 
Pfizer Inc. v. United States, 939 F.3d 173 (2nd Cir. 2019), that section 1346(a)(1) does not grant 
district courts jurisdiction to hear overpayment interest suits. This conflicts with existing 
precedent from the Sixth Circuit, which holds that the district courts do have jurisdiction under 
section 1346(a)(1) to hear stand-alone refund suits for overpayment interest. E.W. Scripps Co. v. 
United States, 420 F.3d 589 (6th Cir. 2005). A series of recent district court opinions have come 
to differing conclusions. See, e.g., Estate of Culver v. United States, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
173235 (D. Colo. 2019) (following Pfizer); Paresky v. United States, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
149629 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (same); Bank of America Corp. v. United States, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
109238 (W.D.N.C. 2019) (following Scripps). 
 
 For a discussion of these cases and the effect that the appropriate sources of jurisdiction 
have on the statute of limitations on filing suit, see the series of blog posts on this by Bob 
Probasco, the latest of which at press time is Another Aftershock From Pfizer, PROCEDURALLY 
TAXING (Nov. 14, 2019), https://procedurallytaxing.com/another-aftershock-from-pfizer/. Some 
of his previous posts on this topic are linked there. 
  







 The private debt collection program remains controversial. A Treasury Inspector General 
for Tax Administration Report released in September of 2018 faulted private debt collection 
agencies that participate in the program for failing to protect taxpayer privacy and for possible 
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. TIGTA, The IRS and Private Debt 
Collectors Took Some Action for 16 Potential Violations of Fair Tax Collection Practices 
During Fiscal Year 2017, Rep. 2018-30-079 (Sept. 25, 2018), at 3-8. The National Taxpayer 
Advocate has criticized the program for targeting low-income and elderly taxpayers whose cases 
might otherwise have been placed in currently not collectible status, which would defer any 
collection efforts. National Taxpayer Advocate, Vol. 1 Annual Report to Congress (Feb. 12, 
2019), at https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2018-
ARC/ARC18_Volume1.pdf. Supporters of the program, on the other hand, claim that the 
program has been successful in terms of collecting revenue that might otherwise have gone 
unpaid. William Hoffman, Private Tax Collections Seeing Uptick So Far in Fiscal 2019, 162 
TAX NOTES1397 (2019). The IRS reports that for fiscal year 2019, the private debt collection 
program generated a $147.7 million balance (after IRS costs), which helped the IRS hire more 
compliance personnel. William Hoffman, 2019 Private Debt Collections Almost Triple 2018’s, 
165 TAX NOTES FED. 1890 (2019).    
 
 The Taxpayer First Act included several provisions relating to the private debt collection 
program. The Act exempts taxpayers from private collection activity if their income consists 
substantially of disability benefits or they have an adjusted gross income less than 200 percent of 
the poverty level. The Act also extends the maximum length of installment agreements that 
private debt collectors can offer taxpayers from five to seven years. Taxpayer First Act of 2019, 
Pub. L. No. 116-25 § 1205(a), (c) (amending Code section 6306(d)(3), (b)(1)(B)). According to a 
House Committee Report relating to an earlier version of the Taxpayer First Act, “[t]he 
Committee intends that by eliminating certain low-income taxpayers from the private debt 
collection program efforts can be focused on collecting debt from taxpayers with an ability to 




 As noted in the casebook, Code section 6334(a) lists classes of property exempt from 
levy. One of those levy exemptions includes a minimum amount of wage income, the amount of 
which is based upon the taxpayer’s standard deduction and the taxpayer’s personal and 
dependency exemptions. See I.R.C. § 6334(b) (before repeal). During those years in which the 
personal and dependency exemptions are repealed (2018-2025), the amount of the levy 
exemption for wage income is based upon the sum of the taxpayer’s standard deduction plus the 
total of $4,150 (adjusted for inflation after 2018) multiplied by the number of the taxpayer’s 









 Among the few revisions included in the 2017 Tax Act that relate to tax procedure are 
changes to the levy and sale procedures. As noted in the casebook, a person other than the 
delinquent taxpayer whose property was seized by the IRS may bring a civil action in district 
court for wrongful levy and in the suit seek return of the property or, if the property has already 
been sold, the greater of either payment of an amount equal to the value of the property or the 
sale proceeds. I.R.C. §§ 7426, 6343(b). The 2017 Tax Act extended the time period by which the 
wrongly levied action may be filed from 9 months after the date of levy to two years. I.R.C. § 
6532(c). The period of time the IRS has to return proceeds from the sale of wrongfully levied 
property was also extended from 9 months to two years. I.R.C. § 6343(b).  
 
  







 In February of 2019, the IRS released an updated Form 433-F. The updated form is 
substantially similar to the earlier version that appears in the casebook. Revised Form 433-F now 
requires taxpayers to list cryptocurrency (“e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Ripple”) among the 





 The Taxpayer First Act codifies the existing exceptions granted low-income taxpayers 
with respect to processing fees for submitting an offer in compromise request and the upfront 
down payment requirement. Taxpayer First Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-25 § 1103 (adding 
Code section 7122(c)(3)). 
 
 Final regulations raise the user fee for offers in compromise from $186 to $205. T.D. 
9894 (amending 26 C.F.R. § 300.3). The increased fees apply to offers submitted after April 26, 
2020. The regulations except from the user fee offers made based on doubt as to liability and also 




 In 2018, the IRS announced that it will send back to the taxpayer the application fee the 
taxpayer submitted with the offer in compromise request if the IRS determines that the 
application is not processable. I.R.M. 5.8.2.4.1.1 (revised May 25, 2018). As a general rule, the 
IRS will also return any down payment the taxpayer submitted with the offer request if the IRS 
cannot process the application. I.R.M. 5.8.2.6.5 (revised February 9, 2018). However, if the offer 
is not processable because the taxpayer failed to file previous years’ returns, the IRS will retain 
the down payment and apply it to any outstanding assessed liabilities. I.R.M. 5.8.2.4.1.2 (revised 




In April of 2020, the IRS released an updated Form 656-B, the “Form 656 Booklet: Offer 
in Compromise” that contains Form 656 (an older version of which is reproduced starting on 
page 767 of the casebook) and Form 433-A (OIC) (an older version of which starts on page 774 
of the casebook). The booklet is available at. https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f656b.pdf. The 
updated forms are substantially similar to the earlier versions that appear in the casebook. 
Revised Form 656 includes updated figures relating to low-income certification (which allow 












 A recent report from the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) 
concludes that the IRS generally complies with applicable Collection Due Process (CDP) 
procedures. However, the IRS sometimes misclassifies CDP requests, which can affect the 
taxpayer’s ability to obtain a CDP hearing and, by extension, Tax Court review of the IRS’s 
determination to proceed with collection. TIGTA, Review of the Office of Appeals Collection 
Due Process Program (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/ 
2019reports/201910058fr.pdf. According to the report: 
 
Appeals properly informed taxpayers that Collection Due Process and Equivalent 
Hearings were conducted by an impartial hearing officer with no prior 
involvement with the tax or tax periods covered by the hearing. However, TIGTA 
identified some errors that were similar to errors identified in prior reports. 
Specifically, the Office of Appeals did not always classify taxpayer requests 
properly, and as a result, some taxpayers received the wrong type of hearing. 
TIGTA reviewed a statistically valid stratified sample of 140 cases and identified 
nine taxpayer cases that were misclassified. This is approximately the same 
number of misclassified cases that were identified in the prior year’s review. 
 
Based on the same stratified sample, TIGTA determined that the Collection 
function did not timely process the hearing requests for an additional five 
taxpayers. When taxpayers mail or fax their hearing request to the wrong 
Collection function location, Collection function procedures require employees to 
fax the taxpayer’s request to the appropriate Collection Due Process Coordinator 
at the correct location on the same day. While the Office of Appeals provided 
taxpayers with the correct hearing type in these cases, the Collection function did 
not follow procedures. As a result, the IRS may not have adequately protected the 





 The report also finds that the IRS sometimes miscalculates the applicable statute of 
limitations on collection for cases that are sent through the CDP process.   
 
In addition, TIGTA continued to identify errors related to the determination of the 
Collection Statute Expiration Date (CSED) on taxpayer accounts. TIGTA 
identified eight taxpayer cases that had an incorrect CSED. For five taxpayer 
cases, the IRS incorrectly extended the time period, allowing the IRS additional 
time to collect delinquent taxes. In the remaining three taxpayer cases, the IRS 
incorrectly decreased the time to collect the delinquent taxes. Overall, this is 
approximately the same number of CSED errors that were identified in the prior 
year’s review. 




Id. One commentator suggests that, based on these findings, practitioners should be wary about 
relying on the IRS to calculate the statute of limitations and should review the date established 
by the IRS for accuracy. Keith Fogg, TIGTA Report Reminds That IRS Regularly Misclassifies 
CDP Request Impacting Taxpayer’s Ability to Obtain a CDP Hearing and the Statute of 




 As noted in the casebook, the taxpayer must timely request a CDP hearing in order to 
trigger Appeals review and, ultimately, Tax Court review. Recognizing that CDP notices issued 
by the IRS come in a variety of forms and can include confusing mailing instructions, the IRS 
announced that a CDP hearing request may be considered timely even if it was sent to the wrong 
address: 
 
 When a taxpayer mails the CDP hearing request to the wrong office, it 
sometimes takes several days or weeks to reach the correct office. Under current 
procedures, this results in taxpayers receiving equivalent hearings and, ultimately, 
depriving the taxpayer of the opportunity for judicial review. In June 2013, our 
office issued Program Manager Technical Advice (PMTA) to the IRS explaining 
our position that timeliness of an improperly-addressed hearing request is 
determined by when it is received in the correct office. Consistent with this 
advice, the Service has procedures to forward improperly-addressed CDP hearing 
requests to the correct office and determine timeliness based on receipt in the 
correct office. . . . Because of the confusion caused by including multiple 
addresses on current versions of the CDP notices, we recommend that the Service 
determine timeliness based on the date the request was mailed to the wrong office, 
so long as the address of the wrong office was shown on the CDP notice (such as 
the payment voucher address on the LT11 or the originating office on the Letter 
3172). . . . The June 2013 PMTA should no longer be followed. 
 
Chief Counsel Memo, Treatment of Incorrectly-Addressed CDP Hearing Requests (Dec. 
12, 2019) at 2-3, https://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta-2020-02.pdf. 
 
 Page 811: 
 
 The citation to Revenue Procedure 2012-14, 2012-1 C.B. 455, should instead be to 




 As noted in Section 16.02[D][1], a taxpayer who raises an issue in a post-lien CDP 
hearing generally is not permitted to raise the same issue during a pre-levy CDP hearing. I.R.C. § 
6330(c)(4). The same holds true in the reverse situation: In general, if a taxpayer raises an issue 
in a CDP hearing under section 6320 and meaningfully participated in that hearing, the taxpayer 
may not raise the same issue in a CDP hearing under section 6330. I.R.C. § 6320(c) (providing 
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that section 6330(c) applies to section 6320). According to Treasury Regulation section 
301.6320-1(e)(1), a “taxpayer may not raise an issue that was raised and considered at a previous 
CDP hearing under section 6330 or in any other previous administrative or judicial proceeding if 
the taxpayer participated meaningfully in such hearing or proceedings.” The scope of what 
constitutes a prior administrative proceeding was at issue in Loveland v. Commissioner, 151 T.C. 
78 (2018).  
 
The taxpayers in Loveland received a Notice of Intent to Levy. The taxpayers did not 
request an Appeals hearing but instead submitted an offer in compromise and negotiated the 
request with a collections officer, who eventually denied the offer request. After the IRS filed a 
Notice of Federal Tax Lien, the taxpayer requested a CDP hearing under section 6320 and asked 
the Appeals officer to consider their earlier offer in compromise application. Id. at 79-81. The 
Appeals officer refused to reconsider the previously rejected offer. The question before the Tax 
Court was whether negotiations with a collections officer constitute a previous “administrative 
proceeding” within the meaning of regulation section 301.6320-1(e)(1). Id. at 85. 
 
 The Tax Court ruled that the Appeals Officer abused her discretion by not considering the 
previously rejected offer in compromise request during the CDP hearing.  
 
Whether a previously rejected collection alternative can be raised at a 
CDP hearing does not hinge on whether the taxpayer had a prior opportunity to 
challenge the rejection; it hinges on whether the rejected collection alternative 
was actually considered at a previous administrative or judicial proceeding. In 
other words it is not a question of whether there was a prior opportunity, but 
whether there was a prior proceeding. 
. . . T]he standard for whether a collection issue can be raised at a CDP 
hearing is whether the issue was actually considered in a previous administrative 
or judicial proceeding. Sec. 301.6320-1(e)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs. The 
Lovelands had a prior opportunity for a CDP hearing regarding their offer-in-
compromise, but they never availed themselves of that opportunity. Because they 
only negotiated with the collections officer and did not have a CDP hearing 
regarding her rejection of their offer-in-compromise, they never had a prior 
hearing. Accordingly, they may request consideration of the same offer-in-
compromise in a subsequent CDP hearing on the same tax for the same period. 
 
Id. at 86 (emphasis in original).   
 
The Tax Court noted that, had the taxpayers sought to challenge the existence or amount 
of their underlying liability (and not just a collection alternative), their failure to request a CDP 
hearing when first contacted would prevent them from raising the issue in a CDP hearing relating 
to the same tax and the same tax year. Id. at 86-87 (citing Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(e)(3) Q&A-
E7). But that is not what happened here, and the taxpayers prevailed. For further reading on the 
importance of the Loveland decision, see Keith Fogg, What is a Prior Administrative Hearing?, 
PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Oct. 2, 2018), https://procedurallytaxing.com/what-is-a-prior-
administrative-hearing/.  
 





 For a nice overview of fairly recent issues in CDP litigation, see Keith Fogg, Trends and 






 In Melasky v. Commissioner, 151 T.C. 89 (2018), the Tax Court considered the standard 
of review on the following unusual facts: 
 
On January 27, 2011, the Melaskys walked into an IRS office with a check for 
$18,000. They asked to apply it to their 2009 tax liability. They assert that this 
would’ve paid their entire income tax liability for that year, and the IRS admits 
that it got this check. IRS records show that it posted the $18,000 payment to the 
Melaskys’ 2009 tax liability on that same day. These records then show a reversal 
of that same amount because the check bounced. Why did it bounce? Here we 
have an unusual, but undisputed, fact—on January 31, the IRS sent a notice of 
levy to the Melaskys’ bank. This notice froze their entire balance, and either that 
or the IRS’s execution of the levy sometime after January 31 made the Melaskys’ 
check bounce. The IRS then applied the entire balance that it got with the levy to 
the Melaskys’ 1995 tax liability on February 28. The IRS also charged the 
Melaskys $360 as a penalty for writing a bad check.  
 
Id. at 90.  
 
The parties actually agreed that the Tax Court should “review the determination for tax 
year 2009 de novo because the Melaskys argue that they had no 2009 tax liability.” Id. at 92. 
However, the court held that abuse of discretion review applied because the taxpayer was not 
challenging the underlying tax liability for 2009 but instead the case involved “a question of 
whether the liability remains unpaid.” Id. at 92. This case also had a second opinion issued the 
same day, Melasky v. Commissioner, 151 T.C. 93 (2018). The Melasky litigation is discussed in 
four posts on the Procedurally Taxing blog. See https://procedurallytaxing.com/?s=Melasky 
(providing search results). 
 
Page 830:  
 
 In Atl. Pac. Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. Commissioner, 152 T.C. 330 (2019), the Tax Court held 
that it lacked jurisdiction over the case because the taxpayer had not received a determination 
letter. Id. at 331. The taxpayer’s CDP request was untimely made and it never received a CDP 
hearing. Id. at 333, 337. The taxpayer tried invoking the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, arguing that 
“section 7803(a)(3), which provides a statutory taxpayer bill of rights (TBOR), gives it a right to 
be heard and to appeal decisions of respondent to an independent forum.” Id. at 336. However, 
the court found that: 
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[S]ection 7803(a)(3) itself does not confer any new rights on taxpayers; it merely 
lists “taxpayer rights as afforded by other provisions of” the Code. Further, 
section 7803(a)(3) imposes an obligation on the Commissioner to “ensure that 
employees of the Internal Revenue Service are familiar with and act in accord 
with” such rights. It does not independently establish a basis for jurisdiction in 
this Court. 
 
Id. For further discussion of this case, see Keith Fogg, Taxpayer Bill of Rights Does Not Confer 













 For a recent Court of Appeals decision discussing the “knowledge” element, and 
highlighting the difficulty of obtaining a reversal of a Tax Court decision in an innocent spouse 
case, see Jacobsen v. Commissioner, 950 F.3d 414 (7th Cir. 2020). In that case, the court 
affirmed the Tax Court’s decision to grant innocent spouse relief to the taxpayer-husband for 
2010 but not for 2011, which was the year the taxpayer’s wife was arrested for embezzlement. 
Id. at 415, 417. The court observed, “by the time the 2011 returns were filed in April 2012, she 
had been convicted of embezzlement and was incarcerated. The Tax Court thus denied relief 
under § 6015(b), and (c) on account of Jacobsen’s knowledge of the omitted income.” Id. at 417.  
 
 For 2011, the Tax Court had found against the taxpayer-husband under all three 
subsections of section 6015: (b), (c), and (f). With respect to section 6015(f), the Tax Court 
stated, “Although the other factors for equitable relief either favor petitioner or are neutral, 
petitioner’s knowledge of the embezzlement income and his involvement in preparing the 2011 
return weigh too heavily against him to allow relief.” Jacobsen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 
2018-115, 2018 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 116, at *31. On this part of the Tax Court’s holding, the 
Court of Appeals stated: 
 
Jacobsen’s argument that the Tax Court improperly assigned too much 
weight to that knowledge is more persuasive. Jacobsen claims that because, with 
the exception of knowledge, the factors relevant to relief under § 6015(f) all 
favored him or were neutral, by denying Jacobsen’s request for equitable relief 
the Tax Court essentially elevated lack of knowledge to a but-for criteria for 
relief. Jacobsen suggests the Tax Court’s conclusion was especially problematic 
in light of Congressional intention to liberalize innocent spouse relief. 
Specifically, prior to the 2013 changes …, the relevant Revenue Procedures 
directed that actual knowledge of the understatement would be treated “as a 
strong factor weighing against relief.” …. The Revenue Procedures 
accompanying the 2013 changes to § 6015 expressly abandon that approach …. 
 
Although the 2013 regulations make clear that knowledge is no longer necessarily 
a strong factor weighing against relief, as Jacobsen himself acknowledges in his 
brief, they do not prohibit the Tax Court from assigning more weight to 
petitioner’s knowledge if such a conclusion is supported by the totality of the 
circumstances…. And although knowledge no longer weighs 
heavily against relief, nothing in the statute or revenue procedures forecloses the 
decisionmaker from concluding that in light of "all the facts and circumstances," § 
6015(f), knowledge of the understatement weighs heavily against granting 
equitable relief. There is thus no reason to believe the Tax Court’s decision 
was necessarily erroneous because only one of the nonexhaustive factors for 
consideration weighed against relief. 
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We are sympathetic to Jacobsen’s situation, and recognize that the Tax 
Court could have easily decided on this record that Jacobsen was entitled to 
equitable relief under § 6015(f). Indeed, were we deciding the case in the first 
instance as opposed to on deferential review, we may have decided the case 
differently…. 
 
Jacobsen’s case is a close one, and we are ultimately persuaded by our 
deferential standard of review. Because nothing in the record leads us to believe 
the Tax Court clearly erred or abused its discretion, we AFFIRM its denial of 
equitable relief. 
 
Jacobsen, 950 F.3d at 421-23 (citations omitted). 
 
For further discussion of this case, see Carlton Smith, Seventh Circuit Affirms Tax 
Court’s Discretion to Weigh Actual Knowledge More Heavily than Four Positive Factors for 
Innocent Spouse Relief, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Feb. 17, 2020), 
https://procedurallytaxing.com/seventh-circuit-affirms-tax-courts-discretion-to-weigh-actual-
knowledge-more-heavily-than-four-positive-factors-for-innocent-spouse-relief/ (also discussing, 
Sleeth v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-138, which is cited below in connection with section 
6015(e)(7)).  
 
Smith and Keith Fogg litigated the Jacobsen case for Harvard’s tax clinic. Id. Smith 
commented, “Given Jacobsen, I am not sure that any court of appeals will ever reverse the Tax 
Court on a section 6015 ruling against a taxpayer.” Id. However, Harvard’s tax clinic is also 
representing Sleeth on appeal from the decision cited above. Smith’s blog post explains: 
 
Sleeth had paid counsel in the Tax Court, but she could not afford to pay counsel 
for an appeal. The Harvard tax clinic, pro bono, is now representing her in an 
appeal to the Eleventh Circuit (Docket No. 20-10221). If the Eleventh Circuit is 
as deferential as to the weighing of factors as the Seventh Circuit was 
in Jacobsen, Sleeth will have a hard time in obtaining victory. However, there are 
arguments that the Tax Court erred in its holdings with respect to the knowledge 
and financial hardship factors. So, it is still possible that Sleeth will break the 







 The Taxpayer First Act of 2019 made an important change in the scope of review in 
innocent spouse cases. In Demeter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-238, 2014 Tax Ct. Memo 
LEXIS 236 (Nov. 24, 2014), which is reproduced in the casebook starting on page 879, the court 
says on page 882 of the casebook, “In determining whether petitioner is entitled to section 
6015(f) relief we apply a de novo standard of review as well as a de novo scope of review.” Id. at 
*9 (citing cases). The Taxpayer First Act added a provision on the standard and scope of review: 
 
Copyright © 2020 Carolina Academic Press, LLC. All rights reserved.
82 
 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6015 is amended— 
(1) in subsection (e), by adding at the end the following new paragraph: 
“(7) STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW.—Any review of a determination 
made under this section shall be reviewed de novo by the Tax Court and 
shall be based upon— 
“(A) the administrative record established at the time of the 
determination, and 
“(B) any additional newly discovered or previously unavailable 
evidence.” 
 
Taxpayer First Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-25 § 1203(a)(1) (adding new paragraph 6015(e)(7)) 
(emphasis added).  
 
The new provision provides a de novo standard review, consistent with Demeter. 
However, the scope of review differs. The scope of review is not limited to the administrative 
record, but it is not fully de novo, either. It is limited to the administrative record plus “any 
additional newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence.” I.R.C. § 6015(e)(7). Christine 
Speidel has argued, “[a]s others have commented, limiting the Court’s scope of review while 
setting a de novo standard of review makes very little sense, particularly in equitable relief cases 
and cases in which abuse is a factor. Unfortunately, taxpayers seeking relief will be caught up in 
delays and litigation over these provisions.” Christine Speidel, Taxpayer First Act Update: 
Innocent Spouse Tangles Begin, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Oct. 10, 2019), 
https://procedurallytaxing.com/taxpayer-first-act-update-innocent-spouse-tangles-begin/. That 
blog post also contains further discussion about the Taxpayer First Act changes. 
 
In Jacobsen v. Commissioner, 950 F.3d 414 (7th Cir. 2020), which is discussed in more 
detail above, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that new section 6015(e)(7) only 
affected the Tax Court’s standard and scope of review, it did not affect the standard of review on 
appeal. Id. at 419.  
 
A few recent Tax Court cases cite new Code section 6015(e)(7), but they do not provide 
analysis of it. See Rogers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2020-91; Lassek v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo 2019-145, 2019 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 151; Jones v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2019-
139; Sleeth v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2019-138; Kruja v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2019-
136, 2019 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 142. In three of these cases, the court had held the trial before 
section 6015(e)(7) was enacted but stated that the new provision did not affect the outcome of 
the case. See Lassek, 2019 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS at *2 n.2; Jones, 2019 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 
145 at *2 n.2; Kruja, 2019 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS at *8 n.4. Some of the cases cited above are on 
appeal. See Carlton Smith, Seventh Circuit Affirms Tax Court’s Discretion to Weigh Actual 
Knowledge More Heavily than Four Positive Factors for Innocent Spouse Relief, 
PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Feb. 17, 2020), https://procedurallytaxing.com/seventh-circuit-affirms-
tax-courts-discretion-to-weigh-actual-knowledge-more-heavily-than-four-positive-factors-for-
innocent-spouse-relief/ and the comments following it. For further discussion of the Sleeth and 
Kruja cases, see Keith Fogg, First Tax Court Opinions Mentioning Section 6015(e)(7), 
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 The casebook explains on page 888 that section 6015(f) did not have a statutory deadline 
but that the IRS and Treasury Department had taken the approach that “section 6015(f) relief can 
be requested during: (1) the 10-year statute of limitations on collections under section 6502 or 
(2) the two- or three-year limitation period on refund claims under section 6511, whichever is 
applicable” (citations omitted). The Taxpayer First Act essentially has codified this approach. It 
adds the following time limitation as a new paragraph in section 6015(f):  
 
(2) LIMITATION—A request for equitable relief under this subsection may be 
made with respect to any portion of any liability that— 
(A) has not been paid, provided that such request is made before the 
expiration of the applicable period of limitation under section 6502, or 
(B) has been paid, provided that such request is made during the period in 
which the individual could submit a timely claim for refund or credit of 
such payment. 
 
Taxpayer First Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-25 § 1203(a)(2) (new I.R.C. § 6015(f)(2)). Section 




 As predicted in the casebook, there has been more litigation on the important issue of 
whether the Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction over innocent spouse claims. Some district 
courts have held that they lack jurisdiction to consider innocent spouse claims made there, 
apparently misunderstanding Code section 6015(e). See Keith Fogg, Litigating Innocent Spouse 
Cases in District Court—Does the Department of Justice Tax Division Trial Section Talk to Its 
Appellate Section?, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Nov. 1, 2018), 
https://procedurallytaxing.com/litigating-innocent-spouse-cases-in-district-court-does-the-
department-of-justice-tax-division-trial-section-talk-to-its-appellate-section/. Note that section 
6015(e) does not purport to provide the Tax Court with exclusive jurisdiction, and, as the 
casebook explains, Congress tried to clarify that its innocent spouse jurisdiction is not exclusive. 
District courts do not yet seem to be clear on this point, however. For a recent case finding a lack 
of refund-court jurisdiction over an innocent spouse claim, see Chandler v. United States, 338 F. 
Supp. 3d 592 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (Horan, Mag. J., adopted by Scholer, J.); cf. Hockin v. United 
States, No. 3:17-cv-1926-JR (D. Ore. May 1, 2019) (Russo, Mag. J.), 
http://procedurallytaxing.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Hockin-Magistrate-
Recommendation.pdf (magistrate judge’s recommendation in Hockin; rejected as described 
below). 
In Hockin, the district court judge rejected the magistrate judge’s findings in part, finding 
jurisdiction over an innocent spouse case involving a refund claim. See Hockin v. United States, 
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400 F. Supp. 3d 1085 (D. Ore. 2019). For further discussion of this case, see Sarah Lora & Kevin 
Fann, Innocent Spouse Survives Motion to Dismiss in Jurisdictional Fight with the IRS, 
PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Sep. 18, 2019), https://procedurallytaxing.com/innocent-spouse-
survives-motion-to-dismiss-in-jurisdictional-fight-with-the-irs/ (noting “The question still arises, 




 Several appellate cases have held that the 90-day filing period of Code section 6015(e) is 
not subject to equitable tolling because it is jurisdictional, affirming the Tax Court. For a recent 
case, see Nauflett v. Commissioner, 892 F.3d 649, 653, 655 (4th Cir. 2018). See also Matuszak 
v. Commissioner, 862 F.3d 192, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2017); Rubel v. Rubel, 856 F.3d 301, 306 (3d 
Cir. 2017).  
  







 In the last paragraph on page 908, the reference to 31 C.F.R. section 10.02(a)(8) should 
be 10.2(a)(8). The reference to section 10.03(f)(2)-(3) should be to 10.3(f)(2)-(3). 
 
 While not included in the Taxpayer First Act, a provision that would grant the Treasury 
Department the authority to regulate unlicensed tax return preparers is still being pursued by 
some lawmakers. See, e.g., Taxpayer Protection and Preparer Proficiency Act of 2019, S. 1192, 
116th Cong. § 2 (2019). In response to the Loving decision, discussed in the casebook, the IRS 
created the “Annual Filing Season Program,” a voluntary return-preparer program that provides a 
certification for otherwise unregulated practitioners who complete the requisite training. 
Practitioners who participate must complete an IRS refresher course, acquire CLE credits, and 
agree to the duties included in Circular 230. Rev. Proc. 2014-42, 2014-29 I.R.B. 192.  
 
In a 2018 case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected a claim by the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants that the voluntary program exceeded the 
Treasury’s authority. AICPA v. IRS, 746 Fed. Appx. 1, 2018-2 USTC ¶ 50,375 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
The Court of Appeals found that, because the program is voluntary, it did not remove existing 
rights that unenrolled preparers have to practice before the IRS. Id. at 3-4.  
 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia also ruled in a separate case that the 
IRS has the authority to charge a user fee for issuing and renewing a preparer tax identification 
number (PTIN). Montrois v United States, 916 F.3d 1056 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 39 
(2019). Anyone who prepares or assists in the preparation of a federal tax return for 
compensation must obtain a valid PTIN. See I.R.C. § 6109(a)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.6109-2(a). The 
court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the IRS’s proposed fee (most 
recently $33) was reasonable. Id. at 1068.  
 
In April of 2020, the IRS announced that the annual fee to apply for or renew a PTIN 
would be $21, plus a $14.95 third-party processing charge. REG-117138-17. The announcement 
was made before the district court in Montrois, on remand, determined what would be a 
reasonable fee. Joseph DiSciullo, Commentators Remark on Proposed PTIN Regs, 167 TAX 
NOTES FED. 1613 (2020). Some commentators have suggested that it would be more appropriate 
to set the fee after the district court has been given an opportunity to address the fee amount. 
Frederic Lee, Lingering Concerns Spur Call to Revoke Proposed PTIN Regs, 167 TAX NOTES 
FED. 1651, 1652 (2020). 
 
  







 While small talk can be used to bridge gaps between the lawyer and the client, a recent 
article emphasizes the importance of avoiding “racially charged words.” Suzanne Rowe, The 
Elephant in the Room: Responding to Racially Charged Words, 15 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: 
JALWD 263, 265 (2018). The article provides as an example of such words, “In meeting new 
clients, an attorney might try to make small talk by asking, ‘No, where are you really from?’—




A recent article focused on the engagement of new clients by criminal defense attorneys 
suggests requesting that the client turn off her mobile phone. See Denis deVlaming, How to 
Engage the New Client, 43 CHAMPION 34, 34 (2019) (stating that “[a] client information form 
should be given to the client upon arrival. . . . [T]he form should include a note in bold letters 




For additional reading regarding predicting the outcome of legal proceedings, see Mark 
K. Osbeck, Lawyer as Soothsayer: Exploring the Important Role of Outcome Prediction in the 




For additional reading regarding topics to address in an engagement letter, see Allison C. 




When delivering bad news to a client, a recent article suggests the following: 
 
[T]he best advice is to be proactive. Don’t let your client find out bad news from 
someone else, and don't be unprepared. Whenever you deliver bad news, I can 
guarantee that you’ll be asked some version of “what now?” You need to have a 
good answer at the ready. 
Before I deliver bad news, I take a couple of minutes to identify all 
possible impacts of the news and potential routes that can be taken to resolve the 
issue. Have a preferred plan of action, but also identify alternatives so that your 
client is empowered through a feeling of choice and control over the situation. 
Make sure that your plan is specific and detailed. No one wants to hear “I’m 
working on it.” Once you have a list of action steps, ask yourself if any of them 
can be done quickly and immediately. Nothing softens the blow of bad news 
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better than finding out that concrete steps have already been taken to right the 
wrong. 
 
Jordan L. Couch, Communicating with Clients Five Conversations You Must Get Right, 35 




 A recent article on the analytical skills that lawyers use in negotiations points out that 
“[d]etermining whether a negotiation is zero sum is important because your negotiation tactics 
might be more competitive when fighting over a fixed pie.” George J. Siedel, Developing Four 
Essential Analytical Skills for Your Negotiating Team, BUS. L. TODAY 1, 3 (Aug. 2018). It also 
provides the following advice:  
 
[D]on't be trapped by what researchers call the “Mythical Fixed Pie Assumption.” 
The assumption that every negotiation is zero sum, while prevalent in settlement 
negotiations, also arises during transactional negotiations. To avoid the 
assumption, you should ask questions designed to identify the interests of the 
other side and match those interests with those of your client to develop 















Copyright © 2020 Carolina Academic Press, LLC. All rights reserved.
